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ECONOMIC AUTHORITY AND THE LIMITS OF
EXPERTISE IN ANTITRUST CASES
John E. Lopatka t & William H. Pagett
In antitrust litigation, the factual complexity and economic nature of
the issues involved require the presentation of economic expert testimony in
all but a few cases. This dependence on economics has increased in recent
years because of the courts' narrowing of per se rules of illegality and the
courts' expansion of certain areas offactual inquiry. At the same time, how-
ever, courts have limited the scope of allowable expert testimony through the
methodological strictures of Daubert and its progeny and through height-
ened sufficiency requirements. In this Article, Professors Page and Lopatka
make four important points about these judicially imposed constraints on
expert testimony. First, they contend that these constraints, in the first in-
stance, rest on "economic authority"-a body of economic ideas adopted by
the courts from the scholarly literature. Second, Page and Lopatka analyze a
wide range of antitrust decisions to show that much of this economic author-
ity is taken either directly or indirectly from the "Chicago School" of antitrust
economics. Third, through analysis of existing case law, the authors show
the ways in which the courts apply economic authority as a screen in deciding
which evidence to admit and which to exclude. In making this point, the
authors highlight four important antitrust categories: determination of pred-
atory pricing; market definition and assessment of market power; characteri-
zation of cartels and proof of "agreement" in cartel cases; and the
determination of damages. Fourth, Professors Page and Lopatka end by ex-
amining the legitimacy of assigning such a defining role to economic author-
ity in general, and to the Chicago School in particular. In making this
point, the authors revisit the continuing controversy over the role of "post-
Chicago" economic analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
The reorientation of antitrust over the past thirty years has in-
creased the importance of expert economic testimony in antitrust liti-
gation.' The Supreme Court's narrowing or elimination of per se
illegality has led to an expansion of factual inquiries requiring expert
I See, e-g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Economic Experts in Antitrust Cases, in 3 MODERN SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAw AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 111, 112 (David L. Faigman et
al. eds., 2002); Andrew 1. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line Between the
Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 663,
663 (1997). For concise, nontechnical discussions of the role of economic expertise in
recent antitrust cases, see THF ANTITRUST RFVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND Pou_
ICY (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. 'White eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter TiE ANTI
TRUST REVOLUTION].
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testimony by professional economists. 2 Nevertheless, a jury's evalua-
tion of conflicting economic opinions rarely decides cases because
federal judges' choices limit the scope and force of expert testimony.
Some of these choices occur in the application of the methodological
strictures of the Daubert trilogy of Supreme Court decisions;34 others
occur in evaluating the sufficiency of expert evidence to support ajury
verdict. 4 This much is well known. This Article argues, however, that
regardless of the nominal procedural context, these judicial choices
rest on economic authorityj a body of authoritative economic knowl-
edge adopted by courts-directly or indirectly-from the scholarly
literature. 6 Although some have suggested that interdisciplinary ap-
proaches have made legal scholarship generally less useful to courts,
7
the use of economics in modern antitrust scholarship has had the op-
2 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (requiring a more extensive
factual inquiry into a dental association's rules restricting certain types of price and quality
advertising); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling the per se illegality of
vertical maximum price fixing in favor of the rule of reason); Cont'l T.V, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling the per se illegality of vertical territorial re-
straints in favor of the rule of reason).
' See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that Daubert ap-
plies to testimony by engineers and other non-scientist expert witnesses); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that die district court's decision on admissibility
under Daubert should be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard); Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence
supply the test for admissibility of expert testimony); see also Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston
Herndon, The Implications of Daubert for Economic Evidence in Antitrust Cases, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 801, 802 (2000) ("Daubert challenges to the admissibility of the economic expert's
testimony already are becoming routine in antitrust cases."); Gavil, supra note 1, at 669-88
(detailing the ways in which Daubert affects the presentation and acceptance of expert testi-
mony in antitrust cases).
4 See Gavil, supra note 1, at 664-67, 688-98.
5 Our use of this term is an homage to John Monahan and Laurens Walker's concept
of "social authority." SeeJohn Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Eval
uating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986). We do not
argue, however, that antitrust courts always engage in the sort of screening of economic
ideas that those authors propose for social science research generally. See id. at 499-509.
6 See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 91, 92 ("The considerations, including the economic consid-
erations, that go to shape legal doctrine ... are not considered questions to he decided by
taking testimony and testing its accuracy by cross-examination, but by reference to general
questions of law and policy.").
7 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1314, 1324
(2002) (arguing that "interdisciplinary legal scholarship is intended to be read by profes-
sors .. .rather than by practitioners (including judges)"). In that article, Judge Posner
cites Judge Harry T. Edwards, who complains that many interdisciplinary articles are im-
practical and useless to courts, Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. I.. Rrv. 34 (1992), and Michael McClintock, who
finds "a 47.35% decline in the use of legal scholarship by courts over the past two decades,
the most notable decline occurring in the past ten years," Michael D. McClintock, The
Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OK.A. L. REv. 659, 660
(1998). See Posner, supra, at 1324 & n.25; see also Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Yhe Citing of Law
Reviews ly the Supreme Court: 1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009, 1009-10 (2000) (finding a de-
cline in citation of legal scholarship by the Supreme Court); cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
2005]
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posite effect. Economic authority largely drawn from that scholarship
now provides the conceptual basis for many judicial decisions in anti-
trust cases, including decisions defining the role of expert testimony.
Antitrust law has always implicitly drawn on economic ideas," but
over the past three decades, its reliance on them has become overt
and sophisticated. 9 Judge Richard Posner has gone so far as to sug-
gest that "antitrust law has become a branch of applied economics."'1
It is critical to recognize, however, that the institutional context of
litigation influences how courts receive and apply economic theory.'1
For example, over the past twenty-five years the Supreme Court has
frequently relied on Chicago School 12 models in deciding antitrust
cases, 13 but largely for institutional reasons it has not adopted Chicago
517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996) (criticizing the dissent for "disregard[ing] our case law in favor of a
theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own version of historical events").
8 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAw 1, 1-3 (Antonio Cucinotta et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Reckoning] (arguing that courts relied on, but did not cite, prevailing eco-
nomic theory before 1980). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Fact, Value and Theory in
Antitrust Adjudication, 1987 DuKE LJ. 897 (detailing various economic theories that have
significantly influenced the development of antitrust doctrine).
9 See generally William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Charac-
terization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989) (describing
the Supreme Court's explicit reliance on economic literature since 1977); Ronald J. Allen
& Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs
and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KEN-r L. REv. 683 (2002) (showing that microeconomic theory has influ-
enced jury instructions far more in antitrust cases than in negligence cases).
10 RicHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 229 (1999).
11 As then-Judge Breyer famously wrote:
[Wihile technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws,
those laws cannot precisely replicate the economists' (sometimes conflict-
ing) views. For, unlike economics, law is an administrative system the ef-
fects of which depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as
they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their
clients. Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualifica-
tion may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-pro-
ductive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983); see also William
H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMoRy L.J. 1, 49-53 (1995)
(arguing that legal process considerations guide the use of theory in antitrust
decisionmaking).
12 See infa Part II.A.l. The Chicago School is a tradition of antitrust scholarship
based upon a shared set of positive economic models of practices (like cartels, tying ar-
rangements, and predatory pricing) and empirical estimates of the frequency and effects
of those practices. The Chicago School is also associated with a set of normative prescrip-
tions for antitrust law. Both the models and the policy program reflect, in general, a confi-
dence in the market's ability to prevent or remedy monopolistic practices (despite asserted
"imperfections") and a skepticism about courts' ability to do so. For a description of the
Chicago School's principal characteristics, see Page, supra note 9, at 1228-43. Virtually all
Chicago scholars trace the origins of central ideas and methods of the school to the late
Aaron Director. Id. at 1229-30 n.44.
13 Page, supra note 9, at 1255 ("The Court has taken account of the normative impli-
cations of the models by reinterpreting existing doctrine.").
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proposals for rules of per se legality. 14 Instead, the Court has used the
models to replace rules of per se illegality with rule of reason inquiries
and to refocus judicial inquiries in subsidiary decisional contexts at
various stages of litigation.' 5 This process has led courts to open some
domains to expert testimony and to foreclose other domains. Moreo-
ver, this process has allowed courts to retain ultimate control over the
influence that expert testimony has on the outcome of a case. Courts
jealously guard their prerogative both to select and to determine the
use of the economic ideas guiding antitrust case outcomes. They are
"gatekeepers" not only of the reliability of experts' economic data and
methods under Daubert, but of the kinds of competing economic theo-
ries and policy arguments that matter.
Though related, economic authority and expert testimony, as
grounds for decision in antitrust cases, rest on different conceptual
foundations. Daubert's inquiry into the reliability of expert testimony
reflects a positivist view that scientific and technical knowledge is ob-
jectively true and that, consequently, the statements of experts should
be testable by recognized methods.' 6 In contrast, judicial adoption of
economic authority implicitly acknowledges a sociological dimension
to the acceptance of theory. The Supreme Court, in particular, has
chosen among available models based upon their apparent explana-
tory value, their prevalence among scholars, and their congruence
with the courts' institutional constraints. 17 This process of choice rec-
ognizes that economic knowledge rests, in large part, on a foundation
of shared beliefs and values.18 By choosing among economic models,
the Supreme Court has maintained judicial control over the evolution
of antitrust doctrine-sometimes foreclosing the use of expert testi-
mony and sometimes insisting on its consideration.
This Article examines the processes by which courts use eco-
nomic authority to control experts. Part I begins with a brief discus-
14 Id. at 1253-57.
15 Id. at 1257-94 (describing use of models in the contexts of characterization, anti-
trust injury, and evidentiary sufficiency).
16 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON
HALL L. REv. 105, 105 (2003) (arguing that Daubert and its progeny "push the criminal
justice system away from the notion that knowledge is socially constructed and toward a
positivist epistemology that assumes we can know things objectively"); see also id. at 106 n.8
(responding to the view that Daubert and Kumho Tire reflect a "realist-constructivist view of
science").
17 See infta Part II.A.I.
18 See Page, supra note 9, at 1297 (arguing that judicial adoption of a widely held
theory "implicitly recognizes the relationship between theory and the prevailing intellec-
tual climate, since a theory will be more widely held and more persuasive to the extent that
it is consistent with the dominant intellectual system"); see also ROBERT H. NELSON, Eco-
NOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SANMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND BEYOND 229 (2001) (arguing that
all economics involves "value assumptions" that "shape the form of analysis" and assert the
"special merit" of these assumptions as descriptions of "the human condition").
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sion of the role of conceptual models, including expert models, in
judicial decisionmaking generally. Part II analyzes the role of eco-
nomic authority in the judicial development of antitrust law, particu-
larly since the Chicago School's influence began to transform
antitrust in 1977. Part II also describes how economic authority
guides the application of the four screens that courts apply to expert
testimony in the antitrust context: the scrutiny of experts' qualifica-
tions and of their testimony's relevance, reliability, and sufficiency.
Part III examines the courts' use of these screens in those evidentiary
contexts in which the Supreme Court's structuring of the legal frame-
work has made expert testimony most critical: predatory pricing, mar-
ket definition and market power, cartels, and damages. The goal of
our argument to this point is largely positive: to identify the factors
governing how courts choose and implement economic authority,
particularly when exercising control over expert testimony. The final
Part, however, examines the legitimacy of assigning such a leading
role to economic authority in the application of the screens, focusing
on the continuing controversy over the role of post-Chicago economic
analysis in antitrust.
I
CONCEPTUAL MODELS, EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND THE
PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION
Before examining the role of economic authority in constraining
expert testimony in antitrust cases, this Article considers more gener-
ally the nature of fact determination and the role of expertise in it.
Fact-finders rely on conceptualizations of reality, explicit or implicit,
to evaluate evidence. When courts rely on expert testimony, these
conceptualizations become more explicit and subject to direct scru-
tiny by the opposing parties, the jury, and the court. Despite the rela-
tive transparency of this process, it holds well-recognized dangers.
A. Models, Evidence, and Adjudication
Although the legal system formally separates questions of law and
fact,' 9 the role of the fact-finder necessarily has a normative dimen-
sion.2 0 A party's representation of "what happened" in a case is not
simply an arrangement of evidence into a neutral narrative of the
I 9 See, e.g., RonaldJ. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97
Nw. L. REV. 1769, 1778 (2003) ("Under the conventional view, legal issues concern the
applicable rules and standards; factual issues involve the underlying transaction or events,
in other words, 'who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or in-
tent.' "(internal citation omitted)); Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of
Legal Strategy, 49 DuKE L.J. 1405, 1407 (2000) ("In the.., legal process, courts define facts
and then apply law to those facts to generate outcomes.").
20 As Holmes observed:
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events, if such a thing is possible. 21 A party's presentation of its case is
an exercise in persuasion 22 aimed at fulfilling a strategy.2 The pres-
entation is guided not only by the applicable legal standards, which
determine the relevance of the evidence, but also by shared conceptu-
alizations of the way the world works. 2 4 As Clifford Geertz has ob-
served, making a case involves representing facts and framing
arguments in light of prevailing ideas of normal and abnormal behav-
Legal, like natural divisions, however clear in their general outline, will be
found on exact scrutiny to end in a penumbra or debatable land. This is
the region of the jury, and only cases falling on this doubtful border are
likely to be carried far in court. Still, the tendency of the law must be to
narrow the field of uncertainty.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 101 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
21 See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKINt EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 107-08
(1990) (arguing that fact determinations are not "value-free"); Catharine Wells, Situated
Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1728, 1743 (1990) ("What we see and hear is filtered and
interpreted within a cognitive framework that is constructed largely from our own individ-
ual temperament and prior experience."); cf. David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional
Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 541, 544 (1991) (critically examining how "[t]he [Supreme] Court interprets facts,"
manipulating social "facts" in constitutional interpretation).
22 See Edward D. Ohlbaum, Basic Instinct: Case Theory and Courtroom Performance, 66
TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1993). Ohlbaum observes:
The facts are the circumstances of a case-the states of events and of
mind-that constitute the universe of components that make up the model
of what happened. Fact extraction requires the advocate to evaluate the
facts fully and exhaustively, not merely by mulling them over and hypothe-
sizing how they fit or clash with the theory, but by placing the facts in the
context of the examinations and arguments in which they will ultimately be
featured. Those facts that remain incompatible with the theory must be
analyzed and explained, consistent with the principles of persuasion. The
advocate must select from among the facts those that strategically may be
presented and reinforced most persuasively.
Id. For a recent elaboration on this idea, see generally Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 295 (2002) (arguing that, over time, case theory has moved more toward a
model of "persuasive storytelling").
23 LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 19, at 1409-10 ("Lawyers devote substantial time
and energy to the development of legal strategies and regard them as capable of determin-
ing outcomes across a wide spectrum of cases.").
24 See Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The O.J Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists'
Rflections on The People of the State of California v. OrenthalJames Simpson, 67 U. COLO.
L. REv. 957, 959-61 (1996) (arguing that 'jurors begin their decision-making process by
constructing a narrative to explain the available facts they have heard at trial" and that the
"story ... will consist of some subset of the events and causal relationships referred to in
the presentation of evidence, as well as additional events and causal relationships inferred
by the juror"); Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 493, 493-94
(2002) ("[W]e expect jurors to possess and rely on a large body of general knowledge
about the world, and we allow the parties, in determining what evidence to present, to
assume that the jurors have such a body of knowledge."). See generally AnthonyJ. Bocchino
& Samuel H. Solomon, What Juries Want to Hear: Methodsfor Developing Persuasive Case Theory,
67 TENN. L. REV. 543 (2000) (distinguishing the processes of formulating a legal theory, a
factual theory, and a persuasive theory of a case).
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ior.25 These ideas influence how parties frame legal issues and how
juries evaluate the presentation of a case.2 6 Further, this process re-
quires a party, through evidence and argument, to describe the con-
duct at issue, as Geertz puts it, in both the "language of specific
consequence" and the "language of general coherence."2 7 The per-
suasiveness of the descriptions of what happened and of what happens
reinforce each other.
2 s
Courts channel the construction and representation of a party's
case theory by controlling the domain of the jury29 through a series of
decisions: rulings on the pleadings and the scope of discovery, deci-
sions in limine and at trial on the admissibility of evidence,3 0 rulings on
motions for summary judgment, and the framing of pretrial orders,
among many others."' Of course, to function rationally, the courts
must be capable of finding facts. The days are long gone when cases
were decided by ordeal, battle, compurgation, or other purely irra-
tional means.3 2 Nevertheless, since the emergence of trial by jury,
25 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 167-75 (1983). Geertz argues that making a
case "comes to describing a particular course of events and an overall conception of life in
such a way that the credibility of each reinforces the credibility of the other." Id. at 175.
26 These ideas may include certain nonrational biases. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice &
Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORN\ELL L. REV. 583
(2003) (discussing the effects of omission and normaliny biases in legal decisionmaking).
27 GEERTZ, supra note 25, at 175. Geertz continues, "Any legal system that hopes to be
viable must contrive to connect the if-then structure of existence, as locally imagined, and
the as-therefore course of experience, as locally perceived, so that they seem but depth and
surface versions of the same thing." Id.; see also Hastie & Pennington, supra note 24, at 961
(arguing that the jurors' confidence in a narrative explanation of an event depends on the
narrative's "coverage of the evidence" and its "coherence," which hinges in part on its
"plausibility"-that is, the "extent [to which] it corresponds to the decision maker's knowl-
edge about what typically happens in the world").
28 See Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability:
How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 15, 24 (2003)
[A]s to fact witness testimony, and various forms of documentary, physical,
or circumstantial proof, the assumption is that average people have devel-
oped, through the process of living in society, sufficient knowledge about
the world of humans and its workings that they have a fair chance to evalu-
ate and accurately weigh and discount information coming from such fa-
miliar sources.
29 For an illuminating history of procedural controls on federal juries, see Ann Wool-
handler & Michael G. Collins, The Article IIIJuy, 87 VA. L. REv. 587 (2001).
0 See generally Matthew S. Rosengart, The Motion In Limine: The Hidden Arrow in the
Federal Litigator's Quiver, 48 FED. LAW., June 2001, at 24 (discussing effective utilization and
strategic advantages of motions made in limine).
31 Cf Lars Noah, CivilJuy Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1601, 1653-57 (2001) (analyz-
ing devices used to focus civil juries on applicable legal standards).
32 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIkM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 632-44 (2d ed. 1968) (describing various common law
institutions supplanted by the trial by jury); see also George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie
Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 585-602 (2001) (describing the way in which criminal juries
came to replace the trial by ordeal).
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courts have also taken measures to prevent factual issues from over-
whelming the decisional process. 33 The elaborate English system of
pleading at common law, to cite an early example, was designed to
force the parties to narrow their disagreement to a single decisive is-
sue of fact or law.
34
Many aspects of the modern legal system still manifest this "fear
of fact"C3 -not a fear of objective reality, but an apprehension that the
fact-finding process, especially where it involves juries, may lapse into
irrationality and speculation and thus undermine the substantive law.
These manifestations include efforts to impose stricter pleading stan-
dards in certain types of disputes36 and to eliminate juries in cases
considered too complex for laymen to fathom. 37 Many evidence rules
likewise reflect an awareness of juries' limited cognitive capacities. 38
But the most significant constraint on jury fact-finding by far is the
courts' ability to adjust the boundaries between fact and law in ways
that "do not conform to the theoretical distinction between law and
fact. '39 If the courts believe ajury is incapable of determining an issue
33 See GEERTZ, supra note 25, at 172 ("The judge's job in admissibility questions is to
decide ... when 'the trial [will be] better off without the evidence.'" (internal citations
omitted)).
34 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 916 (1987) ("Under single issue
pleading, the parties pleaded back and forth until one side either demurred, resulting in a
legal issue, or traversed, resulting in a factual issue.").
35 GFERTZ, supra note 25, at 171.
36 See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. 1.. REV. 551
(2002) (surveying judicial and congressional efforts to impose pleading requirements
stricter than the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
37 See, e.g., In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080 (3rd Cir.
1980) (reading Supreme Court precedent to leave "open the possibility that the 'practical
abilities and limitation of juries' may limit the range of suits subject to the seventh
amendment").
38 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Craig R. Callen, TheJuridical Management of Factual
Uncertainty, 7 INT'Lj. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1 (2003) (analyzing the various evidentiary tools
used to limit factual uncertainty in civil cases); Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the Appear-
ance of Statistical Evidence, 65 TUL. L. REV. 457, 475-96 (1991) (discussing the use of sum-
maryjudgment and burdens of proof to remove some questions from the deliberations of
the jury); Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REv. 43, 55-78
(1994) (discussing the use of hearsay rules to place limits on fact-finders).
39 Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REv. 487, 488 (1986). Zuck-
erman notes that "questions of law-namely, questions which are not concerned with the
existence of facts outside the law-are frequently treated as questions of fact" and that
"questions concerned with the process of ascertaining the facts sometimes receive the kind
of treatment usually accorded to questions of law." Id. For an interesting example of this
process at work, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999), in which
Judge Jackson issued "findings of fact" without accompanying conclusions of law. Because
the .findings were couched in terms made relevant by the law, it was possible to predict the
legal conclusions. Judge Jackson told a reporter, "What I want to do is confront the Court
of Appeals with an established factual record which is a fait accompli," because "I take mild
offense at their reversal of my preliminary injunction in the consent-decree case, where
they went ahead and made up about ninety percent of the facts on their own." KEN
2005]
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of fact, they may characterize the issue as one of law41 or change the
law so as to make a more tractable factual issue the relevant one.
41
Moreover, the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a finding
of fact is always a question of law-a principle that allows a trial court
to remove questions from the jury through summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law whenever it concludes that no reasonable
jury could find a material fact in favor of the party opposing the mo-
tion. 42 In some instances, as we will see repeatedly in Part II, stan-
dards of sufficiency themselves can be adjusted for policy reasons. In
all of these decisions, formally characterized as "legal," the courts'
findings of generalized (or "legislative") facts about society and
human nature allow courts to recast the adjudicative roles of judge
and jury.
B. Expert Testimony and Daubert
Expert testimony occupies a special role in the process of proof.
4 3
Experts are permitted to testify to both fact and opinion because they
bring to bear a system of knowledge that is outside the jury's everyday
knowledge.4 4 The law of evidence requires an expert opinion to be
based on a theoretical construct or other specialized knowledge that
the expert applies to the evidence. 45 Expert testimony must be stated
in the language of general coherence, to use Geertz's term, but that
language must rely on formalized models in addition to common
AULETrA, WORLD WAR 3.0: MICROSOFr AND ITs ENEMIES 230 (2001). The court of appeals
responded:
Whether the DistrictJudge takes offense, mild or severe, is beside the point.
Appellate decisions command compliance, not agreement. We do not view
the District Judge's remarks as anything other than his expression of disa-
greement with this court's decision, and his desire to provide extensive fac-
tual findings in this case, which he did.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 118 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
40 Allen & Pardo, supra note 19, at 1782 (arguing that "law" and "fact" are "the labels
[that] are applied after the pragmatic allocative decision is made").
41 See, e.g., Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 631-36 (describing the ways in
which nineteenth century judges used jury instructions to specify legal standards, which
allowed judges to control the juries' fact-finding).
42 See generally FlemingJames, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evidence andJury-Control Devices Avail-
able Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. Rsv. 218 (1961) (discussing "the concept of sufficiency of the
evidence and... closely related mechanisms" as ways of controlling juries before verdict).
43 For a discussion of the evolution of expert evidence, see Learned Hand, Historical
and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1901).
44 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 723-25 (1995)
(cataloging a range of issues to which experts can, and often do, testify in civil and criminal
cases).
45 Hand, supra note 43, at 51-52 (arguing that an expert supplies "general proposi-




sense and other intuitive preconceptions.46 Juries are supposed to
evaluate the testimony based upon their everyday sense of credibility,
measuring the witnesses' accounts against their own experience.
4 7
Thus, juries will often be asked to choose between expert accounts
that rest on complex analyses far from the jurors' usual experience.
48
An expert must, therefore, support statements of opinion in an
understandable and plausible way, with reasoning that relies on the
relevant theoretical construct. Moreover, the expert must maintain
the plausibility of the testimony in the face of challenges by opposing
counsel and the adversary's expert witnesses. Daubert itself stressed
that cross-examination, rebuttal, and jury instructions are normally
sufficient to control dubious expert testimony.4 9 Nevertheless, the
rules governing the admissibility of expert opinions are prime exam-
ples of the law's fear of fact.50 Conceivably, courts might admit all
relevant testimony5 and rely on the parties to avoid introducing im-
plausible testimony and to attack the plausibility of their rivals' testi-
mony. The law of evidence, however, has never entirely trusted juries
to sort out probative expert testimony from superficially plausible
nonsense.- 2 Courts have suggested that expert testimony may be too
complex to allow juries to use in resolving issues, may fail to consider
relevant factors, or may offer a spurious precision that could mislead
46 See Eileen A. Scallen & William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: Confusing
the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1143 (1998).
Scallen & Wiethoff argue that "[e]xpert testimony, even that based on natural or social
science, is argumentation" rather than simply evidence. Id. at 1144; see also Posner, supra
note 6, at 95-96 (arguing that concerns about the intelligibility of expert testimony are
mitigated by the fact that jurors find clarity more persuasive than credentials and by the
fact that "lawyer's [have an] incentive to call persuasive witnesses").
47 For data on jurors' assessments of expert credibility, see Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic &
Valerie P. Hans, Jurors' Evaluations of Expert Testimony: judging the Messenger and the Message,
28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 441 (2003).
48 Hand, supra note 43, at 54-55 ("What hope have the jury ... of rational decision
between two such conflicting statements each based on [expert] experience.").
49 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). The exclusion of
expert testimony is supposed to be exceptional: "[T]he trial court's role as gatekeeper is
not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system." FED. R. EviD. 702 advi-
sory committee's note. Confronted by the argument that relaxed standards of admissibility
"will result in a 'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irra-
tional pseudoscientific assertions," Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96, the Court responded that
"[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction
on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence." Id. at 596.
50 We exclude from our discussion certain non-evidentiary rules that may result in
exclusion of expert witnesses. See, e.g., Kendall Coffey, Inherent Judicial Authority and the
Expert Disqualification Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 195 (2004) (discussing judicial doctrines al-
lowing disqualification of experts for conflicts of interest).
51 Slobogin, supra note 16, at 106.
52 See Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 28, at 24 ("The commonsense fear is that




jurors.53 Because of the hired-gun character of expert witnesses,
courts are especially wary of tendentious testimony. 54 Although some
have advocated the use of neutral, court-appointed experts to mitigate
this concern,55 the most widely used mechanisms to control experts
are the special evidentiary standards for admissibility of expert opin-
ion testimony.
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 702, which provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
56
Daubert interpreted an earlier version of Rule 702, which ended
with the words "or otherwise."5 7 The list of conditions at the end of
the present rule, added in 2000 in response to Daubert and later cases,
"affirms the trial court's role as gatekeeper and provides some general
standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and
helpfulness of proffered expert testimony."
5 8
53 See, e.g., E. Auto Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 795 F.2d 329, 338
(4th Cir. 1986) ("Scrutiny of expert testimony is especially proper where it consists of 'an
array of figures conveying a delusive impression of exactness in an area where a jury's
common sense is less available than usual to protect it.'").
54 See Posner, supra note 6, at 93-94 (observing that the "expert has both motive and
means of slanting the truth in favor of the client," but further noting that reputational
considerations tend to limit such incentives); see also William L. Foster, Expert Testimony-
Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 HAv. L. REv. 169, 170-71 (1897) (quoting an
earlier commentator's observation that experts do not "wilfully misrepresent what they
think, but their judgment becomes so warped by regarding the subject in one point of view
that even when conscientiously disposed, they are incapable of expressing a candid opin-
ion"). For an argument that present controls on the dishonesty of partisan experts are
insufficient, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current
Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2001).
55 See, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRusT LAw 277-78 (2d ed. 2001) (suggesting the
use of a neutral expert agreed upon by each party's expert); Posner, supra note 6, at 96
(suggesting replacement of each party's expert with a single, jointly agreed-upon expert);
see also Hand, supra note 43, at 56 (arguing for "a board of experts or a single expert, not
called by either side, who shall advise the jury of the general propositions applicable to the
case which lie within his province"); cf In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295
F.3d 651, 665 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., majority) (recommending that the district court
use the powers granted to it by Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to appoint its
own neutral expert).
56 FED. R. EvIn. 702.
57 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
58 Fmo. R. EVwn. 702 advisory committee's note.
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Rule 702, read alongside Daubert, imposes "three distinct substan-
tive restrictions on the admission of expert testimony: qualifications,
reliability, and fit."59 Daubert is perhaps best known for (and is some-
times used synonymously with) its controversial requirement of "relia-
bility."60 Daubert read Rule 702's characterization of expert knowledge
as "scientific, technical, or ... specialized" to mean that the knowl-
edge must be "derived by the scientific method" to assure its reliabil-
ity. 6 ' The Court required consideration of whether an expert's
methodology is objectively testable, whether it was subject to peer re-
view or publication, whether its rate of error is known, whether it was
subject to controls, and whether it is generally accepted in the rele-
vant scientific community. 62 Kumho Tire63 later made clear that these
standards apply to any testimony based on specialized knowledge,
even if it is not strictly scientific.
64
Although Daubert limited its analysis of reliability to the expert's
methodology, 65 the Court observed later in Joiner66 that
conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one an-
other. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence re-
quires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may con-
clude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered.
6 7
Thus, a court must scrutinize not only the expert's data and formal
analysis, but also the expert's grounds for drawing particular conclu-
sions. The 2000 amendments emphasize this point by requiring the
expert's opinion to be "based upon" data and to apply principles
properly.68
59 Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2000).
60 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 & n.9.
61 Id. at 590.
62 Id. at 593-94. On remand, Judge Kozinski read Daubert to require courts "to re-
solve disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely within
their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not
'good science,' and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was not 'derived
by the scientific method."' Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1316.
63 Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
64 Id. at 147.
65 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (noting that the focus "must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate").
66 Gen. Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
67 Id. at 146.
68 FED. R. EviD. 702 adisory committee's note ("[W]hen an expert purports to apply
principles and methods in accordance with professional standards, and yet reaches a con-
clusion that other experts in the field would not reach, the trial court may fairly suspect
that the principles and methods have not been faithfully applied.").
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In addition to assuring that there is no analytical gap between the
expert's data and opinions, Daubert instructs the court to consider
whether expert testimony will "'assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,"'69 as required by Rule
702. This requirement of helpfulness "goes primarily to relevance,"
70
or "fit."71 Testimony that is either irrelevant to an issue in the case, or
relevant but outside the scope of the witness's expertise, will always fail
the helpfulness prong of Daubert. The relevance standard reiterates
Rule 402's requirement that any evidence be relevant, 72 which Rule
401 defines as "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more proba-
ble or less probable than it would be without the evidence. '73 Irrele-
vant expert testimony, therefore, might be excluded under either the
helpfulness prong of Daubert or Rule 402. The redundancy, though
sometimes confusing,74 is harmless so long as courts recognize the dis-
tinction between the relevance and reliability inquiries.
The requirement that even relevant expert testimony be within
the witness's area of expertise is critical in considering what one
scholar has termed "the 'ultimate issue' issue.""' Rule 704 makes clear
that expert testimony "otherwise admissible is not objectionable because
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
76
Thus, if a legal term has professional significance in the relevant area
of expertise, it should be admissible and subject to the usual adver-
sarial testing.77 If, however, the law defines an ultimate issue in terms
having no meaning-or a different meaning-in the witness's profes-
sion, the witness's testimony on that issue may not be "other-wise
admissible.
78
Even if evidence is admissible because it meets the conditions of
qualification, reliability, and relevance, it may still be insufficient to
raise a material question of fact for the jury. The Court stressed in
Daubert that "in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of
evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a rea-
t Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
70 Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
71 Id. (creditingJudge Becker in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.
1985), for use of the term "fit").
72 FED. R, EVID. 402.
73 FED. R. EvIn. 401.
74 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 786
(7th Cir. 1999) (finding that the objection to expert economic evidence "actually had
nothing to do with Dauber; it was that the evidence mainly concerned a matter not in
issue"). This seems to suggest, incorrectly, that Daubert does not itself impose a require-
ment of relevancy.
75 Christopher Slobogin, The "Ultimate Issue"Issue, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 259 (1989).
76 FED. R. Evin. 704(a) (emphasis added).
77 See Slobogin, supra note 75, at 261-62.
78 Id. at 263.
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sonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is
true, the court remains free to direct a judgment... and likewise to
grant summary judgment.'" 79 The admissibility and sufficiency screens
are related, and have the common consequence of removing testi-
mony from the jury's consideration. But allocating the evaluation of
the evidence to the sufficiency inquiry has important procedural con-
sequences on appeal: the district court's evaluation of admissibility of
evidence is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion,8° while its evalua-
tion of sufficiency is reviewed de novo.8 '
II
ECONOMIC AUTHORITY AND EXPERTISE IN ANTITRUST CASES
The preceding Part examined the interaction between factual in-
quiries and conceptualizations, expert and otherwise, of normal and
abnormal conduct. These interactions have special importance in an-
titrust litigation. The decline of per se rules over the past thirty years
has made certain factual issues, and the expert testimony necessary to
resolve them, more important than they were in earlier decades. The
consequences of this trend will be the focus of the remainder of this
Article. To understand the special role of expertise in antitrust cases,
however, one must recognize that it is subordinate to economic au-
thority-the judicially adopted models and empirical estimates that
provide the conceptual basis for legal rules. Courts acquire economic
knowledge independently of expert testimony and rely on it to frame
rules of liability, standing, and evidentiary sufficiency. These rules are
designed to raise issues that courts can practically resolve without de-
terring benign conduct. This process then determines the qualifica-
tions that trial experts must have, the issues about which they may
testify, the models upon which they may rely, and the methodologies
they may use in formulating their testimony.
A. Economic Authority and Antitrust: Models, Rules, and the
Domain of Fact
From the earliest years of the Sherman Act, economic ideas have
influenced antitrust law through unstructured judicial adoption.
8 2
79 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
80 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1997). But cf United States v. Call,
129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the court will "review de novo whether
the district court properly followed the framework set forth in Daubert," but "once we deter-
mine that the district court correctly applied the Daubert standards, we may reverse the
district court only if the exclusion of the expert testimony constituted an abuse of
discretion").
81 Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003).
82 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw 1836-1937, at 268-69
(1991) ("Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its inception.");
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The Supreme Court has approached the formulation of antitrust law
as a common law process, finding in the legislative text or history of
the statutes few decisive constraints on its rulemaking discretion. 83 In
this process the Court recognizes economic authority by accepting
theoretical and generalized empirical propositions as its basis for for-
mulating or applying rules of law.8 4 The Court adopts this form of
authority in much the same way it acquires knowledge of legal prece-
dents: by pragmatically examining the scholarly literature in the con-
text of existing case law and adopting the most persuasive and
plausible accounts .
5
The lower federal courts engage in the same sort of inquiry, con-
strained to varying degrees by the decisions of the Supreme Court. In
many instances, the lower courts have taken the lead in the process of
legal change, relying on economic authority in a variety of doctrinal
contexts in order to resolve cases in ways that minimize the harmful
effects of Supreme Court decisions or. that invite Supreme Court cor-
rection.8 6 Whatever might be said of its validity in other contexts, ju-
dicial inquiry into social science research has been integral to the
Hovenkamp, Reckoning, supra note 8, at 1-3; Joseph F. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 298
(1967) ("The extent to which the basic economic theory of oligopoly has become explicit
in the Court's recent decisions is striking."); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Politi-
cal and Economic Theoy in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIo ST. L.J.
257, 300-09 (1989) (describing judges' use of prevailing economic and political theories in
early interpretation of the Sherman Act).
83 See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1988) (rea-
soning that the Sherman Act's use of common law terminology carries with it the dynamic
common law process of legal change); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84
MicH. L. Rzv. 1696, 1705 (1986) (observing that "[tlhe Sherman Act set up a common law
system in antitrust" and that "[t]he statute and its legislative history authorize the ongoing
transition to an efficiency-oriented approach"), For criticism of the Supreme Court's ap-
proach, see Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sher-
man Act, 74 CAL. L. REv. 263 (1986), proposing an interpretation of the Sherman Act
which is predicated on Congress's basic policy choices, and David F. Shores, Antitrust Deci-
sions and Legislative Intent, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 725 (2001), criticizing the modern Supreme
Court's failure to rely on legislative intent when interpreting the Sherman Act.
84 Page, supra note 9, at 1295-98 (describing the process of judicial selection of
theories).
8" See Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise
Facts, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1988) (describing judicial adoption of facts as premises for for-
mulation of a legal rule); cf. Monahan & Walker, supra note 5, at 488-95 (arguing that the
adoption of social science research should be treated like the adoption of legal precedent).
86 For example, in Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), Judge Posner
held that a dealer suffered antitrust injury from vertical maximum price fixing, but the
court expressed "considerable sympathy with the argument that Albrecht [v. Herald Com-
pany, 390 U.S. 145 (1968), which made the practice per se unlawful,] is inconsistent with
the cases that establish the requirement of proving antitrust injury." Id. at 1363. The court
stated: "In fact, we think the argument is right and that it may well portend the doom of
Albrecht." Id. The Supreme Court accepted the invitation, overruling Albrecht and reversing
Judge Posner's decision. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997); see also Fred S.
McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition For and In the Field of Competi-
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development of antitrust law and has framed the role of expertise in
antitrust litigation.
1. Adoption of Economic Authority
Perhaps the most visible example of courts adopting economic
authority in antitrust has been the Supreme Court's acceptance of the
Chicago School's economic models of many of the practices that have
most concerned antitrust: cartels, vertical price fixing, territorial re-
straints, tying arrangements, and predatory pricing. As we have ex-
plained at greater length elsewhere, the Chicago models show the
effects of various practices on individual actors and on overall effi-
ciency, using the standard economic assumption of value-maximizing
behavior.8 7 From those assumptions, neoclassical economics has con-
structed the theories of cost and consumer behavior, the firm, compe-
tition, monopoly, and dominant firm pricing. Chicago analysts apply
the same assumptions in adapting price theory (understood to encom-
pass considerations of transaction and information costs) 88 to the anti-
trust problem.8 9 They assume that firms engage in those practices
which enhance profits, either by gaining and exercising monopoly
power (through cartels or exclusionary practices), by improving effi-
ciency, or both. The antitrust problem, in Chicago terms, is to iden-
tify the likely effects of the practice on efficiency,90 bearing in mind
that rivals, suppliers, and customers will also respond to monopolistic
actions with value-maximizing behavior of their own-increasing out-
put, substituting new suppliers or customers, or entering new markets.
Using these assumptions, the Chicago analysis sought to refute tradi-
tional monopolistic explanations for a host of practices. 91 The Court
has referred to the Chicago models in a variety of doctrinal contexts,
adopting much of Chicago's analytical framework, including the as-
sumption that firms act rationally to maximize profits and minimize
losses.9
2
Courts usually offer at best only citations to legal and economic
literature when "explaining" the process by which they choose one
model over another. In one important case, however, we have inside
tion Law, 52 EMOR' Lj. 1401, 1408-11 (2003) (discussing the various ways that lower courts
have of minimizing the effect of harmful Supreme Court precedent).
87 See Page, supra note 9, at 1231-37.
88 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theoiy, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L.
RE-v. 77, 138 n.328.
89 Page, supra note 9, at 1237-43.
90 See id. at 1239.
91 See id. at 1235-37.
92 As Herbert Hovenkamp has pointed out, even though economists now question
the universal assumption of rationality, the law has largely adopted it as both a positive and
normative starting point. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 120 (observing that a "rational
actor hypothesis is part of the law of predatory pricing").
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information. The Court's decision in Sylvania,93 which overturned the
per se rule against vertical, non-price restraints established in
Schwinn,94 was driven by Chicago School economics entering the
Court's deliberative process directly and indirectly through the legal
and economic literature, not through expert testimony.95 The Court
endorsed an essential Chicago insight: that vertical restraints may en-
hance interbrand competition by allowing manufacturers to limit free
riding by their distributors, thus creating incentives for the distribu-
tors and retailers to provide costly pre-sale services.9 6 As Andrew Gavil
has shown, Justice Lewis Powell played the pivotal role in persuading
the Court to overrule Schwinn, and his advocacy within the Court
stemmed from an economic conviction shaped by a Chicago analysis
that Powell learned outside of the record and briefs.97 Powell's law
clerk was a former student of William Baxter, a Chicago-oriented
scholar at Stanford Law School; the clerk's memorandum to Powell
criticizing Schwinn highlighted the work of Baxter, Robert Bork, and
Richard Posner.93 In the margin of his pre-conference notes, Powell
wrote three names: "Posner, Baxter, Bork."99 And in a critique of his
clerk's first draft opinion, Powell wrote: "It also is important to
demonstrate the economic illiteracy of Schwinn."'100 Powell's final
opinion for the Court relied heavily on Chicago scholarship."l " Pro-
fessor Gavil concludes,
[T] he collective imprint of the Chicago School is unmistakable. By
creating an accessible body of academic commentary and criticism
that presented an alternative, coherent "school of thought," it is ar-
guable that commentators like Bork and Posner, as well as their
predecessors, Director, Levi, Telser, and Bowman, facilitated
change, providing specific grounds for displacing and discarding
the doctrine they criticized.'
0 2
93 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
94 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
95 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55 ("Economists have identified a number of ways in which
manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more effectively against other
manufacturers,").
96 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55. The article that introduced this economic theory is
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960). In
recognizing the free rider effect, the Court cited Richard A, Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competi-
tion Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 285 (1975). Posner relies on Telser. Id. at 283 n.6.
97 See Andrew I. Cavil, A First Look at the Powell Papers: Sylvania and the Process of Change
in the Supreme Court, A-NTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 8, 9-11.
98 Id. at 11.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 10.
101 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 48 n.13, 55-58 nn.24, 26, 29 (citing articles).
102 Gavil, supra note 97, at 11.
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Justice Powell similarly adopted Chicago models of predatory pricing
in his opinion in Matsushita. I0o In neither Sylvania nor Matsushita did
he conduct the sort of inquiry into reliability contemplated later by
Daubert. Of course, Chicago-inspired arguments have not been uni-
versally successful in the Court. 10 4 The crucial point to note at this
stage is that unstructured choice among competing models has been
an integral part of the development of legal standards in antitrust.
The question remains as to why courts choose one available
model over another. One of the grounds, of course, must be the
model's explanatory value. Milton Friedman has famously argued
that economists, like all scientists, choose theories (or should do so)
based on their predictive accuracy, rather than, for example, the real-
ism of their assumptions.10 5 To illustrate, Friedman hypothesizes a
theory that the leaves on a tree are distributed as if the leaves were
trying to expose themselves to the optimal degree of sunlight; Fried-
man suggests that such a theory would be perfectly valid if empirical
testing showed that it accurately predicted the distribution of
leaves.' 06 Ronald Coase has objected, however, that no such process
of testing typically occurs when economists accept or reject theo-
ries. 0 7 Instead, economists adopt theories of market phenomena
based upon an intuitive assessment of how well the theory helps them
understand the processes at work. 10 8 Coase presents a number of in-
stances in which the vast majority of economists adopted a newly
presented theory without any evidence at all that it made accurate pre-
dictions.I09 Economists are likely to adopt a model identifying previ-
ously unrecognized causal factors in a market phenomenon. Coase
tellingly argues that Friedman's example of a valid theory of leaf distri-
bution would be extraordinarily unsatisfying, regardless its predictive
accuracy: it would be "a very poor basis for thinking about leaves" be-
cause it tells us nothing about the biological forces at work in the
tree.' 10
103 Matsushita Elec, Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see infra
Part III.A.
104 See infra Part III.
105 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYs IN POSITIVE Eco-
NOMiCS 3, 15 (1953) (observing that whether or not the assumptions of a theory are valid
depends not on whether they are "descriptively 'realistic,'" but on whether the theory
"yields sufficiently accurate predictions").
106 Id.. at 19-20.
107 R.H. COASE, How Should Economists Choose?, in ESSAYS ON' ECONONI1CS AND ECONO-
MISTS 15, 16-18 (1994) (arguing that a theory "serves as a base for thinking" and "helps us
to understand what is going on by enabling us to organise our thoughts"),
108 Id.
109 Id. at 19-23.
lt) Id. at 17.
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Courts, like economists, are undoubtedly influenced in their
choices by intuitions about each theory's explanatory value. Presuma-
bly Justice Powell's adoption of the Chicago model in Sylvania was
based on his sense that it explained manufacturers' use of restricted
distribution better than other available models. He certainly required
no formal falsification of the competing models, as Friedman's stan-
dard of choice would have required. But what accounts for these intu-
itions? One factor Coase does not discuss is the role of social visions,
or ideologies-which have influenced antitrust law from its incep-
tion.1 1' Ideologies, unlike theories, are highly abstract conceptions of
social causation.2' 2 Antitrust law has always been torn between rela-
tively laissez-faire and relatively interventionist visions of the proper
roles of the state and the market in organizing economic affairs."t 6
The Sherman Act itself is a legislative compromise that relies on the
undirected market (framed by common law rules of property and con-
tract) to organize production and allocation of goods and services,
but also assumes that sporadic judicial intervention will sometimes be
necessary to bring monopolies and cartels to a timely end.
t 14
The interpretation of the statute over the course of antitrust his-
tory has likewise been influenced by whether the interpreter-be it a
court or a scholar-adheres to a relatively laissez-faire or a relatively
dirigiste ideology. The populist antitrust of the post-War era reflected
a perception that markets tend toward monopoly without constant
governmental vigilance.1 1 The Chicago School's critique of that per-
ception reflected the conviction that the self-correcting forces of the
market were powerful and would typically thwart monopolistic prac-
tices. 11 6 Economists associated with the Chicago School are influ-
enced by their market-oriented vision when accepting or rejecting
theories. Similar factors undoubtedly influence courts in their
choices as well. The Chicago School did not gain widespread judicial
acceptance until its underlying free-market ideology became more
11 See generally William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origin.s of Antitrust Policy, 66
TUL. L. R~v. 1 (1991) (discussing the place of various ideologies in the development of
national antitrust policy). This Article, as in the article cited above, uses "ideology" and
"social vision" in the essentially neutral sense developed by Thomas Sowell. See THOMAS
SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS 14 (1987) (arguing that "visions" are mental constructs
that supply "what we sense or feel before we have constructed any systematic reasoning that
could be called a theory, much less deduced any specific consequences as hypotheses to be
tested against evidence"); see alsoJ.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOcY
3 (1998) (proposing an "ambivalent conception of ideology," which recognizes that "cogni-
tive mechanisms" can be "useful in certain contexts, but in others ... can mislead and help
produce or sustain unjust conditions").
112 See Page, supra note 11, at 9-10.
113 See id. at 9-23, 40-44.
114 See id. at 35-39.
115 Seeid. at 18-23.
116 Id. at 43-47.
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widely held in the judiciary.'1 7 The appointment process no doubt
played a role in these changes, but even justices not otherwise com-
monly associated with political conservatism have been influenced by
Chicago ideas.' 1 8
Although this Article has suggested that courts accept models on
largely the same grounds as economists, even economically sophisti-
cated judges must make their choices under institutional circum-
stances very different from those of professional economists. Judicial
recognition of a theory has far broader consequences than recogni-
tion of the same theory by a scholar. Thus, ajudge may reject a theory
as a basis for resolving a legal issue even if the judge accepts the theory
as a matter of abstract economics."t 9 As the next section explains,
institutional concerns strongly influence the kinds of rules in which
courts are inclined to embody economic authority. 120 Such considera-
tions have led the Supreme Court, rightly or wrongly, to give special
weight to the immediate or obvious effects of practices on consumers.
Theoretical arguments purporting to contradict the obvious evidence
of a practice's effect thus face greater obstacles to adoption.
In some instances, this preference for obvious effects has led the
Court to rely on post-Chicago analyses that detect inefficiencies in a
wider range of circumstances than do Chicago models. 12' These post-
Chicago victories have occurred mainly in cases in which the practice
at issue results in evident and immediate consumer harms that a Chi-
cago analysis suggests are illusory or transitory. In Aspen, for example,
the leading operator of skiing facilities stopped participating in an all-
Aspen ski pass that it had offeredjointly for many years with its smaller
117 Page, supra note 9, at 1300; cf William E. Kovacic, Judicial Appointments and the Fu-
ture of Antitrust Policy, ANTITRUST, Spring 1993, at 8, 9 (concluding, based on an empirical
study, that "the Reagan/Bush strategy of nominating conservative academics has exerted
an importan[t] qualitative influence by fostering acceptance of analytical approaches that
discourage judicial intervention"); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpre-
tation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773, 816 (2002) (arguing that political
affiliations heavily influence judicial outcomes). Since 1976,judges have also heard about
Chicago-oriented economics at institutes sponsored by Henry Manne's Law & Economics
Center. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Trans-
formation of Antitrust Policy, 36 WAVNF L. RFv. 1413, 1434 (1990).
118 See, e.g., Ad. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (Brennan,J.)
(holding that "a firm does not suffer an 'antitrust injury' ..when it loses sales to a com-
petitor charging nonpredatory prices pursuant to a vertical, maximum-price-fixing
scheme").
119 In Thomas Cotter's terms, the courts use economic theory pragmatically. See
Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071,
2139-40 (1996) (arguing that "the pragmatist accepts the insights of economic analysis for
what they are worth," avoiding "brilliant, but acontextual, policy recommendations" in
favor of "a more skeptical, neoinstitutionalist approach in considering policy alternatives").
120 See infra Part II.A.2.
121 For a survey of post-Chicago successes and failures, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-
Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 257.
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rival. 122 Under a Chicago analysis, at worst this refusal was competi-
tively benign because it could not have reduced output in the market.
Nonetheless, the Court affirmed ajury verdict for plaintiffs, observing




Chicago'arguments have generally been successful in limiting an-
titrust liability where the defendant's conduct confers an immediate
benefit on consumers.12 4 As then-Judge Breyer put it, courts "should
be cautious-reluctant to condemn too speedily-an arrangement
that, on its face, appears to bring low price benefits to the con-
sumer.'125 For example, in cases which have involved maximum re-
sale price fixing t26 and predatory pricing, 2 7 the practices at issue
immediately resulted in lower prices to consumers, but plaintiffs al-
leged that the practices should nevertheless be illegal because they
might eventually lead to higher prices. The Court has rejected these
claims, not because the alleged harm could never occur, but because a
rule focusing on an immediate, certain benefit made more sense than
one based on possible future harm. In predatory pricing cases,
"[e]ven if the ultimate effect of [a price] cut is to induce or reestab-
lish supracompetitive pricing, discouraging a price cut and forcing
firms to maintain supracompetitive prices, thus depriving consumers
of the benefits of lower prices in the interim, does not constitute
sound antitrust policy."'
2 8
Courts thus adopt theoretical models (and attendant empirical
assumptions) from various sources in order both to explain current
effects and to predict future effects of practices. They appear to do so
on the basis of the theory's explanatory value, its consistency with the
court's ideological conception of the relationship between the market
and the state, and the special institutional context of antitrust litiga-
tion. Part IV examines some of the questions of legitimacy that this
process raises. For now, however, it is important only to stress the
absence of constraints on reliability analogous to those imposed by
122 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
123 See id. at 606; see aLsoJohn E. Lopatka & William H. Page, iouopolization, Innovation,
and Consumer We/tfare, 69 GEo. WVASH. L. REv. 367, 379-83 (2001) (noting that, although the
Aspen Court arguably should have required a showing that total output declined, the Court
"undeniably examined other evidence of consumer harm").
124 SeeJohn E. Lopatka & William H. Page, 'Obvious' Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy:
The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts, in POsT-CHIc,cGo DE-vELOPMENTS IN
ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 8, at 129-30.
125 Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 931 (1st Cir. 1984).
126 E.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
127 See infia Part III.A.
128 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993); see also Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-62 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that Brunswick's market share discounts were simply price cutting and,
therefore, protected by the rle of Brooke Group).
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Daubert. While Daubert reflects a belief that scientific and technical
knowledge is objectively true and thus should meet criteria of
testability, the process of judicial adoption of economic authority im-
plicitly recognizes that economic knowledge may be socially
constructed.
2. Implementation of Economic Authority
We are now in a position to discuss how courts make use of eco-
nomic authority in formulating and applying antitrust rules. The im-
plications of a theory allow courts to predict that a practice will have
monopolistic effects in specified circumstances. Using these predic-
tions, the courts can identify the sorts of factual inquiries necessary to
determine whether liability is appropriate. Courts must then formu-
late rules that define the factual issues on which the outcome of the
case depends. At the most general level, courts may choose to adopt a
substantive rule of per se illegality or some version of the rule of rea-
son. But there are many other decisional contexts that affect the out-
come of litigation, including rules of antitrust injury or standing and
rules defining evidentiary sufficiency. All of these rules define the do-
main of fact and, hence, the role of expert testimony.
The most sweeping use of economic authority occurs in the adop-
tion of per se rules. When economic authority indicates that a prac-
tice would "always or almost always" reduce consumer welfare, a court
may announce and apply a rule of per se illegality.1 29 In such a case,
the court uses economic authority to give economic content to the law
ex ante, leaving a relatively narrow range of factual issues for trial
courts.1 3 0 Per se rules, of course, economize on the direct costs of
litigation-no small consideration given the daunting evidentiary
challenges in antitrust litigation. 31 These costs might be acceptable if
the investment in protracted litigation were likely to yield more accu-
rate results, but antitrust commentators have been skeptical that the
"big case" is worth its institutional costs.13 2 Apart from the sheer vol-
ume of evidence, the issues presented are often technical and remote
from the judge's or jury's everyday experiences. Parties must, as in
other kinds of cases, rely on narratives that describe the events in ways
129 Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
130 For a fuller discussion of how rules determine in advance what conduct is permissi-
ble, leaving only factual issues for courts, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992).
131 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.1, at 300 (3d ed. 1995).
132 See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, The End of Antitrust Trench Warfare?: An Analysis of Some
Procedural Aspects of The Microsoft Trial, ANTITRUST, Summer 1999, at 7 (considering proce-
dural expedients in the Microsoft trial aimed at avoiding the costly and protracted pro-
ceedings typical of prior monopolization cases).
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jurors will recognize as coherent; 133 but the business practices at issue
in antitrust cases are not always easily understood in terms of a gener-
alist factfinder's frame of reference.
These concerns at one time led the Supreme Court to justify rules
of per se illegality by observing that "courts are of limited utility in
examining difficult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in
any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the
economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one
important reason we have formulated per se rules."' 34 As this Article
will show, the Court has also denied standing to entire classes of in-
jured parties where it doubted the ability of litigation-even with ex-
pert witnesses-to measure individual harm accurately. 35 The court
stressed that "'in the real economic world rather than an economist's
hypothetical model,' the latter's drastic simplifications generally must
be abandoned."'
36
Of course, the inability of courts to weigh actual competitive ef-
fects of a practice in litigation does not necessarily mean that the prac-
tice should be illegal per se. If the relevant economic authority
suggests, ex ante, that the practice is unlikely to reduce competition, a
rule of per se legality may be appropriate.137 Some Chicago scholars
have argued that there should be a default rule of legality for novel or
complex practices because markets generally have a comparative ad-
vantage over courts in identifying and destroying monopolies; an erro-
neous determination that a practice is monopolistic is likely to be
long-lasting and costly, while an erroneous determination that the
practice is benign will eventually be corrected by market forces. 13
133 SeeJoshua A. Newberg, The Narrative Construction of Antitrust, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 181 (2003) (analyzing the competing narratives presented by the parties to the
Microsoft litigation); Richard G. Parker, Simplifying Antitrust Cases, SH045 ALI-ABA 19
(WestlawJLR Database) (2002) (describing the importance of prescnting an antitrust case
in a way that it is consistent with common sense and involves a "simple theme or two
around which to organize the evidence").
134 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972) (citations
omitted).
135 See infra Part III.D.1.
136 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 742 (1977) (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968)).
137 See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 23 (1981) ("The same considerations of judicial econ-
omy and legal certainty that justify the use of per se rules of illegality in some cases justify
the use of rules of per se legality in others.").
1-18 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REv.
983 (1987); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Information and Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
1, 18(
Per se rules conserve on information and on the costs of litigation. They
hold down the sum of excusing conduct that is harmful, condemning con-
duct that is beneficial, and inducing firms to steer clear of potentially bene-
ficial practices that create risks of condemnation (or costly litigation). We
apply per se rules of illegality to cartels and mergers to monopoly. We ap-
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The Supreme Court has increasingly recognized the dangers of "false
positives" in defined circumstances.13 9
For institutional reasons, however, the Court has usually imple-
mented Chicago models in less sweeping ways, which leave open ave-
nues for factual refutation.1 40 In Sylvanial4 ' and in Khan,142 the only
cases in which the Court has expressly abandoned rules of per se ille-
gality, it replaced them with some version of the rule of reason rather
than with the suggested rules of per se legality.
143
More commonly, the Court has used Chicago models to guide
subsidiary inquiries, especially characterization, sufficiency of the evi-
dence, and antitrust injury.144 First, even if a practice, broadly de-
fined, is per se unlawful, courts must characterize particular conduct
as within or without the rule. 145 This inquiry involves a facial evalua-
tion of the practice's "obvious" tendencies in light of the policies un-
derlying the rule-policies that necessarily reflect the implications of
models by which courts understand the practices. 146 Should courts
find the per se rule inapplicable, then some form of the rule of reason
applies.
Second, courts must determine whether the evidence presented
to prove the occurrence of a particular practice is sufficient to create a
jury issue. Because sufficiency is a matter of law, the inquiry incorpo-
rates policy considerations, which may be guided by models. The
Court has even suggested that the plausibility of a party's theory,
viewed in light of the relevant models of rational economic behavior,
may influence the burden of production on the party proposing the
ply per se rules of legality in fact if not in name to the introduction of new
products (although that may destroy desirable substitutes), to the redesign
of old products (same potential effects), to price competition (provided
price exceeds cost of manufacture), to charging what the traffic will bear
(although that may extract monopoly profits), to expanding capacity (even
though new plants may discourage entry), and to non-price vertical re-
straints. All of this we do on a categorical basis, for to examine the practice
at hand in any detail is to abandon per se treatment.
t 9 See, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398, 414 (2004) ("The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2
liability.").
140 See Page, supra note 11, at 49-53 (arguing that the Court's hesitance to adopt rules
of per se legality shows the influence of legal process jurisprudence); see also Richard A.
Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101
MICH. L. REv. 952, 958 (2003) ("Being a judge . .. brings institutional issues to the fore-
front of consciousness.").
141 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
142 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling the per se illegality of vertical
maximum price fixing).
143 Id. at 15-19; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55-59.
144 Page, supra note 11, at 50-51.
145 Page, supra note 9, at 1257-62.
146 See infra Part I I.C.1.
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theory. 14 7 Finally, courts must determine whether the harm that the
plaintiff suffered is compensable-that is, whether it constitutes anti-
trust injury and whether the plaintiff has antitrust standing.148 As dis-
cussed below, this process requires courts to consider the model of
the alleged anticompetitive practice in determining whether the al-
leged injury bears the necessary relationship to the inefficiency associ-
ated with the practice. 149 All of these determinations allow courts,
guided by economic authority, to structure the scope of factual in-
quiry, including the use of expert testimony.
B. Economic Authority and Expert Testimony in Antitrust Cases
To this point, we have shown that antitrust law incorporates eco-
nomic theory by an unstructured process ofjudicial adoption. Courts
pragmatically select among theories based upon explanatory value,
ideology, and the legal process. This process, which establishes eco-
nomic authority, normally precedes any consideration of expert testi-
mony. The Court in Khan,150 for example, rejected the assertion that
it should not overturn the per se illegality of maximum resale price
fixing without expert testimony showing that the per se rule had an-
ticompetitive effects.' 5 1 Instead, the Court demanded evidence that
the rule had positive effects: "It is the retention of the rule of Albrecht,
and not... the rule's elimination, that lacks adequate justification."' 5 2
Notably, the Court referred approvingly to legal and economic schol-
arship arguing that the adverse effects predicted by Albrecht are either
implausible or not anticompetitive. 5 3 In such instances, the unstruc-
tured adoption of economic authority, rather than the structured re-
ception of expert testimony, is the primary mechanism by which
antitrust law changes.
Once adopted, economic authority governs factual inquiries, in-
cluding the use of expert testimony.154 The pronounced fear of fact
that produced the per se rules of antitrust law in pre-Chicago years
147 Page, supra note 9, at 1287-90.
148 Id. at 1268-78.
149 See infra Part II.D.1.
150 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
151 Id. at 19.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 15. The Court observed: "Thus, our reconsideration of Albrecht's continuing
validity is informed by several of our decisions, as well as a considerable body of scholarship
discussing the effects of vertical restraints." Id.; see also Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka,
TheAlbrecht Rule Afier Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE D~xaE L. REv. 123, 146-50 (1998)
(describing the way the Supreme Court used economic authority to overrule the per se
rule against vertical maximum price fixing).
154 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 6, at 92 ("The expert will not be permitted to testify that
antitrust law should not forbid price fixing, but will be permitted to testify that the defend-
ants' pricing behavior is inconsistent with their having agreed to fix prices ....").
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has continued to manifest itself in the subsidiary decisional contexts
we considered in the last section.1 55 Courts have since, of course,
opened up factual inquires for expert testimony. At the same time,
however, they have expressed skepticism about the utility of expert
testimony,' 56 especially where it appears to be biased. t57 Because of
these concerns, courts have not hesitated to use economic authority to
define rules which limit the scope of expert testimony and to scruti-
nize expert testimony directly in those contexts in which the law per-
mits it.
The previous section discussed the screens the Federal Rules of
Evidence have established for expert testimony. This Part briefly de-
scribes how economic authority guides each of these screens in anti-
trust cases. The next section shows how courts have applied them in
the particular antitrust contexts in which expert testimony has been
most crucial.
1. Qualifications
Before examining the reliability, relevance, and sufficiency of ex-
pert testimony, a court must decide whether the proposed witness has
sufficient "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" to
qualify as an expert.'58 This requirement has been interpreted liber-
155 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2000) (
[The FTC's] complaint counsel made a tactical decision not to call a previ-
ously designated expert economist to counter the testimony of CDA's ex-
pert economist. Rather, complaint counsel focused on winning the case
under per se or abbreviated rile of reason, evidently assuming that the eco-
nomic literature would suffice to win the case under full-blown rule of rea-
son if the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court required a more onerous level of
analysis.
see also In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197,
212 (D. Me. 2003) (stating that the application of the rule of reason "will require expert
testimony defining the market (geographically and by product) and will give the defend-
ants the opportunity to assert business justifications").
156 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
242 (1993) ("Expert testimony is useful as a guide to interpreting market facts, but it is not
a substitute for them.").
157 See, e.g., Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1154 (D. Utah 2001)
("[The witness] is clearly a hired gun and any semblance of objectivity is lacking. His opin-
ions lack all indicia of reliability and as such can only confuse and mislead thejury."); In re
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1999 WL 33889,
at *11 (N.D. IlI. Jan. 19, 1999) (asserting that the expert "abdicated entirely the concept of
the independence of expert witnesses and simply became the sponsor for the Class Plain-
tiffs' theory of the case"), rev'd on other grounds, 186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Alumi-
num Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1499-500, 1506-07 (D. Kan. 1995)
(describing expert as "an expert for hire.., driven by a desire to enhance the measure of
plaintiffs' damages, even at the expense of well-accepted scientific principles and
methodology").
158 FED. R. EVIn. 702.
20051
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ally' 59 and in most antitrust cases the expert's qualifications are not
challenged.16 0 Antitrust litigation involves large stakes, and expert tes-
timony is often necessary to success. Consequently, the parties in anti-
trust cases usually have sufficient means and awareness of the issues to
choose a qualified expert. Most disputes over expertise relate to the
proposed testimony itself, which may be inadmissible, irrelevant, or
insufficient even if the witness is a distinguished economist.
1 61
Nevertheless, proposed experts are sometimes disqualified, for ex-
ample, on grounds of inadequate education, teaching, or scholar-
ship.16 2 Disqualification, when it occurs, is a necessary implication of
economic authority, because the increased sophistication of the eco-
nomic theory on which antitrust law is based all but forecloses nonaca-
demic experts, and even otherwise qualified economic experts who
are not familiar with antitrust law.163 Thus, prior testimony in anti-
trust cases, 164 "general business experience unrelated to antitrust eco-
nomics,"'165 and training in engineering and experience in market
analysis as a business consultant'" have all been found insufficient
159 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Rule
702's liberal policy of admissibility extends to the substantive as well as the formal qualifica-
tion of experts."); Berlyn, Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 530, 534 (D.
Md. 2002); ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 598, 602 (E.D.
Pa. 2002).
160 See, e.g., Sannerv. Bd. of Trade of Chicago, No. 89 C 8467, 2001 WL 1155277, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2001); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348,
1353 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
161 See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1046, 1057 (8th
Cir. 2000) (holding that testimony of Stanford economist should have been excluded);
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1999 WL 33889, at *10-11 (excluding the
testimony of Nobel Prize economist).
162 See, e.g., Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791, 799-800 (4th Cir.
1989) ("[T]his witness cannot satisfy even the minimal requirements of Fed. R. Evid.
702."); Berlyn, Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533-36 (D. Md.
2002); Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1237 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (finding expert's
lack of expertise "staggering"), affid, 284 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002).
163 See W. Parcel Exp. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1060
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (granting summary judgment for failure to establish the relevant market,
and noting that "neither [of plaintiffs experts] has a background in antitrust economics,
both disclaimed expertise in antitrust law in their depositions, and neither has offered an
opinion on the definition of relevant markets in antitrust litigation"), affd,'190 F.3d 974
(9th Cir. 1999).
164 See Thomasj Kline, 878 F.2d at 800 (" [I] t would be absurd to conclude that one can
become an expert simply by accumulating experience in testifying.").
165 Id. (reversing district court on admissibility issue for abuse of discretion); see Berlyn,
214 F. Supp. 2d at 536. But see Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 793 (6th
Cir. 2002) (finding that a damage award was supported in part by the testimony of plain-
tiff's CEO that, but for defendant's conduct, plaintiff "would have had a national market
share of approximately 22 to 23 percent").
166 See Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 729, 732 (W.D.
Va. 2000). The proposed witness had no apparent understanding of basic economic con-
cepts, such as elasticity of demand. Id. at 734-35.
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qualifications. Even economic expertise in one industry may not qual-
ify a witness to testify concerning a separate industry.Y 
7
2. Relevance and Helpfulness
Economic authority determines the relevance of expert testi-
mony. First, it forecloses expert testimony not directed to the factual
issues that the law defines: "Expert testimony which does not relate to
any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful."'1 68 In
Daubert terms, courts -nay make an expert's testimony irrelevant or
lacking in fit by adopting or interpreting economic authority. For ex-
ample, the Court's retention of the per se rule against horizontal
price fixing forecloses the use of expert (or other) testimony to show
that a naked cartel agreement, if established by direct evidence, did
not cause competitive harm in a particular case. 169 Similarly, as this
Article will show in more detail below, the Court's adoption of a test
expressed in economic terms, like an incremental cost test for preda-
tory pricing, renders irrelevant any expert's testimony based on any
other measure of cost. 17 1 On the other hand, the Court may adopt a
rule that explicitly or implicitly contemplates the use of expert testi-
mony. The Court's rejection of a per se rule, whether per se lawful or
unlawful, typically implies the need for expert testimony to show the
requisite competitive effect.
Even if expert testimony is relevant to an issue in the case, it may
still be unhelpful. For instance, an expert's testimony might be re-
dundant or the issue sufficiently simple to be within the common un-
derstanding of lay jurors. The test of "helpfulness" implies an
assessment of the marginal benefit of the testimony in informing the
trier of fact. In addition, if the issue is not within the witness's exper-
tise, the testimony is unhelpful.' 7' For all the influence of economic
167 SeeLantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1025 (10th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with
district court that economics expert did not understand computers or the computer mar-
ket); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 134 (3d Cir. 1999) (faulting the expert
for knowing nothing about the baby food industry). Although certain qualifications are
necessary, multiplication of "credentials" does not necessarily make a witness more credi-
ble, and may mislead jurors. Jeffrey Harrison argues that courts should constrain appeals
to "institutional authority" where credentials are duplicative or irrelevant to the question of
competence. See Harrison, supra note 54, at 294-301.
168 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (quoting 3JAcK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE 1 702[02], at 702-18 (1988)).
169 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) ("The anticom-
petitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation
even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some.").
170 See infra Part III.A.
171 City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 567 n.27 (11 th Cir. 1998)
(noting in dicta that the expert's "opinions regarding the legal standards applicable to the




authority on antitrust law, not all rules of antitrust law are stated in
purely economic terms. To the extent that a rule of law incorporates
non-economic terms, an economic expert should not be permitted to
testify that the rule is or is not satisfied.172 For example, as discussed
later, the Sherman Act does not frame the definition of "agreement"
in purely economic terms. Though experts may testify to a number of
subsidiary issues relevant to the existence of an agreement, they may
not testify to the ultimate issue of whether an agreement exists within
the meaning of the statute.
3. Reliability
Most of the Daubert opinion dealt with the requirement that an
expert's methodology be scientifically reliable. This aspect of Daubert
has provoked the most discussion in antitrust circles because of its
potential effect on the way courts treat expert testimony regarding ec-
onomics, which some have argued is not a science. 17- Defining the
line between science and non-science, however, is less important after
Kumho Tire,1 7 4 which extended the reliability inquiry to all expert testi-
mony, including economic testimony in antitrust cases.
175 Courts will
scrutinize an economist's methodology to ensure that the expert has
assembled reliable data, selected reliable principles, and applied the
principles in a reliable way.' 76 This inquiry is common, as the next
Part will show, when expert economists rely on statistical methods
such as a multiple regression analysis. In those cases, courts examine
172 See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing expert testimony on the issue of collusion).
173 Many have questioned whether economics is truly a "science," given the difficulty
of testing the implications of economic models by the scientific method. See Gavil, supra
note 1, at 675 (arguing that "the testability and rate of error factors from Daubert did not
contemplate economics, or any other social science for that matter"); see also Brooks Fiber
Communications of Tucson, Inc. v. GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1124, 1132
(D. Ariz 1997) (holding that Daubert did not apply to expert economist testimony using
"basic economic modeling principles regarding price and cross-elasticity"); Bell Ad. Bus.
Sys. Servs., Inc. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,259, at 76,130-31
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that Daubert was not applicable to expert's testimony concerning
whether and how consumers perform total cost of ownership analysis).
174 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
175 See Coastal Fuels, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 175 F.3d 18, 34 n.12 (1st Cir.
1999) ("The district court's gatekeeping function extends to all expert evidence, including
economic analysis, not merely to evidence involving scientific conclusions." (citing Kumho
Tire, 526 U.S. at 138)); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 121 (discussing pre-Kumnho Tire
precedent).
176 See Coastal Fuels, 175 F.3d at 34 (stating that "Daubert requires 'that the proponent
of the evidence show that the expert's conclusion has been arrived at in a scientifically
sound and methodologically reliable fashion'" (quoting Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola Bottling
Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998))).
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the data set itself, in addition to the selection and use of statistical
methods.i
77
Reliability differs from relevance. One court erroneously sug-
gested that an expert's "methodology must be guided by the control-
ling legal principle, and to the extent that the expert ignores that
principle, the expert's testimony fails Daubert's test of a reliable meth-
odology."178 This statement confuses Daubert's methodological in-
quiry with its requirement that the testimony be relevant to the issues
defined by the law. An economic expert may propose to offer meth-
odologically sound testimony unexceptionable among economists, yet
excluded as irrelevant or held insufficient to support a jury verdict, if
the fact is not in issue under the appropriate legal standard.
Reliability is nevertheless related to relevance because antitrust
law imposes significant constraints on methodology. The economic
authority underlying antitrust rules may have methodological implica-
tions that displace or overlap with professional criteria of reliability.
Most disputes over the reliability of economic testimony in antitrust
cases turn on the requirements that the testimony be "based upon
sufficient facts or data" and that it rest upon "reliable principles and
methods."1 79 Courts say that the expert must have "applied the princi-
ples and methods reliably to the facts of the case," and that the testi-
mony must "incorporate all aspects of the economic reality of the...
market," including "inconvenient" evidence. 180 Moreover, under
Joiner,18 1 even if the methodology is sound, the testimony may still be
excluded if "there is simply too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered."
182
Antitrust law, however, has also incorporated criteria like these
into the framework of liability itself. The determination of issues such
as the definition of "relevant market" requires the consideration of
both empirical studies and theoretical models. For example, in
Microsoft,18 3 the court of appeals rejected the plaintiff's definition of
the market for Internet browsers because there was insufficient evi-
177 See, e.g., Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 793 (6th Cir. 2002); Con-
cord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1056-58 (8th Cir. 2000); Blomkest
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028, 1038 (8th Cir. 2000); Blue Dane Simmental
Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (8th Cir. 1999); In rePolypropylene
Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2000); In re Aluminum
Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1504 (D. Kan. 1995).
178 ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
179 FED. R. EvlD. 702.
180 Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1056-57.
181 Gen. Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
182 Id. at 146.
18- United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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dence in the record to support it.l84 The court could have reached
this same result using Daubert criteria for reliability.' 8 5 Instead, the
court faulted the testimony of the plaintiff's experts on the issue for
"uncertainty"186 because it offered "little more than conclusory state-
ments" rather than concrete evidence.18 7 The court's analysis of the
fit and reliability of the expert's testimony made no reference to
Daubert. Instead, the court treated the requirements of certainty and
supporting evidence as part of the legal standard for market defini-
tion. This characterization of the issue bypassed the Joiner rule that
trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewable only
for an abuse of discretion; 8 8 the legal sufficiency of the evidence is
reviewable de novo.
The approach to expert testimony in Microsoft illustrates a more
general point about the significance of Daubert for antitrust. Before
Daubert purportedly relaxed the standards for admissibility of expert
testimony, federal courts evaluated scientific testimony under Frye v.
United States,189 which focused on whether the expert's methodology
had gained general acceptance in the relevant field. 190 Significantly,
courts in antitrust cases never applied the Frye test,191 yet they now
routinely apply the Daubert trilogy. Thus, while Daubert "may create a
less stringent evidentiary standard than Frye, its standard appears to
apply to a greater range of expert testimony. ' 192 Nevertheless, both
184 Id. at 82-83.
185 For an example, see Worldwide Basketball and Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 273 F. Supp.
2d 933, 944 (S.D. Ohio 2003), in which the court excluded, on Daubert grounds, expert
testimony that pre- and post-season college basketball tournaments are a submarket of the
market for Division I college basketball. The court noted that the expert "fail[ed] to offer
a basis from which to conclude that this [was] an appropriate definition," and instead
"testified in conclusory fashion as to the definition and parameters of this submarket." Id.
The court concluded that the "testimony as to tournament games submarket lacks a suffi-
cient indicia of reliability to be admissible for purposes of Rule 702." Id.
186 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 83.
187 Id. "Simply invoking the phrase 'network effects' without pointing to more evi-
dence does not suffice to carry plaintiffs' burden in this respect." Id. at 84.
188 It is fairly rare to find explicit appellate applications of the Joiner rule to expert
testimony in antitrust cases, though such examples do exist. See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v.
Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming exclusion); Conwood
Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 781, 792-95 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming refusal to
exclude); Coastal Fuels, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 175 F.3d 18, 33-34 (1st Cir.
1999) (affirming refusal to exclude); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d
548, 562-65 (11th Cir, 1998) (reversing some exclusions and affirming others).
189 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
190 Id. at 47.
191 See Christopher B. Hockett & Frank M. Hinman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony in
Antitrust Cases: Does Daubert Raise a New Barrier to Entry for Economists , ANTITRUST, Summer




judges' 91  and mainstream economists' 9 4 have expressed the belief
that courts in antitrust cases do not disregard expert testimony much
more after Daubert than they did in the years immediately before. This
should not be surprising. Economic authority is embodied in rules
defining the elements of antitrust offenses, the requirements for anti-
trust injury, and other substantive antitrust rules guiding both the
methodology and relevance of economic testimony. Consequently,
economic authority pervasively controlled antitrust decisionmaking
before Daubert, and it continues to do so regardless of the procedural
heading under which courts deploy it.
4. Sufficiency
The primacy of economic authority is perhaps most evident in
the criteria for the legal sufficiency of evidence. As Daubert itself em-
phasized, expert testimony, even if admissible, may be found insuffi-
cient to create an issue of fact for a jury. 9 5 Thus, a court's finding
that evidence meets the threshold standard of reliability does not bar
the court from finding the evidence insufficient to raise a jury issue-
even on the specific issue the testimony addresses. More importantly,
the issues of relevance and helpfulness also necessarily affect suffi-
ciency. A court will grant summary judgment to the defendant if it
finds that the plaintiff's expert's testimony is irrelevant because the
testimony applies a standard inconsistent with economic authority.' 96
The same result could follow if the court allowed expert testimony on
subsidiary legal issues, but excluded testimony on the ultimate issue
on the ground that such testimony was outside the expert's area of
expertise. In such a case, the court would be required to determine
whether ajury, based on the expert's evidence, could reasonably infer
the existence of the necessary fact from all of the evidence, including
the expert's testimony on the subsidiary issues.
In antitrust cases, however, economic authority has a special role
in the analysis of the sufficiency of evidence. In some instances, the
Court has placed particular weight on certain theoretical propositions
about business behavior and its relationship to antitrust policy. Where
the Court has determined, based on economic authority, that allega-
tions "make[ I] no economic sense,'1 97 it has required more than the
usual amount of evidence of the conduct to create a jury issue. In
193 See Interview with Judge Kathryn Vratil, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 19, 20-21 (stating
that while Daubert motions are burdensome and frequently unsuccessful, they are often
nonetheless useful because they facilitate an early evaluation of the economic issues in the
case).
194 See Economists' Roundtable, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 8, 14.
195 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
196 See infra Part III.
197 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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effect, the Court increased the plaintiffs burden of production on the
issue. In such circumstances, the Court has approved summary judg-
ment even where expert testimony on the issue was admissible. 198
Once again, economic authority defines the role of expert testimony;
the sufficiency inquiry "forces the antitrust judge to get into the ex-
pert's discipline itself, rejecting the expert's own substantive conclu-
sions in favor of the judge's own."1 99
III
JUDICIAL CONTROL Or EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
CRITICAL CONTEXTS
Thus far, this Article has considered the rubrics under which
courts decide whether juries will be allowed to consider expert testi-
mony on antitrust issues. A court may disqualify an expert altogether.
If the expert is found qualified, the court may still exclude the ex-
pert's testimony on a motion in limine on the ground that it is irrele-
vant, unhelpful, or unreliable. Even if the testimony is not excluded
at this stage, the court may consider its consistency with legal stan-
dards and its sufficiency to create a jury issue on a motion for sum-
maryjudgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Thus,
many of the same issues considered on the motion in limine may be
considered at various points in the process of adjudication. The pro-
cedural context is less important in determining the extent ofjudicial
control than the applicable economic authority.
This Part examines how the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have used economic authority to control expert testimony in
the doctrinal contexts in which it has proven most important.200 In
each case, courts have confined expert testimony by formulating rules
defining the offense and the scope of liability. Having defined the
boundaries of the offense, courts then police the boundaries by evi-
dentiary rulings on either admissibility (usually for relevance) or suffi-
ciency. In some instances, courts have used the Daubert inquiry to
examine methodologies against the standard of the economics profes-
sion. The extent and effect of judicial control vary depending upon
the nature of the issue the court must resolve.
198 Id. at 598.
199 Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 137.
200 Our concern is with the mechanisms forjudicial deployment of economic author-
ity. The substance of the legal and economic ideas at issue is incidental to this discussion,
and we have not, for obvious practical reasons, attempted a comprehensive survey of the




The subject of predatory pricing has generated more academic
heat than any other antitrust issue of the last twenty years.2 0 1 Econo-
mists have debated the circumstances in which price-cutting may lead
to inefficient results and have proposed a myriad of tests by which the
courts should identify predatory pricing.21 2 From this spectrum, the
Supreme Court has chosen a Chicago School analysis of predation,
including both theoretical models and broad empirical estimates of
the significance of the practice20 3 Earlier courts had assumed that a
dominant firm could use retained earnings or profits from other mar-
kets to finance a campaign of low pricing to eliminate existing rivals
and deter new entrants. The Chicago critique, however, suggested
that certainty of present losses to the dominant firm in such a cam-
paign, combined with the uncertainty of future profits, made the con-
ventional story of predatory pricing dubious.20 4 Under this analysis,
predation is an implausible explanation for a dominant firm's behav-
ior in a price war because only in rare circumstances would predation
be rational, profit-maximizing behavior. Thus, most instances of ag-
gressive price-cutting are beneficial to consumers both initially and in
the long run. The policy implication was either that price-cutting
should be per se lawful 205 or that the test for its existence should be
stringently drawn to avoid overdeterrence. The Court has opted for
the latter course, making the claim of predatory pricing difficult-but
not impossible-to sustain. 20 6 The adoption of this view of predatory
pricing as economic authority has drastically narrowed the scope of
expert testimony in predatory pricing cases.
201 For a survey of the early literature, see Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory
Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
738 (1981). For more recent treatments, see Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory
Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002) and Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out
Entrants Are Not Predatory-and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE
L.J. 681 (2003).
202 See, e.g., John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 304-26
(1980).
203 See Page, supra note 9, at 1 287-90 (discussing the Court's analysis in Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 547 (1986), and the extension of that analysis in
Ind. Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1989)).
204 See ROBERT H. Borax, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 149-54 (1978); McGee, supra note
202, at 294-300. But see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REa. 925, 939-44 (1979) (criticizing McGee's and Bork's orthodox Chicago theory
that predatory pricing is irrational, and in the long run improbable, merely because of the
ill effects on the predator's short run profits).
205 See generally BORK, supra note 204, at 144-54 (discussing and critiquing the theory
and techniques of predation).
206 See, e.g., Beech Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Prods. Co., 69 Fed. Appx. 350,
352-53 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding the sufficiency of plaintiffs predatory pricing claim).
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In Matsushita,20 7 the Court made perhaps its most explicit use of
the Chicago models to affirm a summary judgment. The case alleged
a twenty-year conspiracy by Japanese firms to charge predatory prices
on sales of electronic products in the United States.2081 The Court dis-
cerned a "consensus among commentators that predatory pricing
schemes," even by a single firm, "are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful. '20 9 In Matsushita itself, the alleged predation was even less
plausible because the defendants would have had to organize and
maintain a cartel over many years to put the scheme into effect. Thus,
the improbability of either a stable cartel or a successful campaign of
predatory pricing combined to make the claim especially implausible.
To make matters worse, an erroneous finding of liability would "chill
the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect"-in this
case price-cutting, which "is the very essence of competition. "210
The Matsushita Court did not, however, adopt a standard of per
se legality, as some Chicagoans had proposed. Instead, the Court re-
lied on the theoretical critique to alter the standard for summary
judgment: if the defendants "had no rational economic motive to con-
spire . . . , and if [defendants'] conduct is consistent with other,
equally plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an
inference of conspiracy."21 1 Where the claim alleges a type of con-
duct, such as predatory pricing, that is intrinsically implausible in light
of the relevant economic authoity, the plaintiff must offer more concrete
evidence that the conduct is monopolistic. The higher burden on the
plaintiff carries with it a higher standard of sufficiency of evidence to
create a jury question. In Matsushita, the combination of implausibili-
ties justified summary judgment.
212
The Court dismissed as insignificant the plaintiffs' expert testi-
mony "that petitioners had sold their products in the American mar-
ket at substantial losses."2 1 3 The district court originally excluded the
testimony on the grounds that it was based on assumptions about the
defendants' costs that were implausible and inconsistent with the evi-
dence.2 1 4 The court of appeals, however, reversed the district court
on this issue. 215 The Supreme Court did not disagree, but neverthe-
less relied on the substance of the district court's ruling to discount
207 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
208 Id. at 574-78.
209 Id. at 588.
210 Id. at 594
211 Id. at 596-97.
212 Id. at 579, 580, 598.
213 Id. at 594 n.19.
214 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1356-63
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
215 Unlike the district court, the court of appeals thought the expert's testimony was
helpful to the jury:
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the probative value of the testimony. The Court held that "the expert
opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has little probative value in
comparison with the economic factors ... that suggest that such con-
duct is irrational. '21 6 The Court thus explicitly subordinated expert
testimony on an issue of fact to the Court's own inferences from mod-
els it had adopted as economic authority. The theoretical critique of
the predatory pricing doctrine was sufficiently powerful to reduce to
insubstantiality admissible expert testimony that the pricing was below
cost.
The expert's report, discussed at greater length injustice White's
dissent, portrayed the defendants as participating in a cartel whose
aim was to raise prices in the Japanese market but to lower them in
the United States.2 1 7 Thus, injustice White's view, the American man-
ufacturers were injured not only by predatory pricing, but also by the
larger illegal cartel agreement, of which predation was only a part.
The report "alone creates a genuine factual issue regarding the harm
to respondents caused by Japanese cartelization and by agreements
restricting competition among petitioners in this country."2 18 Justice
White caustically observed, "No doubt the Court prefers its own eco-
nomic theorizing to Dr. DePodwin's, but that is not a reason to deny
the factfinder an opportunity to consider Dr. DePodwin's views on
how petitioners' alleged collusion harmed respondents. '2 19 Moreo-
ver, Justice White challenged the majority's insistence that the plausi-
bility of the defendants' scheme depends upon a measure of profit
maximization rather than growth maximization, which, he said,
should have been given to the jury as an issue of fact.
220
What the court in effect did was to eliminate all parts of the report in which
the expert economist, after describing the conditions in the respective mar-
kets, the opportunities for collusion, the evidence pointing to collusion, the
terms of certain undisputed agreements, and the market behavior, ex-
pressed the opinion that there was concert of action consistent with plain-
tiffs' conspiracy theory. Considering the complexity of the economic issues
involved, it simply cannot be said that such an opinion would not help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine that fact in issue.
In reJapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 280 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'g, Matsu-
shita, 505 F. Supp. at 1342-46.
216 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 n.19 (1986).
217 Id. at 602 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 603 (White, J., dissenting).
219 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 604 (White, J., dissenting)
The Court, in discussing the unlikelihood of a predatory conspiracy, also
consistently assumes that petitioners valued profit-maximization over
growth.... In light of the evidence that petitioners sold their goods in this
country at substantial losses over a long period of time, . . . I believe that




The majority rejected the substance of Justice White's argument
by characterizing the higher prices in Japan as irrelevant to the preda-
tion claim in the United States.22 ' Even if the cartel prices in Japan
provided the means to sustain long-term losses, that fact did not sup-
ply a motive, without which the alleged scheme remained implausi-
ble.222 The majority did not respond directly to Justice White's
argument for the primacy of expert testimony, but it evidently be-
lieved that economic authority (what Justice White called the Court's
"own economic theorizing") could set limits on the range of accept-
able expert opinion.
In Brooke Group,2 23 the Court refined the standard for predatory
pricing into a two-part test. First, the plaintiff must show that defen-
dant's prices are below an appropriate measure of cost.22 4 Second,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant "had a reasonable pros-
pect..., of recouping its investment in below-cost prices. ' 225 Both of
these requirements have imposed significant constraints on experts.
The first requirement excludes all expert opinion that even above-cost
pricing may be predatory, regardless whether that proposition is
respected among economists. 226 Then-Judge (now Justice) Breyer
had reasoned in an earlier case that, even if above-cost price cutting
by dominant firms could be theoretically inefficient, the law should
not recognize claims on this basis for institutional reasons associated
with the legal process:
[A] price cut that ends up with a price exceeding total cost-in all
likelihood a cut made by a firm with market power-is almost cer-
tainly moving price in the "right" direction (towards the level that
would be set in a competitive marketplace). The antitrust laws very
rarely reject such beneficial "birds in hand" for the sake of more
speculative (future low-price) "birds in the bush."
227
221 Id. at 593 ("[T]here is nothing to suggest any relationship between petitioners'
profits in Japan and the amount petitioners could expect to gain from a conspiracy to
monopolize the American market.").
222 See id.
223 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
224 Id. at 223.
225 Id. at 224.
226 See, e.g., Edlin, supra note 201, at 941 (arguing that "there is no compelling reason
to restrict predation cases to below-cost pricing, as above-cost pricing can also hurt con-
sumers by limiting competition"); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 138 (suggesting that
the requirement of below-cost predatory pricing "has little to do with economic theories of
limit pricing" and everything to do with "perceived limitations in the fact finding process").
227 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 233-34 (1st Cir. 1983); see
also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 (placing a special evidentiary burden on predatory pricing
claims because outlawing a practice that brings lower prices to consumers is "especially




The Supreme Court in Brooke Group likewise suggested that "it would
be illogical to condemn" an above-cost price cut because to do so
would deter price cutting that might undermine a noncompetitive
price structure, and, in any event, such a policy would "depriv[e] con-
sumers of the benefits of lower prices in the interim."2 28 In effect,
above-cost pricing, no matter how destructive to competitors, falls
within a "safe harbor"
22 9-a form of per se legality.
2"1
Thus, the Court acknowledged that above-cost price-cutting
might impose social costs, but for institutional reasons rejected any
rule imposing liability. In these situations, the immediate and obvious
benefit to consumers outweighs as a matter of law the potential social
cost, even though the latter may predominate in theory. Thus, even if
a plaintiffs expert proposed to testify that prices above average total
cost were predatory, the testimony would be insufficient as a matter of
law.23 1 Even if the testimony were admitted and the expert testified
that the defendant's price-cutting drove the plaintiff from the market,
and, as a result, prices in the market increased, the plaintiff would still
lose as a matter of law.
23 2
Brooke Group's definition of a predatory price went still further.
The Court referred to "incremental cost" in its adoption of the re-
quirement that prices be below cost.2 -33 Because the parties had
agreed "that the relevant measure of cost is average variable cost," the
Court explicitly "decline [d] to resolve the conflict among the lower
courts over the appropriate measure of cost."234 Nevertheless, Brooke
Group appears to point toward some measure of incremental cost
228 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223-24; see also Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,
207 F.3d 1039, 1060-63 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that Brunswick's market share discounts
were simply price cutting and, therefore, protected by Brooke Group). But cf. LePage's, Inc.
v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that bundled rebates covering multi-
ple product lines, combined with exclusive dealing arrangements, were illegally exclusion-
ary even if above cost).
229 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, 735, at 318 (rev. ed.
1996).
230 The Court also noted that "[a]lthough unsuccessful predatory pricing may en-
courage some inefficient substitution toward the product being sold at less than its cost,
unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers." Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224.
231 See Virgin Ad. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 268-69 .(2d Cir.
2001) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff, despite its expert's testimony,
"failed in its burden to show below cost pricing").
232 See Rebel Oil Co. v. Ati. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1444 (9th Cir. 1995). Conse-
quently, the losses suffered by competitors during this period "are not the stuff of antitrust
injury. It would be incongruous to award damages to plaintiffs for actions that in general
benefit consumer welfare." Id.
233 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223 (observing that, although earlier cases had reserved
the question of whether a predatory price could be "above some measure of incremental
cost," those cases' reasoning implied that "only below-cost prices should suffice" (citations
omitted)).
234 Id. at 222 n.1.
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rather than average total cost as the relevant standard. This refine-
ment of the rule imposes still more onerous restrictions on experts
who propose to testify that price cuts are predatory.
23 5
In American Airlines,2 36 for example, the government alleged that
American strategically added capacity on four core routes from its Dal-
las hub in order to drive out low-cost carriers and garner monopoly
profits, both on those routes and on others where it had established a
reputation for predation.2 3 7 Characterizing the charge as predatory
pricing,2 38 the courts held that the alleged pricing behavior was non-
predatory as a matter of law, even though, as the court of appeals
acknowledged, recent post-Chicago theories of predatory pricing justi-
fied greater receptiveness to claims of predation. 23 9 The court scruti-
nized the government experts' testimony, which purported to show
that American priced below the various measures of cost that Ameri-
can itself used in making business decisions. 240 The court concluded
that the testimony was insufficient to create a jury issue, holding that
marginal cost is the appropriate theoretical standard for judging
whether prices are predatory, that any proxy for marginal cost "must
be accurate and reliable in the specific circumstances of the case at
bar," and that average variable cost is such a proxy.2 4 1 The govern-
ment's proposed cost tests, however, were not proxies for marginal
cost, or its close relative incremental cost. Consequently, those tests
were "implicitly ruled out by Brooke Group's mention of incremental
235 Cf. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 533 n.14 (5th Cir. 1999)
(affirming summaryjudgment where the expert erroneously assumed that the law "allowed
a finding of predation when prices are above a firm's variable costs but below a 'short-run
profit maximizing price"'); Rebel Oil Co. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th
Cir. 1998) (finding the expert's use of opportunity cost in predatory-pricing scheme as the
measure of defendant's cost was improper as a matter of law).
236 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), afj'g 140 F. Supp. 2d
1141 (D. Kan. 2001).
237 1d. at 1111.
238 AMR, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 ("The anti-competitive conduct alleged... is preda-
tory pricing: that American, in the face of low fare carrier competition, shifted from its
traditional strategy and adopted competitive tools which combined price reductions and
capacity increases, and that the cost of these tools was greater than the revenue ob-
tained."), affd, 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 n.6 ("While the specific behavior complained of in the
instant case is an increase in output or frequency, these actions must be analyzed in terms
of their effect on price and cost.").
For a criticism of the court's characterization of American's practices as predatory
pricing, see GregoryJ. Werden, The American Airlines Decision: Not with a Bang but a Whim-
per, ANrITRUST, Fall 2003, at 32, 33 (arguing that the government was essentially challeng-
ing American Airline's strategy of flying empty seats in excess of those needed for available
passengers as a means of drawing passengers away from low-cost entrant).
239 See AMR, 335 F.3d at 1115 ("Although this court approaches the matter with cau-
tion, we do not do so with the incredulity that once prevailed.").
240 See id.
241 See id. at 1116.
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costs only. '2 42 The court identified elements of the government ex-
pert's proposed measure of cost that "do not vary proportionately with
the level of flight activity" but "are allocated arbitrarily to a flight or
route."243 For the court, these elements of cost rendered the govern-
ment expert's proposed measure non-incremental, and therefore
irrelevant.
244
The second prong of the Brooke Group test requires that plaintiffs
prove the defendant has a reasonable prospect of recouping its invest-
ment in the predatory campaign. 245 This requirement also affects ex-
pert testimony because it typically involves proof that the defendant
will be able to exercise market power.246 In Cargill247 for example,
the Court examined market share and other factors bearing on mar-
ket power to evaluate the plausibility of a claim that a firm was capable
of predation. 248 Also, the Court's adoption in Brooke Group of an ex-
press requirement of recoupment has led lower courts to scrutinize
expert testimony regarding the likelihood of recoupment, largely on
the grounds of market definition and market power.249 The skepti-
cism implicit in the governing models of the practice, combined with
the fear of overdeterrence, diminishes the deference afforded to ex-
pert opinions.
In Brooke Group itself, the plaintiff offered a complex argument
that recoupment would occur as a result of the restoration of oligop-
oly pricing after the victims of predation were sufficiently chas-
242 Id. at 1117.
243 Id. at 1119; see also Werden, supra note 238, at 34 (suggesting that the court "must
have spent months combing the record for even the slightest indication that the Depart-
ment's experts had overstated true incremental cost").
244 AMR 335 F.3d at 1120. Werden observes that:
The court did not even mention the Department's proffered expert opin-
ion that avoidable cost had been estimated conservatively. Assuming the
court did not just fail to notice this critical testimony, it must have implicitly
held that the testimony lacked a sufficient factual basis, or improperly de-
cided a disputed issue of material fact.
Werden, supra note 238, at 35; see also Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Air-
lines Case: A Chance to Clarify Predation Policy (2001), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra
note 1, at 502 (describing the various measures of cost advanced as the standard of "sacri-
fice" necessary to establish predation).
245 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993).
246 See id. at 225.
247 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
248 Id. at 119 n.15.
249 The district court in American Airlines granted summary judgment on the recoup-
ment issue, because "the uncontroverted evidence establishe[d] that DFW routes are not
structurally susceptible to the supra-competitive prices which is a prerequisite to a success-
ful predatory pricing scheme." AMI, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. The court of appeals did
not reach the recoupment issue because it concluded that the government had failed to
establish below-cost pricing. AMR, 335 F.3d at 1120-21.
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tened.250 The Court, however, relied on economic authority to reject
the plaintiffs evidence, including its expert testimony. The Court
pointed out that, although there was evidence prices were increasing,
output was increasing as well-a fact inconsistent with the economic
principle that "[s]upracompetitive pricing entails a restriction in out-
put. '251 Moreover, the evidence concerning price increases was ques-
tionable because it focused on list prices rather than transaction
prices.2 52 Given the difficulty of tacitly coordinating prices, the Court
found insufficient evidence that the strategy was likely to allow
recoupment.2
5 3
Expert testimony did not change this assessment.254 According to
the Court, "[e] xpert testimony is useful as a guide to interpreting mar-
ket facts, but it is not a substitute for them."2 5 5 Moreover, "[w]hen an
expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the
eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or other-
wise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury's ver-
dict."2 56 For example, the expert in Brooke Group relied on the
defendant's internal documents expressing a desire to slow the
growth of the generic cigarette market. 257 Yet the Court found the
documents insufficient because the defendant had engaged in a mar-
keting effort to increase demand for generic cigarettes25 8-behavior
consistent with the Court's economic authority.259 The critical point
to note here is that economic authority-the theoretical models and
related assumptions that the Court adopted-defined the facts and
evidence for which the Court searched. Whatever the legitimacy of
the expert's testimony as a matter of economics, it did not trump the
Court's own economic assumptions.
250 Brook Group, 509 U.S. at 233.
251 Id. at 233-34; see also id at 237 ("Where, as here, output is expanding at the same
time prices are increasing, rising prices are equally consistent with growing product
demand.").
252 Id. at 235-36. ("[I]n an oligopoly setting, in which price competition is most likely
to take place through less observable and less regulable means than list prices, it would be
unreasonable to draw conclusions about the existence of tacit coordination or supracom-
petitive pricing from data that reflect only list prices.").
253 Id. at 238-39.
254 Id. at 242.
255 Id.
256 Id. But cf Metronet Servs. Corp. v. U.S. West Communications, 329 F.3d 986,
1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court's disregard of experts' testimony in
the absence of a "reasoned analysis of how their opinions" were inconsistent with the
record).
257 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 241.
258 Id. at 241-42.
259 Id. at 241-43.
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B. Markets and Market Power
Some form of monopoly power is necessary for any restriction of
competition. Historically, however, antitrust's reliance on per se rules
often bypassed the requirement that plaintiffs prove that defendants
possessed market power.260 If it appeared that a form of conduct was
unlikely to occur in the absence of monopoly power, and if the con-
duct did not appear to have any redeeming qualities, the courts be-
lieved they could safely find a violation based on proof of conduct
alone. 26' Where market power was an issue, as in merger cases, mar-
ket definition was sometimes conducted formalistically in an effort to
generate high or low market shares, which were then viewed as all but
conclusive proof of market power. 262 Ad hoc notions like "sub-
markets" contributed to this sort of gerrymandering.
263
The growing economic sophistication of the courts has changed
this pattern radically. First, as we have seen, the Court has abandoned
or limited traditional per se rules, recognizing that the practices the
rules covered were not inevitably monopolistic. Under the new rules,
if anticompetitive effects are proven directly or can be inferred from
an accepted theory, and if there is no contrary and plausible explana-
tion for these effects, courts must find that market power exists be-
cause market power is a prerequisite for competitive harm. Courts
have also become more aware, through the unstructured acquisition
of economic authority, of the factors that bear on market definition
and their relevance to market power.264 Courts now recognize that
market definition requires the sophisticated use of data and theory-a
260 See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) ("The
standard of 'sufficient economic power' does not ... require that the defendant have a
monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for the tying product.");
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) ("[A] conspiracy to
fix prices violates § 1 of the [Sherman] Act . . . [,] though it is not established that the
conspirators had the means available for accomplishment of their objective . . ").
261 See N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("[Tlhere are certain agree-
ments or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal with-
out elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use.").
262 See, e.g, Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust,
90 Coi.uM. L. REv. 1805, 1808 (1990) (observing that early approaches to market definition
produced "excessively, and sometimes ludicrously, narrow market definitions").
263 See Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out In An Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise Of
Submarkets, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, 206 (2000) ("Blind application [of the submarket con-
cept] allowed courts to define inappropriately narrow submarkets within the outer bounds
of markets properly defined with reference to substitution possibilities.").
264 Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. Rv. 123,
125 (1992) ("Much of the intellectual development of the concepts relating to antitrust
market delineation took place in classrooms and seminar halls at law schools and econom-
ics departments, in judges' chambers, and in the offices of enforcement agencies, law
firms, and economic consultants." (citations omitted)).
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process that typically requires expert testimony.2 65 At the same time,
however, the law's incorporation of the economic criteria of market
definition now constrains how experts can address the issues. Courts
insist on adherence to economic authority in market definition and
the inference of market power.
1. Market Definition
In recent years, the views of professional economists and the
lower federal courts on the criteria for market definition have con-
verged:266 "[T] he issues of principle that plagued market definition in
the early years have receded, and the cases now involve questions of
fact within a settled framework of economic theory. ' 267 Under this
new consensus, courts insist on the consideration of all sources of sub-
stitution, both in demand and supply, that may affect consumer wel-
fare and thus influence the definition of product or geographic
markets. 268 Some courts require experts to perform standard statisti-
cal tests before testimony on market definition will be admitted.269 In
effect, widely recognized economic criteria for market definition have
become elements of antitrust law. Consequently, many of the same
issues arise whether the court considers the admissibility of the evi-
dence on the grounds of reliability or relevance. 270 And the same is-
265 See, e.g., Am. Key Corp. v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 762 F.2d 1569, 1579 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that "[c] onstruction of a relevant economic market or a showing of monopoly
power in that market cannot.., be based upon lay opinion testimony"); Va. Vermiculite,
Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 549, 576 n.16 (W.D. Va. 2000) (holding expert
testimony practically necessary for market definition); Drs. Stener & Latham, P.A. v. Nat'l
Med. Enters., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1512 n.25 (D.S.C. 1987) ("Failure to adduce expert
testimony on competitive issues such as market definition augurs strongly in favor of grant-
ing summary judgment against an antitrust plaintiff."), afJ'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988)
(Table). Although the court in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 130 F.3d 1101 (2d Cir. 1997), stated that "experts are not always essential
to defining the relevant market," id. at 904, it cited for this proposition United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966), which dates from an era in which market definition
was not conducted on economic grounds.
266 See POSNER, supra note 55, at 156 (arguing that the Supreme Court has left develop-
ment of the law of market definsition to the lower courts, which have, in turn, followed the
enforcement agencies' Merger Guidelines in developing a new consensus).
267 Id.
268 See, e.g., United States v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (af-
firming the definition of a market for "general purpose credit cards" based on expert testi-
mony concerning consumer preferences in forms of payment).
269 See, e.g., Berlyn, Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (D. Md.
2002) (excluding an expert's opinion because his methods were not shown to be "of the
type that other experts would use to determine the relevant markets in an antitrust case");
Vermiculite, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 736 (excluding expert testimony for, among other things,
failure to test alternative hypotheses or to use an Elzinga-Hogarty test).
270 See, e.g., Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1246-47 (11th Cir. 2002) (granting
summary judgment where the plaintiffs expert ignored Eleventh Circuit precedent on
market definition); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 567 n.27 (lth
Cir. 1998) (stating in dicta that expert's assertion that the relevant market is the "largest
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sues may arise in evaluating the probative value of evidence on a
motion for summaryjudgment or judgment as a matter of law.
2 7
Courts thus routinely exclude expert testimony or find it insuffi-
cient on the basis of economic authority. For example, Judge Easter-
brook recently affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on a
claim that the defendant's exclusive contracts for placement of at-
shelf coupon dispensers in retail stores unreasonably restrained
trade.272 The plaintiff had submitted expert testimony that at-shelf
coupons constitute a market distinct from other forms of promotional
devices. 273 Judge Easterbrook, however, found the evidence insuffi-
cient to raise a jury issue. 274 According to Judge Easterbrook's read-
ing of the economic authority, products are in the same market if
statistical evidence shows that the price or output of one varies with
the price of the other. The plaintiffs experts, however, had offered
only "a potpourri of survey research and armchair economics." 275 A
survey purporting to show that consumers prefer at-shelf coupons to
other kinds of coupons was indeed properly excluded under Rule 702
as "unscientific,"276 but was "economically irrelevant anyway" 2 77 be-
cause substitution in supply or substitution by consumers with no pref-
erence among kinds of coupons could still prevent the exercise of
market power by producers of at-shelf coupons. Similarly, evidence
that the output of at-shelf coupon dispensers rose and that the price
paid retailers to accept placement increased during a period of com-
petition was not evidence that the product constituted a market; the
evidence failed to show whether the increase was the result of substitu-
tion away from other promotional devices. Evidence of a shift toward
at-shelf dispensers in response to an effective reduction in price would
tend to show that all promotional devices are in the same market. 278
Finally, because the economists had used both list prices instead of
transaction prices and an incorrect measure of cost, Judge Easter-
brook discounted a study purporting to demonstrate that price/cost
market for which data are available" was contrary to law); FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F.
Supp. 2d 151, 160 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding plaintiff's expert's estimate was not credible
because it was based on untested assumptions that carried only an eighty-five percent confi-
dence level); City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1437, 1457 (D. Kan.
1990) (excluding relevant evidence on market definition because it ignored precedent
requiring focus on products consumers view as reasonably interchangeable).
271 See Bailey, 284 F.3d at 1246-47.
272 Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 354 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
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margins for at-shelf dispensers had increased as market share
increased.
2 79
The plaintiffs economists maintain thatJudge Easterbrook failed
to address tests they did perform, placed too much weight on the ab-
sence of a covariance analysis, and erred in his assessment of their
price/cost analysis. 280 The crucial point for our purposes, however, is
that Judge Easterbrook resolved these questions as a matter of the law
of market definition, based on his own interpretation of economic
authority. This approach, while more economically assured than that
of most judges, is fairly typical.
28 1
Despite these strictures, courts recognize that economists must be
pragmatic in the process of market definition. Courts do not prevent
279 Id. at 666.
280 In a recent communication, one of the plaintiffs economists wrote:
Judge Easterbrook's decision did not address many of the analyses done by
the experts engaged by Menasha. For example, Dr. Langenfeld (who the
judge characterized as a "marketing" expert) performed a critical loss analy-
sis to determine if at-shelf coupon dispensers was a relevant product mar-
ket. Dr. Langenfeld's analysis adjusted for cellophane fallacy issues, and
supported his approach with several refereed articles. The judge faulted
Dr. Warren-Boulton for not performing a statistical covariance analysis simi-
lar to that suggested by Stigler and Sherwin in their 1985 article. Although
such analyses can be useful in offering support for market definition, the
substantial literature since that article has explained the limits of such anal-
yses and, under any condition, the defendant in this case did not provide
sufficient information in discovery to perform the detailed statistical analy-
sis of prices over time that Judge Easterbrook favored. Instead, among
other analyses, both Dr. Warren-Boulton and Dr. Langenfeld offered evi-
dence (including statistical regression analysis by Dr. Warren-Boulton) of a
"natural experiment" that would shed light on the relevant market. NAMIS
purchased its main competitor, ActMedia, a few years before the case, and
both experts found NAMIS's margins increased as a result of that merger.
There was a factual dispute over whether this increase was due to reduced
competition, but the evidence was consistent with an at-shelf coupon dis-
pensing market and NAMIS having a dominant position in that market.
E-mail from James Langenfeld to William H. Page (Oct. 18, 2004) (on file with authors).
281 A Ninth Circuit panel, echoing Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209 (1993), wrote that 'if
there are undisputed facts about the structure of the market that render the inference
economically unreasonable, the expert opinion is insufficient to support a jury verdict."
Rebel Oil Co. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1995). The court found
insufficient an expert's testimony that full service and self-service gasoline distribution
were in different markets, because the expert had failed to consider supply substitution-
i.e., that full service pumps can be converted into self-service pumps at virtually no cost. Id.
at 1436-37.
Another court found insufficient expert testimony that the product market was lim-
ited to natural gas sold for residential use, where the record showed that gas sold for other
uses was identical, and that other energy sources for home heat were available. Bailey v.
Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1246-47 (11 th Cir. 2002). The court also rejected the expert's
testimony that the geographic market was limited to a twenty-mile radius around the plain-
tiffs' distributorship, where the expert failed to consider prices and locations of other dis-
tributors or consumer customer preferences. Id. at 1248; see also FTC v. Tenet Healthcare
Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court erred in defining a
geographic market for hospitals in which, expert testimony showed, twenty-two percent of
residents use services at hospitals outside of the putative market).
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experts from making simplifying assumptions in the data they collect
and analyze, so long as the experts have legitimate grounds for their
choices and the choices are consistent with sound econometric prac-
tice. 282 For example, one court upheld under Daubert an expert's de-
cision to exclude from the market for air travel those cities less than
150 miles from each other because ground travel was assumed to be a
viable substitute at those distances.
283
2. Market Power
While legal standards for market definition closely track eco-
nomic standards, the legal definition of market power differs signifi-
candy from its economic counterpart. 28 4 In economic theory, a firm
has market power if it faces a downward-sloping demand curve. A
competitive firm faces a horizontal demand curve; it takes the market
price as given and sets its output at the point at which the marginal
cost of production equals the price. If the firm faces a downward-
sloping demand curve, it will recognize that its output decisions affect
the price-the definition of market power.285 The law, however, has
long recognized that this definition is far too inclusive to be of any
practical legal use.
2 86
Consequently, antitrust law has fallen back on a variety of proxies
for market power, especially market share.28 7 To determine market
share, the court must first define the relevant market. At one time,
282 See In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1366-67 (N.D.
Ga. 2000) (finding that the "[e]xclusion of outliers is a common practice in statistical anal-
ysis" and that the expert's use of data filters did not alter his analysis).
283 In re Northwest Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 197 F. Supp. 2d 908, 916, 919 (E.D.
Mich. 2002). The court also found the expert's testimony admissible even though it ex-
cluded city-pairs in which the defendants held fifty percent or less of the market. The
court rejected defense arguments that the expert was assuming market power wherever
Northwest had more than a fifty percent market share, noting that the expert made the
exclusion not to define the market, but to "streamline" the analysis by identifying markets
with characteristics that were consistent with market power. Id.
284 Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 95, 100 (2002).
285 Where demand is horizontal, the price (average revenue) is equal to marginal reve-
nue because the firm captures the full revenue from the sale of each additional unit. If
demand is downward-sloping, marginal revenue falls below average revenue because the
sale of each additional unit drives down the market price, and this applies to all of the
intramarginal units. Thus, the firm maximizes profit by setting its marginal cost equal to
marginal revenue, not price.
286 See POSNER, supra note 55, at 22 (arguing that "to infer that every seller who faces a
downward-sloping demand curve has monopoly power in a sense interesting to antitrust
law would be a profound mistake"); cf Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic
Analysis after Kodak, 3 Sup. CT. ECON. Rav. 43, 72-74 (1993) (observing that most econo-
mists distinguish among degrees of market power for policy purposes, but advocating in-
stead a distinction between a firm's individual pricing discretion and market power).




market share figures were all but decisive in determining market
power-a phenomenon closely related to the practice of gerryman-
dering in market definition. 288 Courts now recognize that other fac-
tors, especially the absence of barriers to entry, may undermine an
inference of market power even from very high market shares. 289
Nevertheless, it remains a matter of economic authority that mar-
ket share is relevant to the existence of market power.2 90 First, high
concentration still creates an inference of market power. In merger
cases, for example, the presence of a high Herfindahl-Hirshmann In-
dex (HHI) 291 combined with a significant increase in concentration
creates a prima facie case that the merger will lead to anticompetitive
effects. 292 Very "high market concentration levels . . . require, in re-
buttal, proof of extraordinary efficiencies."293 An expert opposing
such figures is at a disadvantage. In Heinz, for example, the court of
appeals reversed the district court's finding that a merger in a market
with very high HHI figures and high entry barriers would not increase
the risk of tacit collusion, despite expert testimony.294 Economic au-
thority embodied in scholarly literature and the enforcement agen-
cies' Merger Guidelines made the district court's reliance on expert
testimony erroneous as a matter of law. On the other hand, low mar-
ket shares virtually foreclose the existence of market power. Yet the
law continues to impose market share thresholds on findings of mar-
ket power, and thus forecloses any expert opinion to the contrary.2 95
Expert opinions that firms with market shares of under fifty percent
have monopoly power have been found insufficient as a matter of
288 See Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural
Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 22 n.90 (1994) (arguing that the Warren Court erred in
"setting its market power criteria too low and relying exclusively on market shares, espe-
cially in gerrymandered markets... to determine power"); George J. Stigler, The Economists
and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 Am. EcoN. REv. 1, 9 (1982) ("The typical antitrust case is an
almost impudent exercise in economic gerrymandering.").
289 See BAUER & PACE, supra note 287, at 333.
290 See id. at 334.
291 The HHI is a measure of market concentration and is defined as the sum of the
squares of the market shares of all of the firms in the market.
292 See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Sufficiently
large HHI figures establish the FTC's prima facie case that a merger is anti-competitive.").
293 &d at 720.
294 Id. at 724 ("[T] he district court made no finding that any of these 'cartel problems'
are so much greater in the baby food industry than in other industries that they rebut the
normal presumption [arising from a high HHI]."). For a discussion of Heinz by the de-
fense expert, see Jonathan B. Baker, Efficiencies and High Concentration: Heinz Proposes to
Acquire Beech-Nut (2001), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 150.
295 BAUER & PAGE, supra note 287, at 335-37.
[Vol. 90:617
2005] ECONOMIC AUTHORITY
law.296 Likewise, courts frequently reject expert testimony resting on
unorthodox proxies for market power.
29 7
In some instances, courts have allowed plaintiffs to bypass the
market share inquiry (and therefore the market definition inquiry) by
permitting "direct" proof of market power-for instance, by showing
that the defendant in fact exercised market power by reducing output
and increasing price. 298 The FTC has successfully argued, for exam-
ple, that a merger of close competitors in a broader market of differ-
entiated products may result in unilateral anticompetitive effects. 299
Traditionally, antitrust law evaluates mergers by estimating the risk
that the increased concentration will facilitate price coordination.
This "unilateral effects" approach attempts to identify mergers in
which the surviving firm, even if lacking a large share of a convention-
ally defined market, may be able to increase the price of an item with-
out diverting sufficient sales to competitors to make the increase
unprofitable.30 0 Economists using price data from a range of geo-
graphic markets are able to provide a firm basis for predicting the
effects of a merger by showing the effects of competition between
close competitors.
296 See, e.g., Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding
that market share of fifty percent or less is inadequate as a matter of law to establish market
power and that expert's use of return on investment to measure market power had not
been accepted by any other circuit).
297 See, e.g., Bailey v, Allgas, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1245 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (finding
that expert's opinion that the "true test of market power is concentration ratios or other
indices, not market share" and use of return on investment to show market power was
contrary to law (internal quotation marks omitted)); Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 729, 739 (W.D. Va. 2000) (finding that expert's contention that mo-
nopolist is a seller that increases prices without reducing output was wrong as a matter of
law because monopolists decrease output while increasing price).
298 In NCAA, the collegiate athletic association argued that it had no market power in
the sale of rights to tclevise football games. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 109 (1984). The Court rejected the argument on both legal and factual grounds.
Id. As to the factual refutation, the Court relied on lower court findings that no good
substitutes existed for televised college football games. Id. at 111. But it might have simply
repeated its earlier conclusion that "[t]he anticompetitive consequences of this arrange-
ment are apparent .... Price is higher and output is lower than they otherwise would be."
Id. at 106-07. Even though the Court's conclusion may have been wrong, its logic com-
pelled the further conclusion that the NCAA had market power.
299 The court in FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1082-83 (D.D.C. 1997) issued a
preliminary injunction against the merger of two office superstores based in part on the
FTC's econometric studies showing that markets with a single superstore had significantly
higher prices than those in which there were competing superstores. For a discussion of
the economic data in the case, see Serdar Dalkir & Frederick R. Warren-Bouhon, Prices,
Market Definition, and the Effects oJ Mferger: Staples-Office Depot (1997), in THE ANTITRUST
REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 52; see also POSNER, supra note 55, at 157-58.
300 See generally Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, Spring




The Supreme Court's decision in Eastman Kodak,30 1 and its after-
math in the lower federal courts, illustrates the interaction of eco-
nomic authority and expertise in resolving a critical issue of market
definition and market power. The Supreme Court in Kodak rejected
an argument that economic theory foreclosed any inquiry, by expert
testimony or otherwise, into the existence of monopoly power in so-
called aftermarkets-the "markets" for a single firm's parts and repair
services.30 2 The decision predictably led to a flood of lawsuits by the
rivals of large firms in their downstream parts and service markets.
The lower courts stemmed the tide, however, by identifying in the
facts of Kodak conditions for liability that firms could avoid in structur-
ing their aftermarket programs.
303
In Kodak, independent service organizations that provided parts
and maintenance for Kodak copiers and micrographic equipment
30 4
were driven from the market by Kodak's sale of replacement parts
only to purchasers of Kodak equipment who either used Kodak's re-
pair service or who repaired their own equipment.30 5 The Court held
that there was sufficient evidence to create ajury issue that Kodak had
economic power in the tying (parts) market to restrain trade in the
tied (service) market. 0 6 Kodak argued that if it attempted to charge
supracompetitive prices in the aftermarkets for parts and services,
consumers would simply switch to competitors' equipment in their in-
itial purchases. 30 7 Consumers would include the price of parts and
service over the useful life of the equipment as part of the real
price. 30 8 Consequently, as a matter of economic authority, the sort of
market power a firm has over aftermarkets in parts and service did not
permit the firm to restrain trade; "basic economic reality" dictates that
when a defendant lacks market power in the primary market for
equipment, it lacks power in aftermarkets to charge supracompetitive
prices.-I° 9 If consumers were injured, it would not be because of the
301 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
302 Id. at 486.
30" See David A.J. Goldfine & Kenneth M. Vorasi, The Fall of the Kodak Aftermarket Doc-
trine: Dying a Slow Death in the Lower Courts, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 209 (2004),
304 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 454.
305 Id. at 458-60.
306 Id. at 462-64.
307 Id. at 465.
308 Id. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] rational consumer considering the purchase
of Kodak equipment will inevitably factor into his purchasing decision the expected cost of
aftermarket support.").
309 Id. at 465-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 26,
Eastman Kodak (No. 90-1029) ("Overcharging for service is an especially implausible strat-




exercise of market power, but because of an opportunistic exploita-
tion of a long-term commitment. As Justice Scalia argued in his
dissent:
Leverage, in the form of circumstantial power, plays a role in each of
these relationships; but in none of them is the leverage attributable
to the dominant party's market power in any relevant sense. Though
that power can plainly work to the injury of certain consumers, it
produces only "a brief perturbation in competitive conditions-not
the sort of thing the antitrust laws do or should worry about."
310
In a result widely viewed as a rebuff to the Chicago School,3 11 the
Court rejected this argument, noting that under Kodak's new policy
prices to its customers rose, but sales of equipment did not decline.
3 12
Instead of the Chicago argument, the Court accepted plaintiffs' eco-
nomic argument that significant information and switching costs
could prevent customers from protecting themselves from rising
prices in the aftermarkets.31 3 In an unorthodox move, Image Techni-
cal's brief informed the Court that its argument had "been developed
with the assistance of Professor Steven C. Salop, Professor of Econom-
ics and Law at Georgetown University Law School. Professor Salop is
a recognized expert in the fields of industrial organization, competi-
tion, and antitrust. He is cited with approval by Kodak." 3 14 Appar-
ently impressed, the Court cited three articles by Professor Salop to
support its rejection of Kodak's theory.3 15 The Court reasoned that
consumers required a substantial amount of data and a "sophisticated
analysis" to calculate their expected parts and service costs over the
life of the Kodak equipment.31 6 Indeed, according to the Court, some
consumers were unable to take lifecycle prices into account at the
time of initial purchase. 17 Further, consumers who had already pur-
chased Kodak equipment would tolerate some increase in aftermarket
310 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 498 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec.,
Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 236 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
1 1 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect hiformation Could
Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 193 (1993). Even Chicagoan
Robert Bork lamented in 1993 that the "Kodak decision may suggest that forward move-
ment [toward a new economic sophistication for antitrust] has stopped or is about to go
into reverse." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 436 (rev. ed. 1993).
312 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 472.
313 Id. at 472.
3514 Brief for Respondent at 20 n.13, Eastman Kodak (No. 90-1029) (quoted in Stephen
Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 61 AN-rr1lRUsT L.J. 269, 306
(1993)); see also Lisa Meckfessel Judson, Note, Kodak v. Image Technical Services: The Tam-
ing of Matsushita and the Chicago School, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1633, 1671 n.230 (1993) (observ-
ing that "the parties' briefs can be seen as pitting one school of thought against another").
315 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473 n.19, 476 n.22.
3416 Id at 473.
317 Id. at 473, 475.
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prices because once "locked in" customers faced prohibitively high
costs in switching to a competitors' equipment. 3 8
Unlike the alleged predatory pricing in Matsushita, "[t] he alleged
conduct-higher service prices and market foreclosure-is facially an-
ticompetitive and exactly the harm that antitrust laws aim to pre-
vent. '31 9 This passage echoed the argument of an amicus curiae that
Kodak was "precisely the opposite [of Matsushita]: conduct that pro-
duces direct and immediate harm to consumers-higher (service)
prices, which antitrust law generally aims to prevent-is being de-
fended on the speculative theory that such conduct is from a broader
perspective, actually beneficial to consumers. '320 Thus, Kodak's asser-
tion of economic authority was insufficient to establish as a matter of
law that, "despite evidence of increased prices and excluded competi-
tion, an inference of market power is unreasonable."3 21 In circum-
stances where there is immediate, facial harm to consumers, "[1] egal
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual
market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court
has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, focus-
ing on the 'particular facts disclosed by the record."' 322 In this con-
text, "formalistic distinctions" meant theoretical predictions of
necessary effects enshrined as economic authority; "actual market re-
alities" and the "particular facts disclosed by the record" implied the
prospect of expert testimony. In the litigation on remand, the case
predictably turned on factual questions raised by expert testimony.
32 3
Interestingly, however, Kodak has not markedly expanded the in-
fluence of expert testimony in litigation. Instead, it has refocused the
application of economic authority in the terms of the Kodak majority's
reasoning. In one ensuing decision, the district court admitted expert
testimony for both sides324 but ultimately granted judgment as a mat-
ter of law to the defendant.325 A manufacturer of merchandise secur-
ity tags alleged that its competitor had attempted to monopolize the
market. The plaintiffs expert testified that the market was limited to
318 Id. at 476.
319 Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
320 Brief of Bell Atlantic in Support of Respondent at 14, Eastman Kodak (No. 90-1029)
(quoted in Ronald S. Katz, The Kodak Case: Setting the Antitrust Agenda for the Nineties, C695
ALI-ABA 15, 28-29 (Dec. 12, 1991)).
321 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469.
322 Id. at 466.
323 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.
1997). For a discussion of the plaintiffs' theories by one of their experts in the case on
remand, see Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason &John Metzler, Links between Markets and Afiermarkets:
Kodak (1997), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 428.
324 ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 598, 628 (E.D. Pa.
2002).




the type of tag manufactured by the parties because, as in Kodak, it was
costly for their customers to switch to other types.3 2 6 Unlike in Kodak,
however, information costs were trivial: the defendant provided its "so-
phisticated" customers with detailed projections of future tag costs,
327
which customers could readily use to negotiate reduced prices.3 28
The plaintiff s expert's testimony that the relevant market was limited
to one type of tag thus could not support a jury's verdict. 32 9 The Ko-
dak rationale for rejection of a rule of per se legality became the basis
for close scrutiny of the record, ultimately rendering the expert's testi-
mony insufficient on the undisputed facts.
C. Cartels
Although the Chicago School's influence has diminished the
scope of rules of per se illegality, the per se rule prohibiting naked
cartels remains in place. Chicago scholars generally have supported
the rule, arguing that it should be the primary, if not exclusive, focus
of antitrust.330 Economic theory predicts that cartels will restrict out-
put and increase prices. Some have argued that a legal prohibition is
unnecessary because entry of competitors and cheating among the
cartel participants will eventually destroy any cartel,331 and others
have argued that cartels may in some instances be efficient.332 Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has from the earliest years of the Sherman
Act foreclosed any testimony that cartels are necessary to prevent "ru-
inous competition" or that they are justified by some other social pol-
32b Id. at 643.
327 Id. 643-44.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 694.
330 See BoRK, supra note 311, at 263; Richard A. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Divi-
sion, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 500, 528-29 (1971); see alsoJohn E. Lopatka & William H. Page,
Posner's Program for the Antitrust Division: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 48 SMU L. REv. 1713
(1995) (reviewing Posner's statement that consensus among economists and efficiency
concerns was reason enough for a strong anti-cartel enforcement program).
331 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 330, at 529. For discussion of strategies cartels use to
foster stability, see Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEx. L. REv. 515
(2004).
332 See, e.g., LESTER G. TELSER, THE THEORY OF EFFICIENT COOPERATION AND COMPETI-
TION (1987); Donald Dewey, Information, Entry, and Welfare: The Case for Collusion, 69 Am.
ECON. REv. 587 (1979); cf George Bittlingmayer, Price-Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, in
5 REs. IN L. & ECON. 57 (1983) (discussing the near impossibility of reaching competitive
equilibrium in many market scenarios).
66920051
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
icy. 333 Courts continue to enforce the per se rule against naked
cartels. 334
The per se illegality of price fixing does not mean expert testi-
mony is unnecessary in price-fixing cases. The prosecution in a crimi-
nal case might prove the offense using only the direct testimony of
participants in a naked cartel.3 5 But if the existence of a cartel agree-
ment must be inferred from circumstantial evidence, an expert is al-
most always necessary. 336 Still, the peculiar nature of the law's
definition of "agreement" may preclude expert testimony on some is-
sues and limit the probative value of the testimony on others. Before
turning to the proof of agreement, however, we examine an issue that
is perhaps more basic: what sorts of admitted agreements are per se
unlawful cartels? Expert testimony may be appropriate-or even nec-
essary-in answering this question as well.
1. Characterization
Historically, antitrust law has divided practices into those gov-
erned by a per se rule and those judged under an open-ended rule of
reason.93 7 More recently, however, the Court has suggested that there
is no bright line distinction between practices "that give rise to an in-
33- One could argue that the ban on competitive bidding in National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), was efficient because it reduced search
costs, so that consumers who wanted high-quality services were able to find them. That is,
the price paid might have been higher, but the quality was better. Absent a low-cost
method of identifying high-quality suppliers, the "lemon effect" could result in high-quality
suppliers being squeezed out of the market, which would injure consumers who wanted
high-quality service. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488, 495-96 (1970); John E. Lopatka, Antitrust and
Professional Rules: A Frameworkfar Analysis, 28 SAN DIEco L. REv. 301, 365-70 (1991). Never-
theless, the Court was unwilling to trade lower prices for possibly higher quality, conclud-
ing that the antitrust laws rested on the premise that "ultimately competition will produce
not only lower prices, but also better goods and services." Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
334 See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); cf Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999)
(refusing to apply a truncated rule of liability to a dental association's rules limiting adver-
tising, even though the rule prevented members from engaging in certain forms of price
advertising and making claims of quality-information generally valuable to consuners).
The association rule was not a garden-variety cartel because it did not prevent full and
detailed price advertising. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 952 (9th Cit. 2000).
335 See, e.g., United States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming a
conviction for bid rigging where the evidence showed "a deal was struck.., in the men's
room that MMR, in exchange for a lucrative subcontract, would become part of the
conspiracy").
3-36 See infra Part III.C.
337 See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). In such
cases, the Court has preferred to govern by "standard," allowing "consideration of all or at
least most facts that are relevant to the standard's rationale," rather than by "rule." See
MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000).
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tuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call
for more detailed treatment. "'3 8 The Court must make
an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details,
and logic of a restraint. The object is to see whether the experience
of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confi-
dent conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will
follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more
sedulous one.
3 39
The Court thus mandates first a facial examination of the practice,
and then an appropriately detailed "empirical" evaluation. The more
obvious the harm to consumers, the more circumscribed will be the
evidence necessary to establish liability-and by necessary implication,
the narrower the scope for expert testimony.
The facial evaluation of practices occurs primarily at the level of
economic authority. In Broadcast Music,3 40 for example, the Court re-
fused to apply a rule of per se illegality to a blanket licensing arrange-
ment by which organizations with market power fixed the prices of
performance rights for copyrighted musical works.3 ,1 The question,
according to the Court, was whether the practice facially appears to
restrict output or to enhance efficiency.34 2 Because the activities of
performing rights societies evidently reduce transaction costs and
make some desirable transactions possible without foreclosing others,
they should be judged under the rule of reason.3 43  Similarly, in
Sharp,3 4 4 the Court relied on the Chicago School models of resale
price maintenance and cartels to exclude from the per se category
those vertical agreements that merely limit price-cutting. 345 Accepting
the view that resale price maintenance was per se illegal only because
it might facilitate cartelization, 346 the Court reasoned that only verti-
338 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780-81; see also id, at 779 ("[Olur categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of
reason' tend to make them appear.").
339 Id. at 781. For the sorts of advertising restrictions at issue in the case, the Court
concluded, "[tlhe obvious anticompetitive effect that triggers abbreviated analysis has not
been shown." Id. at 778; see alo William J. Kolasky, California Dental Association: The New
Antitrust Empiricism, 14 ANTITRUST L.J. 68, 70 (1999) (concluding that "courts must apply a
sliding scale, in which the amount of proof demanded of the plaintiff depends both on
how obvious the anticompetitive effects are and how strong or weak the proffered justifica-
tions are").
340 Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
341 Id. at 24.
342 Id. at 19-20.
343 Id. at 14-16.
S44 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
345 Page, supra note 9, at 1262.
346 Sharp, 485 U.S. at 724-25.
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cal agreements setting a price or price level could be effective to po-
lice retail or manufacturing cartels.
347
In some instances, expert testimony-or the lack of it-may influ-
ence the court's characterization decision. In California Dental,34 s the
Court examined a dental association's ban on certain price and qual-
ity advertising and concluded that the association's suggested justifica-
tions were plausible enough to warrant more exacting scrutiny than a
"quick look."349 The FTC had rested its case in part on published
studies of the effect of advertising restrictions on consumer welfare in
markets other than dental services 35 0-in effect a claim that economic
authority was sufficiently conclusive to justify a truncated rule of rea-
son inquiry. The Supreme Court, however, credited a different body
of economic authority, one that identifies a form of market failure
known as "the lemon effect":
351
In a market for professional services, in which advertising is rela-
tively rare and the comparability of service packages not easily estab-
lished, the difficulty for customers or potential competitors to get
and verify information about the price and availability of services
magnifies the dangers to competition associated with misleading
advertising.
3 5 2
The Court quoted the seminal article by George Akerlof for the pro-
position that in a market characterized by informational asymmetries,
"dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the
market."
353
347 Id. at 726-27.
348 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 759 (1999).
349 See id. at 778 ("[T]he plausibility of competing claims about the effects of the pro-
fessional advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently abbreviated review to which the
Commission's order was treated. The obvious anticompetitive effect that triggers abbrevi-
ated analysis has not been shown.").
350 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the FTC
relied on CAROLYN Cox & SUSAN FOSTER, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION (1990)); Lee Benham, The
Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15J.L. & ECON. 337 (1972);James A. Langenfeld
& John R. Morris, Analyzing Agreements Among Competitors: What Does the Future Hold?, 36
ANTITRUST BULL. 651 (1991); Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82J. POL. ECON. 729
(1974); andJohn R. Schroeter et al., Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal Service Mar-
kets: An Empirical Investigation, 36J. INDUS. ECON. 49 (1987)). Though Cox and Foster do
discuss dental advertising, the study "cites no empirical evidence concerning dental adver-
tising restrictions substantially similar to those enacted by CDA." Cal. Dental 224 F.3d at
951.
351 See supra note 333.
352 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 772; see id. at 771-73 (citing alsojack Carr & Frank Mathew-
son, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J. LAw &
EcoN. 307, 309 (1990); Robert G. Evans, Professionals and the Production Function: Can Compe-
tition Policy Improve Efficiency in the Licensed Professions, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE & REGU-
LATION 225 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing:
A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87J. POL. EcoN. 1328, 1330 (1979)).
.153 Id. at 775 (quoting Akerlof, supra note 333, at 495).
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit read the Supreme Court's decision
to require that the record contain "some relevant data from the pre-
cise market at issue in the litigation. '3 5 4 The FTC's counsel had not
thought it "necessary to supplement the existing economic literature
cited by the FTC with the testimony of an expert economist wit-
ness. '35 5 The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that "the social sci-
ence evidence cited by the FTC does not constitute substantial
evidence of the anticompetitive nature of the California Dental Associ-
ation's advertising restrictions." 56 The California Dental Association,
in contrast, offered an expert who testified that the restrictions in the
dental services market prevent "buyers from getting mistaken impres-
sions about information contained in advertisements, and therefore
arms them with more accurate and verifiable information; makes
them better able to search for their particular value. '357 The court of
appeals reasoned on this basis that, by standardizing the form of price
advertising,
the restrictions create a kind of network externality by mandating a
common language to be used by those CDA members who advertise
discounts. As a result, a consumer's costs of searching for the less
expensive service would be reduced. . . . We are therefore per-
suaded that CDA's restrictions do mitigate some of the informa-
tional asymmetries that exist in the market for dental services.
358
The court found all of the factual claims of the association to be "well-
supported by expert testimony and anecdotal evidence from individ-
ual dentists practicing in California." 5 9 Thus, a remand to the agency
was unnecessary.360 Whatever the merits of this assessment,361 the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit make clear that
judicial choices on matters of economic authority dictate the role of
expert testimony in the characterization inquiry.
2. "Contract, Combination . . . , or Conspiracy"
The concept of collusion in economics is related to, but distinct
from, the concept of collusion in antitrust law. In evaluating market
behavior, economists consider whether firms are cooperating. Game
theory, for instance, distinguishes between cooperative games, which
354 Cal. Denta, 224 F.3d at 952.
355 Id. at 958.
356 Id. at 952.
357 Id.
358 Id. at 952-53.
359 Id. at 957.
360 Id.
361 For the Federal Trade Commission's most recent attempt to embody the teaching
of California Dental in an analytical paradigm, see In re PolyGram Holdings, Inc., Dkt. No.
9298 (July 24, 2003) (Muris, Chairman), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/
polygramopinion.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
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involve coalitions of players formed through communication and
trustworthy promises, and noncooperative games, in which players act
independently for their own welfare. 362 Similarly, the theory of cartel
behavior assumes complete cooperation among the cartel mem-
bers,363 and various models of oligopoly predict "noncompetitive" out-
comes based on rivals' mutual awareness of the circumstances of the
market.3 64 Economics has also identified practices that might facili-
tate cooperation and thus foster some forms of interaction that lead
to noncompetitive outcomes.
365
Like the economist's idea of cooperation, antitrust law's concept
of agreement is an effort to distinguish noncompetitive from competi-
tive behavior. Because of the institutional characteristics of the legal
system, however, antitrust must consider other factors in shaping the
legal categories within which courts determine the existence of an
agreement.3 66 The distinctive features of the law's concept of agree-
ment are not apparent in its abstract definitions. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act condemns every "contract, combination .... or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade."3 67 The courts have said that an illegal
agreement requires "a unity of purpose," "a common design and un-
derstanding," or "a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrange-
ment. 1368 The general definitions pose little difficulty where the case
involves evaluating direct evidence of an express, though clandestine,
agreement to fix prices3 69 or the competitive effects of an explicit
362 DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 9 (1990); MARTIN
SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 217 (1982).
363 ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 136 n.3 (1985).
364 Id at 192-201.
365 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,
126-36 (3d ed. 2000).
366 As one court has noted:
[T]he Supreme Court has applied a gloss to the term "concerted action"
when using it in the antitrust context. And, accordingly, courts mtist treat
this phrase as a term of art in the context of the Sherman Act; it cannot be
understood as it might be in ordinary parlance, to reach any and all forms
of joint activity by two or more persons. It must be defined consonant with
its role in the antitrust analysis, as the basis for determining the unlawful-
ness of conduct prohibited by section 1.
Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs, Inc., 307 F.3d 277, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 598 U.S. 998 (2003).
367 Courts have not distinguished among the three statutory terms, treating all three as
denoting the same concept of concerted action. See, e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig.,
166 F.3d 112, 117 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999); POSNER, supra note 55, at 262 ("[T] he courts sensibly
have not worried about whether the terms 'contract,' 'combination,' and 'conspiracy,' in
section 1, have nonoverlapping meanings.").
368 Am. Tobacco Co. v, United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
369 See, e.g., United States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming a
conviction for bid rigging where the evidence showed an express agreement to participate
in return for a subcontract).
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agreement to engage in practices that almost certainly facilitate non-
competitive outcomes.
3 70
The issue becomes crucial, however, when the case requires the
inference of an agreement from circumstantial evidence of parallel
conduct by rivals. Game theory suggests that competitors may be able
to raise prices to supra-competitive levels without overt communica-
tion or explicit agreement simply by taking each other's anticipated
reactions into account in setting their own prices. 371 This phenome-
non is variously labeled interdependent pricing, oligopolistic interde-
pendence, tacit collusion, and conscious parallelism.37 2 Economists
also have identified a variety of practices that might facilitate the coor-
dination of prices or the detection of cheating among cartel partici-
pants.3 73 An economist might characterize firms' behavior in an
oligopoly as noncompetitive or even collusive, particularly in the pres-
ence of these facilitating practices.
The courts, however, have been unwilling to allow juries to infer
the existence of unlawful agreements solely on the basis of parallel
behavior. - 74 The legal challenge of applying Section 1 to consciously
370 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust ILitig., 288 F.3d 1028, 1033
(7th Cir. 2002) ("There is authority for prohibiting as a violation of the Sherman Act or
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act an agreement that facilitates collusive activ-
ity .. "); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696-700, 709-17 (1948) (condemning agree-
ments among competitors to use a basing-point pricing system); see also POSNER, supra note
55, at 91-93; GEORGEJ. STIGLER, A Theory of Delivered Price Systems, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 147, 148-51 (1968) (discussing various kinds of delivered price systems); Dennis
Carlton, A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing Systems, 23 J.L. & ECON. 51 (1983); David D.
Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive vs. Collusive Theories, 72 Am. ECON. REv. 289
(1982) (discussing basing-point pricing systems and the legal reaction to the practice).
Explicit agreements to engage in practices that may not facilitate collusion, however,
cannot be condemned summarily. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
441 n.16 (1978) ("[E]xchanges of Iprice data and other] information do not constitute a
per se violation of the Sherman Act."); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir.
2001) (stating that an agreement to exchange price information "is not illegal per se, but
can be found unlawful under a rule of reason analysis" (citations omitted)); see also Dennis
W. Carlton et al., Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MA-
soN L. REv. 423, 424 (1997) (arguing that "in the absence of direct evidence to form a
'naked' cartel to restrict output or to raise price, the appropriate standard to judge the
flow of information among competitors is the rule of reason").
371 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 365, ch. 6 (presenting game theoretic models of
noncooperative oligopoly); Blair & Herndon, supra note 3, at 818-20 (summarizing theo-
ries of shared monopoly).
372 Conscious parallelism is the "process, not itself unlawful, by which firms in a con-
centrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-
maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and
their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions." Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
373 See, e.g., CARLION & PERLOIF, supra note 365, at 139-41.
374 SeeIn reCitric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999); City of Tuscaloosa v.
Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 570 (11th Cir. 1998); Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55
F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995); Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231
F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1269 (N.D. Ga. 2002), affd sub nom. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris
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parallel behavior was the focus of a debate between Donald Turner
and Richard Posner.575 Both scholars sought to formulate a rule that
embodied the economic theory of oligopoly in a way that took ac-
count of the institutional strictures of the legal system. Turner argued
that when oligopolists simply take into account the probable reactions
of competitors in setting their basic prices, there is either no agree-
ment at all or, at most, no unlawful agreement.3 76 He reasoned that
an oligopolist acts rationally, just as a competitive firm does, except
that the oligopolist "takes one more factor into account-the reac-
tions of his competitors to any price change he makes." 377 Turner
thus implicitly suggests that it would be unjust to punish firms for act-
ing rationally.378 More importantly, he noted that there is no practi-
cal remedy against such interdependent behavior; an injunction
would be "hopelessly vague," 379 demand "irrational behavior,"380 or
result in something akin to undesirable "public-utility regulation.
'3 1l
Turner did, however, willingly condemn parallel adoption of certain
facilitating practices, such as basing-point price systems, 3 2 because in
those cases an injunction would effectively promote price
competition.
38 3
Posner first responded to Turner thirty-five years ago, but has re-
cently updated his arguments. He agrees with Turner that "tacit collu-
sion" is "a form of concerted action," but he argues that it may be
USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (lth Cir. 2003). One court summarized the state of the law as
follows:
Courts... have almost uniformly held, at least in the pricing area, that such
individual pricing decisions (even when each firm rests its decision upon its
belief that competitors will do the same) do not constitute an unlawful
agreement under section 1 of the Sherman Act. . . That is not because
such pricing is desirable (it is not), but because it is close to impossible to
devise a judicially enforceable remedy for "interdependent" pricing.
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988).
375 See generallyJohn E. Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Yry, 41 ANTITRUST
BULL. 843 (1996) (describing both Turner's approach to the problem of oligopoly pricing
and Posner's critique of that approach).
376 Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Paral-
lelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 671 (1962).
377 Id. at 665.
378 See id. This interpretation is bolstered by Turner's further argument that the oligo-
polists are much like the lawful monopolist that merely charges a monopoly price. Id. at
667-68.
379 Id. at 669.
380 Id.
381 Id. at 670.
382 Id. at 675-76.
383 Id. at 676 ("Finally, in sharp contrast to the basic-price case, here a perfectly under-
standable, plausible, and readily enforceable injunction can be written which would have




unlawful as well. 38 4 Because "[t]acit collusion is not an unconscious
state," an injunction against it would not "tell[ ] oligopolists to behave
irrationally.' - 5 Courts might infer the existence of unlawful collusion
from certain types of parallel facilitating conduct, such as the use of a
basing-point system, 8 6 then award damages387 and an injunction
against the facilitating practices. 38 8 Thus, the practical difference be-
tween Turner and Posner is that, in the case of pure pricing interde-
pendence-a case both believe will be unusual3S89-Turner would find
no unlawful agreement, whereas Posner would impose damages.
The Turner-Posner debate is echoed in the judicial evaluation of
parallel conduct. Posner's analysis has influenced what is recognized
as economic circumstantial evidence of agreement. This influence
first appeared in enforcement agencies' efforts in the 197 0s and early
1980s to challenge "shared monopolies" by using economic evidence
of market structure, predisposing characteristics, and facilitating prac-
tices.3 9 0 Litigants and courts continue to classify and discuss evidence
of "tacit collusion" in Posner's terms. Nevertheless, courts have main-
tained barriers to the inference of agreement from this kind of evi-
dence. 39' Courts have required evidence of certain "plus factors,"
' 92
384 POSNER, supra note 55, at 94. Posner's original reply to Turner was in Richard A.
Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969)
[hereinafter Posner, Oligopoly]. His position was refined slightly in the first edition of his
book on antitrust law. See RicHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
42-77 (1976).
385 POSNER, supra note 55, at 97, 98.
386 id. at 92 (arguing that evidence that the sellers agreed to establish a basing-point
system should be "unnecessary to establish a violation of the Sherman Act").
387 Posner would prefer an action for damages brought by the Justice Department on
behalf of the victims of antitrust violations-a form of suit that would require a statutory
change-to a private treble-damages action. Id. at 99. But he is apparently willing to ac-
cept the private damages suit as a second-best alternative.
388 Id. at 98-99. This conception of an appropriate Section 1 remedy marks a slight
change in thinking. Posner earlier advocated "a relatively simple and general injunction
against express or tacit price-fixing," together with a damages sanction. Posner, Oligopoly,
supra note 384, at 1591 n.76.
389 See POSNER, supra note 55, at 97 ("(Tlhere probably are few cases of purely tacit
collusion."); Turner, supra note 376, at 662 ( 'It may well he that in reality a stable and firm
pattern of noncompetitive prices is rarely achieved without some kind of agreement.").
3')0 See generally Lopatka & Page, supra note 330, at 1717-20 (discussing the Antitrust
Department's adoption of the Chicago School theory of "tacit collusion").
391 One court recently emphasized that "[the most important evidence will generally
be non-economic evidence 'that there was an actual, manifest agreement not to compete."
In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
392 See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a price
fixing agreement "may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such inter-
dependent conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors such as
defendants' use of facilitating practices"); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask.,
203 F.3d 1028, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding insufficient evidence of "plus factors" to
support an inference of agreement in a case based on a theory of conscious parallelism); In
re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that courts "require
that evidence of a defendant's parallel pricing be supplemented with 'plus factors'" in
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defined tautologically3 9 3 as activity that "tend is] to exclude the possi-
bility that the defendants merely were engaged in lawful conscious
parallelism."594 Courts have suggested that "plus factors may include
evidence demonstrating that the defendants: (1) acted contrary to
their [individual] economic interests, and (2) were motivated to enter
into a price fixing conspiracy, ' 395 though neither of these conditions
alone is sufficient. 396 Courts thus require evidence that justifies the
inference of an actual agreement, rather than simply noncompetitive
market behavior.
397
Consequently, the focus is on whether the defendant's actions are
rational choices for a firm acting in its individual self-interest. In
other words, the court will ask whether the action would make sense
for a firm acting independently but taking account of the past and
anticipated actions of its rivals. If the evidence shows only the sort of
action supporting an affirmative answer, then no jury question of col-
lusion is created. 395 Moreover, if the plaintiff introduces evidence
tending to show a plus factor, the defendant must have the opportu-
nity to offer an independent business justification for the practice.
399
If the competing justifications are equally plausible, then, again, no
jury question is created. 40 0 One implication of this approach is that a
plus factor must involve behavior that increases the probability of
supra-competitive pricing. Predisposing market conditions, such as
order for a court to infer a conspiracy from circumstantial evidence); PHILIP AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 1434a (2d ed. 2002).
393 To say that plus factors "tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted
independently" merely restates the issue. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-
Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1993). Similarly unhelpful is the explana-
tion that "[t]he simple term 'plus factors' refers to 'the additional facts or factors required
to be proved as a prerequisite to finding that parallel action amounts to conspiracy.'" Baby
Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (quoting AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 1433(e) (1986)).
394 City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 572 (11 th Cir. 1998); see
also Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that to avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs must show that defendants "had a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective"
and offer "evidence that excludes the possibility that the alleged coconspirators acted inde-
pendently or based upon a legitimate business purpose" (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
.95 Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122; see also Plat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (using the same test);
Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1242 (same); Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168
("Examples of these 'plus factors' include actions contrary to a defendant's economic self-
interest, product uniformity, exchange of price information and opportunity to meet, and
a common motive to conspire or a large number of communications." (citations omitted)).
396 See, e.g., Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122; Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 849 F. Supp. 1458,
1467 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
397 Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 ("[Plus] factors serve as proxies for direct evidence of an
agreement.").
98 See BAUER & PAGE, supra note 287, at 66-67 ("[Elquipoise is not enough to take the
case to the jury.").
399 SeeWilliansson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).
400 See id. a( 1310.
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high concentration, hospitable to interdependent pricing are insuffi-
cient because the presence of such conditions cannot exclude the pos-
sibility of independent action. 40 ' Courts justify this approach-in
ways reminiscent of Turner-by pointing to the dangers of overdeter-
rence. If it were rational for oligopolists to act interdependently, then
penalizing them for doing so would deter socially beneficial conduct.
This consideration is magnified when the alleged practices involve
price-cutting, which the Supreme Court has accorded special protec-
tion from erroneous findings of liability.
The Posner-Turner debate frames the role of economic experts.
Experts are typically necessary to identify and analyze practices and
conditions conducive to tacit understandings. 40 2 But to be admissible
under Daubert, their testimony must be reliable, relevant to the exis-
tence of an agreement, and helpful to the jury; moreover, to avoid
summary judgment, the evidence must be sufficient to create a jury
issue. 40 3 Reliability depends largely on the empirical and theoretical
standards of the economics profession. Courts occasionally exclude
portions of expert testimony on this ground in cases alleging the in-
ference of price fixing. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, relied on
Daubert to exclude testimony based in part on sales data from a state
outside of the area of the alleged conspiracy. 40 4 The inclusion of the
data "skew[ed] any cumulative measurements, such as percentages
and frequencies, that depend upon the size and characteristics of the
database as a whole and that are intended to describe the alleged con-
spiracy." 40 5 Consequently, where the expert could not easily segregate
401 See id. at 1317-18; see also E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the "mere existence of an oligopolistic market structure in
which a small group of manufacturers engage in consciously parallel pricing of an identical
product" is lawful because it is merely "a condition, not a 'method;' indeed it could be
consistent with intense competition").
402 See Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Bidding, Bid Rigging, and School Milk Pices:
Ohio v. Trauth (1994), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 211, 216-17 (listing
eleven "factors facilitating collusion" in Ohio milk markets identified by economists re-
tained by the state).
403 For an illustration of the relationship among these devices, see Hall v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D.N.C. 2003). The court granted summary judgment on
the ground that plaintiffs' evidence of plus factors, particularly various forms of "signal-
ing," in an alleged conspiracy by airlines to depress ticket agent commission rates, did not
exclude the possibility of independent action. The court rejected a set of asserted "struc-
tural plus factors" as "unfounded under antitrust law." Id. at 674. These included concen-
tration on the airlines' side of the market, fragmentation on the ticket agencies' side, entry
barriers, "an upward sloping supply curve," and a fungible service. Id. The court held that
mere participation in an oligopoly is not unlawful, and that price uniformity was to be
expected for homogeneous products. Id. It denied as moot the defendant's motions to
exclude the reports and testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. Id. at 681.
404 See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 566 (11 th Cir. 1998).
405 Id. at 567.
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the extraneous data, his testimony based on those data was
inadmissible.
40 6
Courts also occasionally exclude as irrelevant expert testimony on
the issue of collusion. Facilitating practices, for example, are not nec-
essarily plus factors. 40 7 To incur liability, the facilitating practices,
viewed in light of the market structure and their competitive effects,
must tend to exclude the possibility of independent action by making
it more plausible that the defendants' conduct emanated from collu-
sion than from unilateral conduct in the defendant's own self-inter-
est.40 8 Expert testimony that the defendant's conduct is collusive in
some sense other than the one the law defines is irrelevant.
40 9
Some courts go further and exclude expert testimony that the
defendant's conduct is collusive within the law's definition. 410 Identi-
fying unlawful collusion is outside the domain of economic expertise
because the legal definition of collusion differs from the related eco-
nomic concept. 41' Thus, the expert should testify only to the nature
406 Id. The court did allow the analysis of Florida data to be used for corroborative
purposes. Id. at 566-67.
407 See Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253,
1274-75 (N.D. Ga. 2002), affd sub nom. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d
1287 (l1th Cir. 2003).
406 As one court explained, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial economic evidence to
prove an agreement must "present economic evidence that would show that the hypothesis
of collusive action was more plausible than that of individual action." In re Brand Name
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
The court pointed out that the plaintiffs did not, "as the defendant manufacturers rather
absurdly argue, have to exclude all possibility" that the defendants' parallel conduct "was
unilateral rather than collusive." Id. And the plaintiffs were "equally wide of the mark...
when they argue[d] that proof' of parallel conduct that is equally consistent with individ-
ual and collusive behavior "shifts to the defendants the burden of proving that the [con-
duct] was unilateral rather than collusive." Id
409 Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1322-23.
410 See Robert A. Milne &Jack E. Pace III, Conspiratologists at the Gate: The Scope of Expert
Testimony on the Subject of Conspiracy in a Sherman Act Case, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 36,
39-40 (summarizing cases disallowing expert testimony on the existence of a "conspiracy"
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
411 See George J. Stigler, What Does an Economist Know?, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 311, 312
(1983) ("There is no established economic content to words such as 'collusion', 'conspir-
acy', or 'concerted action'."); see alsojonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section I Dilemmas:
Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL.
143 (1993) (discussing the difficulties of and the strategies for proving collusive behavior
from circumstantial evidence of collusion conducive business environments); Malcolm B.
Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert?, 34 AKRON L. REv.
795, 828 n.131 (2001)
While performance evidence can show an anticompetitive effect, neither a
Chicago nor a PCE [Post-Chicago Economics] economist should expect to
survive a Daubert hearing in an oligopolistic industry because the poor per-
formance may be caused by unilateral pricing behavior, and not by a price-
fixing agreement. The problem is particularly acute for the PCE economist




of the practice and its likely motivations. 41 2 For example, an expert
might testify that a particular course of action was contrary to the self-
interest of the defendants.
4 13
Two decisions of the Eleventh Circuit illustrate these points. In
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc.,4 1 4 the district court had ex-
cluded expert testimony that the circumstantial evidence in the case
justified a finding of price-fixing. The lower court reasoned that, be-
cause the expert failed to distinguish between an illegal agreement
and consciously parallel behavior, his testimony failed Daubert's crite-
ria for reliability.4 15  Based on the evidentiary ruling, the court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. 4 16 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit held, however, that the district court erred in requiring the ex-
pert, as a condition of admissibility under Daubert, to "show a
successful conspiracy. ' '41 7  Experts' opinions "need not prove the
plaintiffs' case by themselves; they must merely constitute one piece of
412 See Milne & Pace, supra note 410, at 42 (concluding that expert testimony should
be limited to "such relatively objective factors as whether there is an economic motive to
conspire, whether the market structure is conducive to collusion, whether defendants' con-
duct is consistent with their non-interdependent business interests and the like"). Some
commentators have suggested that experts should be permitted to testify that the defen-
dant's conduct is collusive in economic terms, leaving the ultimate issue of the legality of
the conduct to the jury. See, e.g, Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 141 (stating that an expert
should be permitted to testify that "a fact inference of agreement is warranted" by the
economic evidence); Robert F. Lanzillotti & James T. McClave, Comment: Meeting the "Ambi-
guity" Test Under Daubert, ANTiTRuST, Spring 2003, at 44, 45 (stating that an expert should
be permitted to testify to the Bayesian "likelihood ratio" of collusion because they can tell
"whether the evidence was more likely to have been generated in a collusive than in a non-
collusive market"); Stigler, supra note 411, at 311-12. These scholars are all quoted and
criticized in Milne & Pace, supra note 410, at 37-39. All of these assertions assume that an
economist's definition of the "fact" of a "cartel," an "agreement," or "collusion" has a well-
understood relationship to the legal definition of a Sherman Act agreement and, thus, that
hearing the economist's opinion on the issue would assist the jury. But the jury's almost-
certain assumption would be that the two definitions are the same. For this reason, the
court in Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), discussed
infra, held that this sort of testimony is irrelevant. But cf In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1999 WArL 33889 (N.D. 111. Jan. 19, 1999),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999). The trial court, having "instructed
the jury that there is . . . a qualitative difference between the word 'collusion' as he has
used it in the conspiracy charge in this case and what the jury has to find" allowed the
expert to testify to collusion so long as his opinion did not "equat[e] collusion in an eco-
nomic sense and conspiracy in a legal sense." Milne & Pace, supra note 410, at 41. Milne
and Pace observe that "it is difficult to see how the testimony that was allowed did not
convey to the jury that (the expert] believed an explicit conspiracy existed." Id.
413 But cf Cleveland v. Viacom, Inc., 73 Fed. Appx. 736 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming the
exclusion of conclusory testimony of plaintiffs' expert that the defendant movie studios'
parallel refusals to deal with the plaintiffs on the same terms as with the plaintiffs' domi-
nant rival was contrary to the studios' self interest).
414 158 F.3d 548, 564 (11th Cir. 1998).
415 See id. at 564-65.
416 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 392, 322.1 (citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros
Chem., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995), rev'd, 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998)).
417 City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 564.
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the puzzle that the plaintiffs endeavor to assemble before the jury. '4 18
Summary judgment was inappropriate because the expert's evidence
of parallel behavior tended to show a plus factor sufficient to distin-
guish conscious parallelism from unlawful collusion. 4 19 The court of
appeals did agree with the exclusion of the expert's opinion concern-
ing the ultimate issue of whether a conspiracy existed, however, be-
cause ajury is "entirely capable of determining whether or not to draw
such conclusions without any technical assistance from [experts] ."420
The rules of evidence permit experts to testify to an ultimate issue, but
only if the testimony would assist the jury. Because the legal definition
of agreement differed from economic concepts of collusion or coop-
eration, the issue was outside of the expert's domain.
The distinction between economic and legal concepts of agree-
ment was also crucial in Philip Morris,42 1 where the plaintiffs tried to
prove by circumstantial evidence 42 2 that cigarette manufacturers had
fixed prices. 423 The district court granted summary judgment in an
extended opinion stressing the failure of the plaintiffs' expert to dis-
tinguish between facilitating practices and plus factors.4 24 The plain-
tiffs identified, for example, "signaling" of intended price changes in
press conferences and analyst reports, monitoring of competitive be-
havior by reports to a central organization, reducing the number of
tiers in defendants' price structure, and engaging in prior conspira-
cies to limit health-based marketing of cigarettes and to fix prices.
425
418 Id. at 565 (citations omitted).
419 Id. at 570-73. The necessary plus factor was evidence of incumbency rates that mea-
sured the percentage of times the incumbent bidder won subsequent bids on the same
account. Id. at 572-73. This was evidence that defendants had agreed not to compete on
each other's existing accounts. Id.
420 Id. at 565; see also Ohio ex rel. Montgomery v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp.
1247, 1254 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (" [E] xperts may not express an opinion in the form of a legal
conclusion regarding the existence of an illegal conspiracy."). But cf Petruzzi's IGA Super-
markets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1240-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
the trial court erred in excluding at the pretrial stage expert testimony that the defend-
ants' conduct was collusive).
421 Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1321
(N.D. Ga. 2002), affd sub nom. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287
(1Ith Cir. 2003).
422 Id. at 1274.
423 Id. at 1263.
424 Id. at 1274-75. Significantly, the court correctly implied that facilitating practices
can constitute plus factors; it said simply that they do not necessanly do so. Id. Thus, the
court observed that "'facilitating devices' are not necessarily sufficient under the law to
constitute a 'plus factor.'" Id. In Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001), the
court seemed to imply that facilitating practices always constitute plus factors: "[A] hori-
zontal price-fixing agreement may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when
such interdependent conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors
such as defendants' use of facilitating practices." Id. at 198 (alteration in original). The
suggestion that any facilitating practice is a plus factor was likely inadvertent.
425 Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1274-1310.
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The court examined each of these practices and found that they ei-
ther had legal justifications or did not tend to exclude the possibility
of independent action, even though they may have facilitated
collusion.
42 6
Plaintiffs' expert submitted an affidavit stating:
I characterize the behavior that I have observed in the cigarette in-
dustry during the relevant period as a "collusive oligopoly" or a
"loose cartel." I believe that the cigarette companies have engaged
in activities beyond mere conscious parallelism, and indeed have
participated in various facilitating practices that are anticompetitive
in purpose and effect.
42 7
According to the court, the expert was "positing a new theory where
certain aspects of conscious parallelism should be found to be an-
ticompetitive." 423 The court continued: "The failure of Plaintiff's ex-
pert to distinguish conscious parallelism from cartel behavior makes
his subsequent opinion inadmissible as he finds inferences of collu-
sion where the law finds none."429 The expert failed to explain how
the facilitating practices excluded the possibility of independent ac-
tion, and his "allegations of 'anticompetitive' conduct [were] broad
and could be read to include lawful activity."43 10 Consequently, "his
flawed view of the law" rendered his testimony inadmissible. 4 11 The
court of appeals agreed that because the witness
defined collusion to include conscious parallelism .. .he did not
differentiate between legal and illegal pricing behavior, and instead
simply grouped both of these phenomena under the umbrella of
illegal, collusive price fixing. This testimony could not have aided a
finder of fact to determine whether appellees' behavior was or was
not legal, and the district court properly excluded it.
4 3 2
D. Damages
This Article has shown that the process of formulating antitrust
law requires the adoption of economic authority and the integration
of its insights with institutional considerations. This process is equally
evident in the rules governing the proof of antitrust damages. Section
4 of the Clayton Act4 33 authorizes those injured by antitrust violations
426 Id. at 1274-1314 (noting that expert's testimony focused on "how certain practices
in the cigarette industry would have facilitated an agreement... [, but did] not tend to
exclude the possibility that defendants were engaged in lawful competitive conduct").
427 Id. at 1322.
428 id. at 1321.
429 Id.
410 Id. at 1322.
431 Id.
432 Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003).
43 1. U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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to recover treble damages, but courts qualified this right by formulat-
ing a system of rules linking damages to the purposes of the antitrust
laws in ways the courts can administer. Courts rely on economic au-
thority to structure the process of proof so that damages reflect not
only the net harm to the plaintiff, but also the net social harm.
434
First, using the doctrines of antitrust injury and standing, courts de-
fine the measure of compensable harms to reflect the social harm
flowing from the unlawful practice so that damage awards will not de-
ter efficient conduct. As this Article shows below, courts must look to
economic authority to identify the inefficiencies to which each prac-
tice is directed. Second, rules governing proof of harm assure that
actual damages are measured by the difference between the plaintiffs
actual condition as a result of the offense and its hypothetical condi-
tion but for the offense. Proof of this amount requires the construc-
tion of a theoretically sound damage model that accurately projects
the "but for" world. Expert testimony is almost always essential to this
process. Because the process depends largely on statistical methods
that transcend the antitrust context, courts typically evaluate those
methods using Daubert's reliability inquiry, incorporating the stan-
dards of the economics profession.
1. Antitrust Injury and Standing
Despite the general language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the
law does not permit all those who suffer injury from an antitrust viola-
tion to recover. The Supreme Court has limited recovery to prevent
antitrust law from deterring efficient conduct and to assure that the
appropriate deterrent penalty be imposed efficiently. 4 35 The Court's
vehicles in this task have been the antitrust injury and standing doc-
trines, both of which are shaped by economic authority and, in turn,
determine the appropriate role of expert testimony. The antitrust in-
jury doctrine requires a plaintiff to have suffered a harm caused by the
anticompetitive aspect of a practice.4 36 It is not enough for the plain-
tiff to prove that a violation inflicted harm; the harm must be one
causally connected to the inefficiency for which the practice is prohib-
ited. Proper application of the doctrine requires a court to deter-
mine, in light of the relevant economic authority, whether the alleged
harm bears the requisite causal relationship to the inefficiency associ-
434 See Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH. L.
REv. 423, 428-35 (1995).
435 See generally William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1445 (1985) (discussing the relationship between standing and antitrust injury in de-
termining optimal deterrence).
436 Ad. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990).
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ated with the practice. 437 The effect of such an inquiry on expert testi-
mony is apparent in Brunswick,438 which first articulated the antitrust
injury doctrine.
4 39
Brunswick, a manufacturer of bowling equipment, acquired and
began operating some of its customers' bowling centers in financial
difficulty. The competitors of those centers sued, alleging that the
acquisitions violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act and that the plain-
tiffs were injured by the preservation of the failing centers. 440 The
plaintiffs offered the testimony of qualified experts concerning the
"profits which the plaintiff bowling centers would have made but for
defendant's violations of law." 441 The Court's adoption of the require-
ment of antitrust injury,442 however, rendered the testimony irrele-
vant. Even if the acquisitions were unlawful, the plaintiffs' lost profits
should not have been allowed as a measure of damages because they
were unrelated to the reason for the prohibition of the merger.
443
This requirement imposes important constraints on experts. Instead
of showing simply that the defendant's conduct injured the plaintiff,
an expert must show that the harm stems from the inefficient aspect
of the practice.444 Thus, the measures of cost that determine whether
437 See generally Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, The Role of Economics in the Definition
of Antitrust Injury, 17 MANAGERAL AND DECISION ECON. 127 (1996) (discussing the eco-
nomic analysis used by courts in determining standing and antitrust injury).
438 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 523 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977).
439 See generally John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Brunswick at 25: Antitrust Injury
and the Evolution of Antitrust Law, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 20 (discussing the Brunswick case
and the effect that that case had on substantive antitrust law).
440 See Brunswick, 449 U.S. at 486-88.
441 NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 276 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated sub noma. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 449 U.S. 477 (1977).
442 Brunswick, 449 U.S. at 489.
443 Id at 488 (holding that it "is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award dam-
ages" measured by the "profits [plaintiffs] would have realized had competition been
reduced").
444 There are limits to this principle, which are illustrated by State Oil v. Khan. See 522
U.S. 3 (1997). Under a strictly economic interpretation, a dealer who suffers lost profits as
a result of vertical maximum price fixing does not suffer antitrust injury because the prac-
tice itself creates no inefficiency. See Page, supra note 435, at 1469-70; Blair & Lopatka,
supra note 153, at 139-46. Under such an interpretation, any expert testimony showing
that the dealer had suffered lost profits would be irrelevant. In the court of appeals deci-
sion in Khan, however, Judge Posner rejected this conclusion, reasoning that the interpre-
tation voided Albrecht's per se rule: someone must be able to suffer antitrust injury from a per
se illegal practice for the rule to have "some domain of application." Khan v. State Oil Co.,
93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). The rule
could only be based on a non-economic rationale, such as protecting trader freedom.
Even if there is no inefficiency from vertical maximum price fixing, Judge Posner wrote,
the Supreme Court "may also think that interfering with the freedom of a dealer to raise
prices may cause antitrust injury." Id, Thus, it was possible that "the injury to a dealer like
Khan from not being able to raise his price because of a restriction imposed by his supplier
is antitrust injury." Id. The expert's report was sufficiently probative to show injury in fact
under such a measure. Id. at 1366. The Supreme Court reversed, overruling Albrecht's per
se rule. Khan, 522 U.S. at 22. Thus, the antitrust injury inquiry forced the Court to con-
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the defendant's price-cutting is predatory also determine whether the
harm to its rival from the price-cutting constitutes antitrust injury.
445
In addition to the requirement of antitrust injury, the Supreme
Court has imposed antitrust standing restrictions limiting the right to
sue to the classes of actors who would be the most efficient plain-
tiffs. 446 One example of these restrictions is the rule of Illinois Brick.447
A decade earlier, the Supreme Court had already held that those who
purchase directly from antitrust offenders may sue for the entire over-
charge, even if they passed on a portion of it to others in the chain of
distribution. 448 In Illinois Brick, the Court extended the logic of that
holding by denying the right to sue for damages to indirect purchas-
ers who pay an overcharge as a result of an antitrust violation. 449 Ex-
plaining the rule, the Court emphasized the limitations of expert
testimony in resolving factual issues in complex markets. It noted the
serious problem of measuring the relevant elasticities-the percent-
age change in the quantities of the passer's product demanded and
supplied in response to a one percent change in price. In view of
the difficulties that have been encountered, even in informal adver-
sary proceedings, with the statistical techniques used to estimate
these concepts ...it is unrealistic to think that elasticity studies
introduced by expert witnesses will resolve the pass-on issue.
451
The Court observed that the "economist's hypothetical model"4 ,i of
the incidence of an overcharge among actors in a chain of distribu-
tion cannot reliably capture the real-world complexities of identifying
the degree of passing on. The "sound laws of economics" actually
"heighten[ed] the awareness of the difficulties and uncertainties in-
volved in determining how the relevant market variables would have
behaved had there been no overcharge." 452 The Illinois Brick rule
means that expert testimony concerning the overcharge to indirect
purchasers, which is routinely offered in state court indirect purchaser
front directly the economic absurdity of Albrecht, and this led directly to the demise of the
per se rule. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 439, at 23.
445 Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
where the plaintiff failed to allege pricing below the appropriate measure of cost, its "re-
duced profits attributable to defendants' decrease in prices [was] not an antitrust injun,").
446 See Page, supra note 435, at 1483-98. Antitrust standing, of course, is distinct from
standing in the constitutional sense, "which requires only injury in fact plus redressability."
U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003).
447 Il1. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
448 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 89-94 (1968).
449 I1. Brick, 431 U.S. at 744.
450 Id. at 742.
451 Id. In using this phrase, the Court echoed its observation in Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S.
at 493, that it is "difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather than an econo-
mist's hypothetical model .. .what effect a change in a company's price will have on its
total sales." Id. at 726 n.3.
452 IL Brick, 431 U.S. at 743 (citation omitted).
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class actions,45 3 is categorically inadmissible in federal court because
the Supreme Court has determined, as a matter of economic author-
ity, that it would be unduly costly or unreliable.
454
2. Proof of Damages
The antitrust injury and standing doctrines identify which mea-
sures of harm are consistent with the public goals of the antitrust laws.
The plaintiffs must then prove that the defined harm occurred-typi-
cally with an expert's model that compares the plaintiffs' actual condi-
tion, measured by the appropriate index, with their but-for
condition. 45 5 Again, economic authority controls the process; the law
of damages, much like the law of market definition, has grown to em-
body accepted economic criteria for assessing the net harm attributa-
ble to a practice. The models courts use to determine the existence of
the practice and its likely effects on competition also guide any in-
quiry into the effects of the practice on the plaintiff.456 The antitrust
injury inquiry assures that the alleged harm bears the necessary causal
link to the inefficiency associated with the practice. That causal link
forms the basis for any damage model.
Ideally, the damage model would isolate the antitrust offense as
the single causal factor accounting for the difference between its ac-
tual condition and the but-for condition.45 7 Thus, the model must
account for other major causal factors that may have affected the in-
dex during the relevant period.458 To do this, an expert typically must
453 See generally John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Con-
sumer Interest, 48 AINTITRUST BULL. 531 (2003) (summarizing the Illinois Brick rule and dis-
cussing the failure of state indirect purchaser suits to properly redress harm to consumers).
454 See Drug Mart Pharmacy Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., NO. 93-CV-5148 (ILG),
2002 WL 31528625, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 21, 2002) (excluding evidence of lost profits
damages on the ground that they were barred by Illinois Brick).
455 Blair & Page, supra note 434, 436-38 ; see 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST
LAw 390-97 (2d ed. 2000).
456 Blair & Page, supra note 434, at 438 (arguing that "the plaintiff must rely on a
theoretical model of the illegal practice" and that "[t]he model's assumptions and causal
implications will provide the basis for both the measure of damages and the projection of
the plaintiff's but-for experience").
457 See U.S. Tobacco Co. v. Conwood Co., 537 U.S. 1148 (2003) (denying certiorari);
Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, Stephen E. Fienberg, Franklin M. Fisher, Daniel I..
McFadden, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10, U.S.
Tabacco (No. 02-603) ("An appropriate economic analysis of damages would identify the
wrongful acts and devise a scientific test to measure their impact as opposed to those of
lawful competitive actions."); D.H. Kaye, Adversarial Econometrics in United States Tobacco
Co. v. Conwood Co., 43JuRIMETRicsJ. 343, 347 (2003) ("If one could quantify the effects of
all the possibly confounding variables, then one could ascertain whether there is any 'left
over' effect that should be attributed to the illegal conduct.").
458 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 786
(7th Cir. 1999) (noting that "to obtain damages the plaintiffs would have to separate the
price effects of collusion from the price effects of the defendants' lawful market power");
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224 (9th Cir. 1997)
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(1) gather the necessary data; (2) identify a benchmark, or normative,
period that was free from illegal conduct, but was otherwise compara-
ble to the damage period; and (3) project the but-for world using an
appropriate theoretical model of firm behavior 459 and appropriate sta-
tistical methods, usually multiple regression analysis. Courts should
scrutinize each of these steps to assure that the expert's model is relia-
ble and consistent with economic authority.
460
In addition, the expert first must ensure that the data used in the
model are accurate. For example, an expert attempting to show that
the defendant's actions delayed the production of the plaintiffs prod-
uct, thus reducing the plaintiffs profits, may not simply accept with-
out verification the plaintiffs projections of its likely production
volumes and sales. 461 The expert must verify the accuracy of the
data.462 Although errors in an expert's selection of a sample from a
verified data set generally "bear on the weight of the testimony, not its
admissibility," 463 in some instances, errors may reduce the weight of
(holding that the plaintiffs were required to "segregate damages attributable to lawful com-
petition from damages attributable to [defendant's] monopolizing conduct").
459 See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1055 (8th Cir.
2000), rev'k21 F. Supp. 2d 923 (W.D. Ark. 2000). The expert in Concord Boat relied on a
Cournot model of oligopoly, which predicts that in a two-firm market, equally efficient
firms producing identical products would have equal market shares. Concord Boat, 21 F.
Supp. 2d at 926. Based on this model, the expert testified that Brunswick's seventy percent
market share must be attributable to exclusionary conduct. Id. The district court accepted
the testimony because the Cournot model "is an appropriate method for predicting equi-
librium price formation in oligopolistic markets." Id. at 934. But, as Herbert Hovenkamp
has noted, the Cournot model was inapplicable to a market with differentiated products, in
which the principal rival had been forced to recall all of its engines. See Hovenkamp, supra
note 1, at 126-29; see also Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. Lightning Prot. Inst., 287 F.
Supp. 2d 1038, 1066-68 (D, Ariz. 2003) (excluding expert testimony basing damages on
Cournot duopoly model, where the expert's assumptions contradicted the Cournot
model's implications concerning the relationship of a firm's marginal cost to its market
share).
460 See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1041
(N.D. Cal. 2001) ("The Fisher model contains entirely too many assumptions and simplifi-
cations that are not supported by real-world evidence.").
461 ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 696 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (
Given Dr. Kursh's reliance on [plaintifFs] projections against the back-
ground of only generalized research into the EAS systems market .... the
court concludes that Dr. Kursh's testimony as to future lost Laserfuse prof-
its should not have been admitted at the Daubert stage of these proceedings,
nor should it have been placed before the jury at trial, even if the arithme-
tic model used accurately predicts future lost profits in the typical case.
462 Heary Bros., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1065-66 (excluding expert testimony on damages
based on the assumption that there were only two sellers of lightning protection equip-
ment before the alleged offense, where the evidence showed that there were other rivals).
463 Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
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the evidence sufficiently to warrant summary judgment.464 Courts
also scrutinize the normative period on which the expert bases the
projection of the but-for world. The normative period should be a
reasonable proxy for the market as it would have been absent the ille-
gal conduct. Selection of a period in which the plaintiffs fortunes
were unusually good is improper, because it would exaggerate the dif-
ference between the plaintiffs normal condition and its condition
during the damage period.465 Courts now require experts to conduct
standard statistical tests to reinforce the reliability of their selection of
a normative period.
466
Courts also insist that experts use appropriate statistical tech-
niques in projecting the but-for world. In some instances, this has led
to a requirement that the expert conduct a multiple regression analy-
sis, by which the expert can calculate the effect that a change in an
independent or explanatory variable has on the dependent variable,
the variable that the model seeks to "explain. '467 In antitrust actions,
464 In Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1241 (3d
Cir. 1993), plaintiff's data sample contained only one year of information concerning a
particular defendant. The court wrote:
While this data problem is not enough to exclude the price study generally,
it does serve to limit the inferences that can be drawn from it as it relates to
[the defendant]. Therefore, because this is the only evidence implicating
[the defendant], this evidence standing alone is not sufficient to defeat
summary judgment.
Id.
465 In reAluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1504 (D. Kan. 1995).
In Aluminum Phosphide, the plaintiffs' expert selected the ten-month period after the al-
leged conspiracy had ended as the normative period, ignoring data from the period before
the alleged conspiracy, when prices were higher. Id. at 1501-02. The court concluded that
the expert's "analysis is driven by a desire to enhance the measure of plaintiffs' damages,
even at the expense of well-accepted scientific principles and methodology." Id. at
1506-07.
466 Id. at 1503 (holding expert should have performed a regression analysis on pricing
patterns in the proposed normative period, using a dummy variable for the effect of the
conspiracy in order to assure that the conspiracy was not still affecting the market during
that time); see also Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035,
1040-41(8th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's exclusion of expert because expert
had not identified and examined independent variables as other economists would have
and finding that "before and after" tests are "not typically used to make statements regard-
ing causation without considering all independent variables that could affect the conclu-
sion"); Sanner v. Bd. of Trade of Chicago, No. 89 C 8467, 2001 WL 1155277, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 2001) (excluding expert testimony because expert failed to conduct tests to sub-
stantiate his opinion and failed to gather scientific evidence according to accepted meth-
ods); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1999
WL 33889, at *12 (N.D. 1ll.Jan. 19, 1999) (excluding expert for failure to conduct study of
demand elasticities), rev'd on other grounds, 186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999); Law v. NCAA, No.
94-2053-KHV, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6640, at *12-35 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 1998) (admitting
expert over challenges for failure to perform regression analysis and other standard
methodology).
467 See ABA SEcTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ISSUES 145 (William H. Page ed., 1996) [hereinafter PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES].
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the dependent variables are some critical elements of a damage
model, such as profit, sales, or price. A simple weighted average of
the critical variable during a normative period does not provide a ba-
sis for projecting what the competitive price would have been but for
the violation because it assumes that the only difference between the
normative and damage periods is the violation.468 Consequently, a re-
gression analysis is necessary to isolate the effects of other variables. 469
Of course, regression analyses themselves are subject to chal-
lenge. It is not enough that regression is a legitimate technique for
estimating damages; the expert's use of it must be reliable and consis-
tent with economic authority. 4 70 The considerations of the profession
and those of the legal system in evaluating regressions are similar, but
not necessarily identical. 471 One common ground for challenge is the
failure to include appropriate variables in the regression model.
472
This issue is as much a matter of economic authority as one of reliabil-
ity. Independent variables must have a theoretical influence on the
dependent variable,4 73 and the relevant theoretical models of chal-
lenged practices are inevitably elements of economic authority.474
Cost theoretically affects price, so if price is the dependent variable,
cost must normally be included as an independent variable. Failure to
include an important independent variable may lead to biased re-
468 Id. at 149.
469 Aluminum Phosphide, 893 F. Supp. at 1503-04.
470 See Kaye, supra note 457, at 346 (noting that to say a study employed regression
analysis "is a bit like saying that it used arithmetic or algebra").
471 See Posner, supra note 6, at 94-95 (arguing that courts should not necessarily adopt
statisticians' standards of statistical significance).
472 See Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 794 (6th Cir. 2002). For criti-
cism of Conwoods analysis of regressions, see Kaye, supra note 457, at 350 and D.H. Kaye,
The Dynamics ofDaubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical and Econometric Studies,
87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1988-2010 (2001) (discussing the expert testimony in Conwood). For
other cases on the issue, see Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1056-58
(8th Cir. 2000); BlomkestFertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1038 (8th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000); Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n,
178 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (8th Cir. 1999); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp.
2d 1348, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2000); In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust Litig,, No. 95-2104, 1998 WL
1031507, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998); Law v. NCAA, No. 94-2053-KHV, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6640, at *26 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 1998); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F.
Supp. 1497, 1504 (D. Kan. 1995).
473 Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFC EVIDENCE 181 (2d ed. 2000); PROVINc. ANTITRUST DAMAGES, supra note 467, at
146; see aLso Kaye, supra note 457, at 347 ("Deciding which variables might affect sales and
how they could be related requires substantive economic theory.").
474 See Kevin A. Kordana & Terrance O'Reilly, Daubert and Liligation-Driven
Econometrics, 87 VA L. REV. 2019, 2022 (2001) (suggesting that it may be "unnecessary to
worry about finding the right statistical technique to test [the Conwood expert's] theory,




suits4 7 5 or reduce the explanatory power of the model. 4 76 Similarly,
including too many independent variables may lead to spurious re-
suits. 4 77 Adding variables that are correlated with each other can di-
minish the effect of individual variables.
478
Challenges on these grounds have had mixed results, 479 however,
in part because of the Supreme Court's decision in Bazemore v. Fri-
day,480 which predates Daubert. In Bazemore, the lower courts in an em-
ployment discrimination case had excluded a regression analysis on
the ground that it failed to include "'all measurable variables thought
to have an effect on salary level.'"481 The Supreme Court reversed,
stating:
While the omission of variables from a regression analysis may
render the analysis less probative than it otherwise might be, it can
hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis which
accounts for the major factors must be considered unacceptable as
475 PROVINC. ANTITRUST DAMAGES, supra note 467, at 162-63; Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1072 (1985); Daniel L. Rubinfeld &
Peter 0. Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1983, at 69, 90.
476 See Rubinfeld & Steiner, supra note 475, at 90-91. The R2 figure provides a mea-
surement of the explanatory power of the model. If important variables are omitted, their
effect falls into the error term, and the R2 is lower. Rubinfeld, supra note 473, at 215.
477 Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 702,
715 (1980).
478 See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 660 (7th Cir.
2002) (discussing the problem of multicollinearity).
479 See Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 793 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding
that expert ruled out other factors); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d
1039, 1047, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Cournot model using only market
share as variable failed to account for other events in the market affecting price and should
have been excluded); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1038
(8th Cir. 2000) (finding expert's econometric model unreliable-although not striking it
under Daubert-for failure to consider events that would have increased prices absent a
conspiracy); Callahan v. A.E.V., Inc., 182 F.3d 237, 254-60 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding expert's
"but for" model sufficient to create factual question despite alleged failure to consider
other variables); Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035,
1040-41 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding expert's "before and after" model was unreliable because
it failed to take into account other independent variables); Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc.,
156 F.3d 452, 483-87 (3d Cir. 1998) (same); In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust Litig., No. 95-
2104, 1998 ANL 1031507, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998) (observing that defendants cannot
simply point to excluded variables but must support contention that the variables should
have been included); Law v. NCAA, No. 94-2053-KHV, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6640, at *
13-16 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 1998) (refusing to exclude, on a motion in limine, statistical esti-
mates of the amount of damages from an NCAA salary cap); In re Aluminum Phosphide
Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1503-05 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding expert's "before and
after" model unreliable for failure to account for several factors); Colorado v. Goodell
Bros., Civ. A. No. 84-A-803, 1987 WL 6771, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 1987) (concluding that
expert's failure to take into account an engineer's estimate of construction project cost
indicated that expert's method was unreliable).
480 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
481 Id. at 399-400 (quoting Court of Appeals).
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evidence of discrimination. Normally the failure to include variables
will affect the analysis' probativeness, not its admissibility.
48 2
Although this language suggests that failure to include all relevant
variables affects only the weight to be accorded a regression analy-
sis, 48 3- the Court did note that " [t] here may, of course, be some regres-
sions so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant.
'48 4
In some instances, the relative lenience of Bazemore has led to a
kind of burden shifting. Some courts have required a party to support
with evidence any contention that the omission of particular variables
renders a regression unreliable, 4 5 and the party offering the regres-
sion may then be required to rebut.4 6 One basis for evaluation is a
high R 2 figure for the regression. This may suggest that the indepen-
dent variables in the model are good at accounting for the factors
affecting the dependent variable and that the addition of more inde-
pendent variables would not significantly alter the model's predictive
power.
48 7
The Polypropylene Carpet litigation illustrates the complexities con-
fronting courts in analyzing experts' use of regression in antitrust
cases. 48 8 The plaintiffs' damages expert used a multiple regression
482 Id. at 400 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Conwood, 290
F.3d at 794 (relying on Bazemore to uphold regression evidence).
483 See, e.g., Sanner v. Bd. of Trade of Chicago, No. 89 C 8467, 2001 WL 1155277, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2001) (holding that objection to "power" of model is better left forjury
to decide); Law v. NCAA, No. 94-2053-KHV, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6640, at *29 (D. Kan.
Apr. 23, 1998) (holding that expert's treatment of "other factors" had a logical basis and
"any weakness in the underpinnings of his analysis go to the weight and not the admissibil-
ity of his testimony").
484 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400 n.10; see also Kaye, supra note 457, at 347 ("Daubert re-
quires the expert to take reasonable steps to eliminate [confounding unmeasured vari-
ables] and thus confine the estimated damages to the result of the allegedly illegal
conduct.").
485 See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1365 (N.D.
Ga. 2000) (observing that "defendants do not offer a statistical analysis of demand and
price of polypropylene carpet to explain why exclusion of a variable for demand establishes
the unreliability of [the expert's] model"); In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust Litig., No. 95-2104,
1998 WAL 1031507, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998) ("[A] party cannot successfully challenge
the admissibility of a regression analysis by simply pointing to a laundry list of possible
independent variables that were not included in the study."); In re Domestic Air Transp.
Antitrust Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677, 690 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (class certification stage) (holding
that "it is incumbent upon defendants to substantiate" challenges to statistical models).
486 See Polyproylene Carpet, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1366 (accepting expert's justification for
omitting a demand variable because of lack of data and risk of extrapolation error); Law v.
NCAA, No. 94-2053-KHV, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6640, at *29 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 1998) (find-
ing that expert's treatment of "other factors" had a logical basis and "any weakness in the
underpinnings of his analysis go to the weight and not the admissibility of his testimony").
487 See In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., No. 1075, 2000 WrL 863456, at *3 n.1
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2000) (noting that the expert's model had an R' between eighty-six and
ninety-six percent and, thus, including a variable for demand would not have increased the
model's predictive power).
488 Polypropylene Carpet, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
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analysis to estimate what the prices would have been during the dam-
age period but for the alleged conspiracy48 9 by using manufacturing
style, selling style, shipping point, and order quantity as the indepen-
dent variables. 490 The expert did not use total manufacturing cost as
an independent variable,491 instead using the ratio of the price of car-
pet to fiber costs as the dependent variable. 49 2 Defendants challenged
the expert's treatment of the cost variable 493 and asserted that his fail-
ure to consider variables for demand, changes in income, interest
rates, business cycle characteristics, capacity utilization, the entry of
competition, and growing buying power rendered the expert's model
unreliable.
494
The plaintiffs expert explained the decision not to use manufac-
turing cost as a variable by arguing that sufficient data to estimate
properly the effect cost had on price in the benchmark period were
unavailable; 495 that differences in the measures of fiber costs between
the benchmark and conspiracy period may cause extrapolation er-
ror 496 from the use of an unrepresentative sample;497 and that the
price of carpet might affect cost, thus raising problems of endogeneity
or simultaneity. 498 The defendants did not challenge the expert's ex-
trapolation error and endogeneity concerns, but argued instead that
there were sufficient data to measure the coefficient of cost to
price.49 9 The defendants observed that the expert had run a Chow
test 50 0 to determine if the coefficients of the independent variables
remained constant in the benchmark and damage periods.50 1 The
court, however, concluded that the sufficiency of the data in perform-
ing a Chow test did not mean that the data were sufficient to estimate
489 Id. at 1359.
490 Id. at 1360.
491 Id.
492 Id.
493 Id. at 1360-63.
494 Id. at 1364-66.
495 Id. at 1361.
496 Id.
497 The court provided the somewhat less useful example of "a model that attempts to
predict the growth rate in the height of a seventy-year old person by looking at data from
when the person was thirteen years old." Id. at 1361 n.10.
498 Id. at 1361. Simultaneity occurs when the dependent and independent variables
affect each other. See Rubinfeld, supra note 473, at 195 n.44. If simultaneity exists, then
spurious correlation may result. Id. at 195. Rubinfeld warns that simultaneity may result in
price-fixing cases because if price-fixing occurred, the defendant may have affected the
values of the independent variables and biased the results. Id. at 195 n.45.
499 Polypropylene Carpet, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
500 The Chow test is a "test of the equality of two independent sets of regression coeffi-
cients under the assumption of normally distributed errors." B.S. EVERrr, THE CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 61 (2002).
501 Polypropylene Carpet, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
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EVALUATING THE PRIMACY OF ECONOMIC AUTHORIY
OVER EXPERTISE
So far this Article has argued that economic authority, which ap-
pellate courts-especially the Supreme Court-adopt from the legal
and economic literature, dictates the role of expert testimony in anti-
trust cases. This Part considers the possible justifications for such an
arrangement and how the legitimacy of this process might be rein-
forced. First, it examines the institutional characteristics of the two
mechanisms for gathering economic knowledge. Although both have
shortcomings, the informal process of economic authority has decisive
advantages within the antitrust system. Nevertheless, it is subject to
abuses that appellate courts should acknowledge and address. Sec-
ond, as an illustration, this Part examines the proper treatment of
post-Chicago economics. Even though some have argued that post-
Chicago methodologies, when used by experts, fail Daubert's criteria
for admissibility,5 4 this Article argues that such a categorical ap-
proach is inappropriate. Instead, the confrontation between Chicago
School and post-Chicago School economics should occur at both the
level of economic authority and the level of expert testimony, using
criteria appropriate to each.
A. Comparing Institutional Characteristics
As we have seen, economic authority can render expert testimony
irrelevant or unreliable. Even if expert testimony clears these obsta-
cles to admission, courts may still dismiss the testimony as insufficient
to create ajury issue. Is such an arrangement defensible? One might
argue that it conflicts with Daubert's admonition that courts should
avoid taking on the role of super-experts and instead limit themselves
to a neutral gatekeeping function that preserves the fact-finding role
502 Id.
503 Defendants also argued that the expert's failure to include an independent varia-
ble for demand in his model rendered the model unreliable by failing to account for the
effects of changes in the popularity of carpet and substitute products. Id. at 1364-65. The
expert again cited a lack of data and the risk of extrapolation error as justifications for his
choice, and added that when he had tested the relationship between price and the availa-
ble measures of demand he had found that the results were contrary to the basic economic
theory that increases in demand result in increases in price. Id. at 1365. The court ac-
cepted the expert's justifications, noting that excluding the demand variable was actually
beneficial to defendants since the available data suggested that demand was increasing. Id.
504 See Coate & Fischer, supra note 411; Bruce H. Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust:
A Post-Mortem, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 411, 413 n.18 (1997).
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of the jury.50 5 All would concede that economics is necessary for anti-
trust decisionmaking. At first glance, though, it may not be obvious
that the economics appellate courts learn by examining the merits of
competing economic ideas should take precedence over expert testi-
mony in the particular case. If courts' only concern is how to gain the
economic knowledge necessary to decide a particular case, a presenta-
tion of the competing views of retained experts to the trier of fact
might seem preferable.
This approach has some superficial appeal. Expert testimony oc-
curs in a structured pretrial and trial process that assures that the cre-
dentials, sources, data, and reasoning of the opposing experts are laid
bare for comparison. Ajury endorses one expert's opinion only after
a full opportunity for argument and rebuttal on both sides. In con-
trast, appellate courts absorb economic teaching and adopt economic
authority by reading the briefs of the parties and amici curiae and by
conducting an ad hoc, non-adversarial search of the legal and eco-
nomic literature. These latter techniques are clear and flexible, 50 6 but
they also ignore Daubert's list of criteria for the reliability of expert
testimony. Nevertheless, the priority of economic authority is a neces-
sary product of the institutional characteristics of the antitrust pro-
cess. First, and most obviously, antitrust must be a body of law that
integrates economics into its rules over time so that the rules can pro-
vide an efficient system of incentives for businesses. Unlike areas of
law that look to expertise to resolve occasional issues of fact, antitrust
must incorporate economics into every substantive and evidentiary
rule and standard, while remaining open to incremental change. A
series of choices made by various juries between competing experts is
unlikely to create a coherent system of law, embodying both economic
and institutional considerations, to guide business conduct and future
cases.
Although no formal rules traditionally constrain the judicial no-
tice of legislative, as opposed to adjudicative, facts, 50 7 courts do not
have unbounded discretion. The legitimacy of the process of adopt-
505 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ("Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contradictory evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.").
506 See Monohan & Walker, supra note 5, at 499-500.
507 Kenneth Culp Davis argued:
IJ] udge-made law would stop growing ifjudges, in thinking about questions
of law and policy, were forbidden to take into account the facts they believe,
as distinguished from facts which are "clearly... within the domain of the
indisputable." Facts most needed in thinking about difficult problems of
law and policy have a way of being outside the domain of the clearly
indisputable.
Kenneth Culp Davis, A System ofludicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPEC-
TIVES OF LAW 82 (1964).
2005]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ing of social science research rests on the same basis as any common
law process: courts must draw upon the record and external sources of
knowledge while deciding cases according to law, and they must artic-
ulate the reasons for their decisions. In enacting the antitrust laws,
Congress fully anticipated that courts would give meaning to the gen-
eral language of the antitrust laws using this common law process. 8
The selection of theories in formulating rules to govern practices
at the most general level is part and parcel of the process of legal
change, which always requires courts to generalize about economic
behavior. Whatever method by which courts adopt theories-be it
from an independent review of the literature, from briefs, or from
expert testimony-their choice is subject to evaluation on the same
grounds as their adoption of available precedent. In each case, the
criteria include applicability, plausibility, and generality of accept-
ance. Such an approach acknowledges not only objective factors, like
coherence, but also subjective factors like ideology, because some pro-
positions of economic theory are more likely to gain wide acceptance
in favorable ideological climates. This dependence on social visions is
unavoidable because antitrust embodies a compromise between com-
peting conceptions of the proper roles of the state and the market.
The courts' receptivity to theories necessary to the resolution of anti-
trust issues has predictably followed the fortunes of the competing
ideologies in the larger culture.
Though appellate adoption of economic authority is necessary
and legitimate, it does involve risks of abuse by courts and litigants.
To curb any potential for abuse, courts should take steps to help en-
sure the legitimacy of their decisions. First, the reliance on economic
authority should be as transparent as possible. Where a court has sur-
veyed the literature in a contentious area, it should acknowledge the
controversy and justify its reliance on one viewpoint. 50 9 Where a court
formulates a rule or standard, it should identify not only the eco-
nomic theory on which it relies, but also the institutional considera-
tions that affect its decision. The Supreme Court has recognized "the
necessity, particularly great in the quasi-common-law realm of anti-
trust, that courts explain the logic of their conclusions" in order to
allow scholarly criticism. 51 0 This observation has particular force be-
508 See Page, supra note 9, at 1302-03. See generally Andrew N. Kleit, Common Law, Stat-
ute Law, and the Theory of Legislative Choice: An Inquiy Into the Goal of the Sherman Act, 31
ECON. INQUIRY 647 (1993) (arguing that the Sherman Act and the common law have simi-
lar goals of maximizing efficiency).
509 Herbert Hovenkamp has argued that, until the ascendancy of the Chicago School,
courts routinely relied on economics, but without citing authority. See Hovenkamp, Reckon-
ing, supra note 8, at 2-3.
510 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (citing PHILIP AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 1500, at 364 (1986)).
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cause Congress has so rarely interfered with the "quasi-common-law"
evolution of the field.51 1 Second, courts should be alert to the strate-
gic use of scholarship to influence the creation of economic authority.
Both government and private litigants may produce scholarly litera-
ture in briefs in order to reinforce the positions they wish to take.
5 12
Although funded scholarship may be of high quality, courts should be
conscious of its partisan origins and view it with some degree of skepti-
cism, just as they take note of hired-gun expert testimony.
The most conclusive uses of theory-rules of per se legality or
illegality-require the most justification. For example, courts have
not used Chicago School models systematically to replace rules of per
se illegality with explicit rules of per se legality. Instead, they have
acknowledged the contingency of theory by using the models to limit
the application of rules by imposing substantive and remedial precon-
ditions. This method is consistent with congressional intent that the
Sherman Act be "experimental,' '5 1 3 with the testing to occur in litiga-
tion. The Supreme Court has often claimed that judicial experience
in evaluating a practice allows a surer basis for the formulation of
rules to govern it.514 Similarly, it has been suggested that experience
511 One federal appellate judge, although recognizing that the Chicago School's "eco-
nomic assumptions are being integrated throughout the courts," has expressed the view
that "rather than abdicating the decision of what the antitrust goals should be, Con-
gress . . . should determine the goals of the antitrust laws and set forth the rules and
standards by which the goals shall be obtained." Carol Los Mansmann, Impact of GTE Sylva-
nia on Third Circuit Jurisprudence, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 92 (1991). Congress, however, has
shown no inclination to do so.
512 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Crab-
bing Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 1129, 1147-48 (2001)
(summarizing and criticizing studies Exxon funded to support its legal opposition to puni-
tive damage awards in the litigation growing out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill); Richard
Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for
Change, 48 DEPAui L. REv. 867 (1999) (discussing an Exxon-funded article by W. Kip Vis-
cusi and Reid Hastie on jury bias); Richard Lippitt, Note, Intellectual Honesty, Industry and
Interest Sponsored Professorial Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money, or Is
the Money Earning the Viewpoint, 47 WAYNE L. REv. 1075 (2001) (proposing greater disclo-
sure for funded research); see also United States v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 668-70
(1974) (arguing that Exxon-funded studies of punitive damages are legitimate, but should
be scrutinized). In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974), the
court rejected as without evidentiary support the government's theory that bank mergers
would reduce competition by creating a statewide linkage of oligopolies. Id. at 622. The
theory rested primarily on an article written by an economist associated with the Antitrust
Division. Id.
513 WILLIAM LETWIN, LLW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN AN-TITRUST ACT 95 (1965).
514 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1984)
("[Jludicial inexperience with a particular arrangement counsels against extending the
reach of per se rules."); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)
(suggesting that per se illegality is appropriate " [ o]nce experience with a particular kind of
restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn
it"); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (refusing to hold vertical
territorial restraints per se illegal because of a dearth of experience). Of course, the Court
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under a rule-and scholarly criticism of it-can expose the rule's
flaws. 515 Exacting studies of the records of antitrust cases have been
crucial to the development of the law.516 As receptive as they have
been to Chicago models, members of the modern Court have been
influenced also by the Legal Process school of jurisprudence, which
emphasizes the role of institutional competence, and the "allocation
of institutional responsibilities."5 t 7 Just as courts may be receptive to
the viewpoint that markets have important advantages over courts in
eroding monopolistic practices, they also recognize the institutional
demands of precedent and the fact-finding process.
The preference for experimentation and the assumption that an-
titrust knowledge can grow in the process has guided courts' use of
economic authority to both enhance and confine expert testimony.
Where economic authority is most robust, it can foreclose factual in-
quiries and identify the preconditions for anticompetitive effects.
Thus, economic authority can be used to formulate subsidiary rules
that focus factual inquiry on indicia that the practice is efficient or
inefficient. It may also be used to limit "the permissible inferences"
5 18
a jury may make from evidence of parallel conduct, or to increase the
burden on a party seeking to establish an anticompetitive effect from
did not always follow this approach-as Schwinn illustrates. See United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (establishing a per se rule against vertical, non-price
restraints).
515 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 13-19 (1997) (reviewing decisions and
scholarly criticisms that undermined the per se illegality of vertical maximum price fixing);
see also Easterbrook, Information and Antitrust, supra note 138, at 16-17 (arguing that subse-
quent economic study of an antitrust case provides greater understanding of a practice);
Lopatka & Page, supra note 439, at 20 (describing the role of the antitrust injury doctrine
in focusing judicial attention on the inefficiencies of substantive rules).
516 Perhaps the most influential study is John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1958). Other such studies are F. Jay Cum-
mings & Wayne E. Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 329 (1979); Kenneth
G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, Utah Pie and the Consequences of Robinson Patman, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 427 (1978); Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by "Raising Rivals's
Costs"- The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1996); John E. Lopatka & Paul E. Godek,
Another Look at Alcoa: Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the View, 35 J.L. & EcoN. 311
(1992); Scott E. Masten & Edward Snyder, United States versus United Shoe Machinery
Corporation: On the Merits, 36J.L. & ECON. 33 (1993); John L. Peterman, The Brown Shoe
Case, 18 J.L. & ECON. 81 (1975); John L. Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22J.L. &
EcoN. 351 (1979); David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure
of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly., 33J.L. & EcON. 419, 437 (1990).
517 See Howard Latin, Legal and Economic Considerations in the Decisions ofJudge Breyer, 50
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 59-61 (1987). See generally ALBERT M. SACKS, JR. & HENRY M.
HART, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BAsic PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 4
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958) (arguing
that "every modern society differentiates among social questions, accepting one mode of
decision for one kind and other modes for others").
518 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986) ("[Alntitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evi-
dence in a § 1 case.").
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alleged predatory pricing. This approach acknowledges the role of
the jury in resolving the empirical issues, and thus defines the domain
for expert testimony. It also recognizes the role of these institutional
actors in the process of accumulation of knowledge. Expert testimony
is an essential but volatile ingredient in this process. Deference to
experts without a proper policy framework would be a prescription for
uncertainty. Properly confined, however, expert testimony can be
central to the development of the law. As the courts' confidence in
the economics profession's ability to resolve difficult factual issues
grows, courts will be more likely to design legal tests dependent on
economic evidence submitted in trial courts by expert witnesses.
B. Implications for the Confrontation Between Chicago and
Post-Chicago Economics
This Article has used the example of the Supreme Court's adop-
tion and use of Chicago School models to illustrate the role of eco-
nomic authority in shaping antitrust analysis, particularly in
expanding and refocusing the role of expert testimony. In each doc-
trinal context, the Court has crafted legal categories that foreclose
certain economic inquiries and require others. Through restrictions
on expert testimony, the Court thus gives economic content to rules
ex ante, while preserving a domain for acquiring economic content ex
post. In essence, where the theory is insufficiently determinate to jus-
tify a per se rule, the Court frames rules in such a way that subsequent
cases provide the most reliable possible tests of the practice's competi-
tive effects.
One continuing dimension of this process in recent years has
been the role of Post-Chicago Economics (PCE). Some have argued
that PCE is unsuited to the formulation of legal rules5 19 or that it fails
Daubert's standards of reliability. Our account suggests that the con-
frontation between the Chicago and post-Chicago schools cannot be
resolved so categorically. Judicial choice of theory depends upon the
relationship of the theory to a range of institutional factors. Just as
there was no ratchet in antitrust law to prevent contraction of liability
in response to Chicago analyses, 52°1 there is none to prevent expansion
of liability in response to post-Chicago analyses.
Nevertheless, the characteristics of PCE influence its suitability as
economic authority or as expert testimony. Much of PCE is based on
519 See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Do Easy Cases Make Bad Law? Antitrust Innovations or
Missed Opportunities in United States v. Microsoft, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1042 (2001);
Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. EcoN. 113
(1989).




game theoretic mathematical modeling of strategies firms might
adopt to maximize their profits, taking into account the strategies of
other players.521 Given only a limited set of facts, this sort of model is
likely to have multiple equilibria, or outcomes. While one of these
outcomes may be anticompetitive, neither the model itself nor empiri-
cal testing can show its likelihood. If, on the other hand, the model
incorporates more assumptions to make it more determinate, it be-
comes difficult to apply in litigation.
Because of these characteristics, critics have challenged game the-
ory's usefulness to antitrust. Franklin Fisher argues, for example, that
game theory offered too few determinate, robust predictions to form
the basis for policy.522 Bruce Kobayashi, writing before Joiner and
Kumho Tire, argued that game theoretic models of industrial organiza-
tion should be excluded under the reliability prong of Daubert.
52 '3
Specifically, he focused on the language in Daubert that, to be reliable,
scientific testimony "must be derived by the scientific method."52 4 Be-
cause these almost purely theoretical economic models "have not
been empirically verified in a meaningful sense,"52 5 and because con-
clusions drawn from them "tend to be very sensitive to the way
problems are defined and the assumptions that follow," 52 6 testimony
based on them is not "arrived at through the scientific method."
527
Malcolm Coate and Jeffrey Fischer argue that PCE testimony should
be excluded for failure to satisfy the helpfulness prong of Daubert.
528
Their central argument is that, at best, PCE models demonstrate only
what could happen, and an expert who cannot testify as to what did
happen or even what probably happened does not assist the trier of fact
in the dispute resolution process.
5 29
These critiques, while telling, do not foreclose the use of PCE in
antitrust. True, PCE models cannot support new rules of per se ille-
521 As two authors explain, the PCE school of thought "generally focuses on the strate-
gic behavior of firms. Instead of focusing on the basic competitive interactions of the
market, these models show how firms can enhance or protect their market power by incor-
porating specific strategies-and the reactions of their rivals-into a complex equilibrium
analysis." Coate & Fischer, supra note 411, at 812.
522 Fisher, supra note 519, at 117-23 (distinguishing generalizing and exemplifying
theories); see also Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law And Policy: A Decision-
Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 497 (2001) ("The post-Chicago models indicate
that tying can be anticompetitive, not that it must be anticompetitive or that it is likely to
be anticompetitive.").
523 See Kobayashi, supra note 504, at 412, 413 n.18.
524 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); see Kobayashi,
supra note 504, at 413 n.18.
525 Kobayshi, supra note 504, at 412.
526 Id.
527 Id. at 413 n.18.




gality, because they do not identify a limited set of observable facts
that predictably imply anticompetitive harm.530 PCE models may,
however, suggest avenues for empirical identification of anticompeti-
tive effects in circumstances that established antitrust law might miss.
One success in this regard has been the proof of unilateral anticompe-
titive effects in merger cases using sophisticated econometric meth-
ods. 531 Unilateral effects analysis goes beyond traditional conceptions
of market definition and market power. Nevertheless, it rests on
sound theoretical and empirical grounds and is viewed by some as a
more secure basis for predicting the competitive effects of a merger
than conventional coordinated effects analysis alone.
532
PCE models may also be used to challenge rules of per se legality,
as they were in Kodak to defeat the proposed rule that firms lacking
market power in an equipment market can never exercise market
power in aftermarkets for parts and service. 533 Post-Chicago scholar-
ship has also challenged the established rule that above-cost prices are
never predatory53 4 and the Chicago argument that tying arrange-
ments can never be anticompetitive. 53 5 To be sure, these examples
suggest the challenge facing those who propose the adoption of PCE
as economic authority: the Kodak experiment has failed, and PCE
challenges have had little effect on predatory pricing and tying doc-
trine thus far, evidently because of problems in estimating the costs of
false positives. 53 6  Nevertheless, these difficulties may be
surmountable.
More importantly, the inconclusiveness and intractability that
make PCE difficult to use in the formulation of rules do not pose as
substantial an obstacle to its use in expert testimony. PCE does not
categorically fail the reliability inquiry. Certainly, where PCE relies on
sophisticated statistical methods, it will be admissible under accepted
530 See Hylton & Salinger, supra note 522, at 513 (concluding that "each of the four
tied-market conditions ... emphasized by the post-Chicago literature-entry barriers, com-
plementary goods, network effects, and technologically advancing markets-would be in-
sufficient to justify a per se prohibition even if coupled with the existing requirements for
the per se rule").
531 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1082-83 (D.D.C. 1997).
532 See POSNER, supra note 55, at 157-58 (arguing that "[e]conomic analysis of mergers
[came] of age" in the FTC's use of statistical methods in Staples); -lovenkamp, Reckoning,
supra note 8, at 19-21.
533 See supra notes 301-23 (discussing the Kodak case).
534 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
535 See generally Hylton & Salinger, supra note 522 (summarizing the post-Chicago
challenges)-
536 Id. at 526 (noting that for the courts to incorporate post-Chicago insights into legal
rules "the courts need to make a judgment about the relative frequencies of harmful tying
under a lax legal standard on the one hand and the beneficial tying that will not occur
under a stricter standard," all while recognizing "that tying is so pervasive even in competi-




standards of reliability. In Kumho Tire, the Court extended the Daubert
inquiry to testimony based on "technical" and "other specialized"
knowledge, explaining that the purpose of the inquiry "is to make
sure that an expert ... employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field."537 Without question, reliance on game theoretic mod-
els is common in the economics profession, and an expert who bases
his testimony on such models is employing the same level of rigor that
characterizes the professional study of economics.
5 3 8
As this Article has shown, the relevance, helpfulness, and suffi-
ciency of economic testimony depend upon the substantive law and its
attendant economic authority. When PCE testimony conflicts with a
rule adopted by the Court through economic authority, it is irrelevant
and therefore unhelpful. For some offenses, however, evidence that
an anticompetitive outcome could have occurred satisfies the tradi-
tional test of relevance by making "the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."599 For example,
game theory may help a court understand pricing strategies in a pred-
atory pricing case. 54 And game theoretic demonstration that certain
types of facilitating practices might make price coordination more
likely is relevant in a price-fixing case.5 4' Conversely, in one striking
instance, expert testimony based on game theory showed that a pat-
tern of bidding might not have been collusive by revealing that a key
competitor had an independent justification for its actions.
542
Thus, testimony based on PCE is not categorically inadmissible or
insufficient. Instead, it should be measured against the requirements
of economic authority to determine its relevance and against the re-
quirements of Rule 403 to determine if its "probative value is substan-
5-7 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
538 See Coate & Fischer, supra note 411, at 824 n.l0 ("While Kobayashi's scientific
concerns are certainly reasonable, the Supreme Court's algorithm for evaluating scientific
testimony bay allow a court to admit PCE models as science."); id. at 827 ("While the PCE
theorists certainly have problems with scientific verification of their theories, the Daubert
standard itself is probably flexible enough to accept the characterization of the model as
science.").
539 FED. R. Evm. 401.
540 See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001) (observing
that evidence showed that airlines used game theory in formulating entry strategies), affd,
335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
541 See Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1009-11 (6th Cir. 1999)
(holding that an expert's "deposition and report establish a genuine issue of material fact
whether unilateral imposition of adverse splits would have been economically rational for
the defendants").
542 See FTC v. Abbott Labs., 853 F. Supp. 526, 534-35 (D.D.C. 1994) (crediting testi-
mony based on game theory that "it was in Abbott's unilateral and independent self inter-
est to submit the 'no bid' for the sole source on the second round" of a government bid
letting for purchase of infant formula).
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tially outweighed by the danger of ... confusion. '" 543 If admissible, it
can be tested by "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of con-
trary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof.
' 544 Fi-
nally, a court could ultimately conclude that PCE testimony fails to
create a jury issue.
545
CONCLUSION
In interpreting and applying the antitrust laws, courts pragmati-
cally gather economic knowledge that functions as authority in the
formulation and application of antitrust rules. Their criteria for adop-
tion include both those used by economists and those recognizing the
institutional characteristics of the legal system. Thus, whether courts
adopt an economic idea and in what legal context they employ that
idea hinge in part on the courts' sense of juries' fact-finding capabili-
ties. Economic expert testimony is a critical element in this analysis.
Though courts can rely on economic authority to adopt per se rules
foreclosing most significant factual issues, the availability of economic
expertise allows courts to frame rules that allow the ex post acquisition
of the information necessary to identify competitive effects. At the
same time, however, relying on ex post expertise carries the danger of
significant direct and indirect costs. Consequently, courts have
shaped antitrust rules to raise factual issues they believe expert testi-
mony can help resolve, but have maintained control over the specifics
of expert testimony offered on the issues. Although these controls
come under several headings-relevance, sufficiency, or reliability-
they ultimately depend on economic authority.
543 FED. R. EVID. 403.
544 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
545 See id.
20051
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